A global CGE model at the NUTS 1 level for trade policy evaluation by Standardi Gabriele
University of Verona 
 
Doctorate in Economics and Finance 
XXI Cycle 
 
A GLOBAL CGE MODEL AT THE NUTS 1 
LEVEL FOR TRADE POLICY 
EVALUATION 
 
Ph.D. Candidate: Gabriele Standardi 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Federico Perali 
 
 
2010 March 
 
  
 
                                                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                   To my family 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Federico Perali, director of 
my thesis, for sharing his scientific expertise while guiding me with his 
invaluable help and suggestions.   
A heartfelt thanks to my friends at CEPII, particularly Riccardo Magnani, 
whose collaboration was essential for bringing this work to completion.   
Special thanks to Prof. Pieroni for his constant availability and the many 
kindnesses shown.   
Last but not least, I want to thank my father, Alvaro,  my mother, Idola and my 
sisters, Barbara and Elisabetta for their loving support and presence throughout 
these years of academic study and personal growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
Index 
 
Introduction .......................................................................................................    11 
 
Chapter 1 
Global CGE trade models 
1.1  Relevant theoretical assumptions...............................................................    17 
            1.1.1 Geographical product differentiation: the Armington hypothesis ....    17 
            1.1.2 Horizontal product differentiation.....................................................    19 
            1.1.3 From a static to dynamic model ........................................................    21 
            1.1.4 Firm heterogeneity: the Melitz model...............................................    23 
1.2  Sensitivity of the simulation results to key hypotheses .............................    26 
            1.2.1 Armington elasticity..........................................................................    26 
            1.2.2 Firm conduct .....................................................................................    28 
            1.2.3 Labour market ...................................................................................    29 
1.3  Main global CGE models for trade policy evaluation ..............................    30 
            1.3.1 The GTAP model .............................................................................    31 
            1.3.2 The MEGABARE model ..................................................................    32 
            1.3.3 The MIRAGE model.........................................................................    34 
1.4  Global CGE trade models at the sub-national level ...................................    37 
            1.4.1 The CAPRI-GTAP model .................................................................    37 
            1.4.2 The MONASH-MRF model .............................................................    39 
            1.4.3 The MIRAGE-DREAM model .........................................................    41 
 
Chapter 2  
A global CGE trade model at the NUTS 1 level with perfect competition 
2.1  Introduction ................................................................................................    45 
2.2  Database .....................................................................................................    47 
2.3  Sectoral and geographical aggregations.....................................................    50 
2.4  The theoretical structure of the model .......................................................    52 
            2.4.1 Demand ............................................................................................    52 
 8 
            2.4.2 Supply ...............................................................................................    54 
            2.4.3 Factor markets ..................................................................................    57 
            2.4.4 Macroeconomic closure ....................................................................    57 
2.5  Calibration..................................................................................................    58 
2.6  Trade policy simulation..............................................................................    61 
2.7  Simulation results.......................................................................................    66 
            2.7.1 Production reallocation across sectors in the NUTS 1 regions 
                     after a world trade liberalization in the agricultural sector ...............    66 
            2.7.2 Sensitivity analysis on  production reallocation with  
                     the introduction of unskilled/skilled labour mobility........................    74 
            2.7.3 Further interesting results..................................................................    80 
2.8  Interpretation of the results ........................................................................    91 
 
Chapter 3 
A global CGE trade model at the NUTS 1 level with imperfect competition 
3.1  Introduction ................................................................................................  105 
3.2  The theoretical structure of the model .......................................................  107 
            3.2.1 Demand ............................................................................................  107 
            3.2.2 Supply ...............................................................................................  112 
            3.2.3 Factor markets ..................................................................................  113 
            3.2.4 Macroeconomic closure ....................................................................  114 
3.3  Calibration..................................................................................................  114 
3.4  Simulation results.......................................................................................  117 
            3.4.1 Production reallocation across sectors in the NUTS 1 regions   
                     after a world trade liberalization in the agricultural sector ...............  117 
            3.4.2 Sensitivity analysis on  production reallocation with    
                     the introduction of unskilled/skilled labour mobility........................  125 
            3.4.3 Further interesting results..................................................................  132 
3.5  Interpretation of the results ........................................................................  144 
 
 
 9 
Conclusions............................................................................................................  153 
 
Appendix 1: notation .............................................................................................  157 
Appendix 2: list of variables..................................................................................  157 
Appendix 3: list of parameters...............................................................................  159 
Appendix 4: list of equations.................................................................................  161 
 
Bibliography ..........................................................................................................  169 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
Introduction 
 
In recent years the development of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has 
generated  a great demand for estimates of potential consequences of trade policy. 
The Uruguay round and Doha round negotiations are typical examples. The policy 
maker could be interested in having information about the effects of trade 
liberalization on income, production and other relevant macroeconomic variables. It 
could also be useful for her/him to know the distribution of these effects across 
families, countries or sectors to evaluate who are the winners and who are the losers. 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are an important tool for meeting 
this need because they allow a lot of trade information to be elaborated in a coherent 
economic structure where agents maximise their utility and firms maximise their 
profits. Today many governments and international institutions, e.g. the WTO, the 
European Commission (EC)  and the World Bank (WB), use CGE models to assess 
the impact of global trade reform. 
While these models are widely used in policy analysis in different areas 
(international trade, tax policy, income distribution), they were funded and developed 
in the context of academic research. ‘The central ideal is to convert the Walrasian 
general equilibrium structure (formalized in the 1950s by Kenneth Arrow, Gerard 
Debreu, and others) from an abstract representation of an economy into realistic 
models of actual economies’ (Shoven and Walley, 1992, p. 1). The models are solved 
numerically. In 1967 Scarf found the first algorithm that guaranteed a convergence 
toward an equilibrium solution. Today specific software, such as GAMS or 
GEMPACK, makes the computation easy and allows thousands of equations and 
variables to be solved.  
Over the years, the CGE models have evolved by incorporating elements that do 
not belong to Walrasian framework. The so-called Structuralist CGE models 
incorporate elements of short-run macro models, including “demand driven” 
Keynesian equilibria where money is not neutral.        
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In this work my attention is directed toward large-scale global CGE trade models, 
such as GTAP, MEGABARE and MIRAGE, used by international organizations 
(e.g. the WB, the WTO, the EC) for their analysis of trade liberalization.1 I have 
chosen this kind of model because I had the opportunity to work with MIRAGE at 
CEPII. 
This type of models maintains a strong Walrasian spirit. Factors are fully 
employed, money does not explicitly figure into the model and a solution is made 
possible through relative prices. Nevertheless, some important non-Walrasian 
assumptions, such as imperfect competition and others, are introduced or can be 
introduced; these will be explained in the first chapter.   
A global approach has the unquestionable advantage of taking into account within 
the same theoretical structure the trade relationships of all countries or groups of 
countries in the world, such as the EU, the USA, China, India and Africa. With 
respect to this, it is very important to have a consistent economic global database that 
covers all parts of the world. GTAP, based in the Agricultural Economics 
Department at Purdue University (West Lafayette, Indiana), has been created to 
satisfy this need; It is a global network of researchers who conduct quantitative 
analysis of international economic policy issues, especially trade policy. The latest 
version of the GTAP database, GTAP 7.0 (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008),  is a 
large social account matrix (SAM). It contains complete bilateral trade information 
as well as transport and protection linkages among 113 countries or groups of 
countries and 57 sectors for the base year 2004. GTAP is the most widely used 
dataset for global CGE trade models. It is very rich and practical, however it only 
allows analysis at the national level. 
CGE trade models exist at a sub-national level but they only consider a single 
region or a handful of regions. As will be shown in section 1.4, the CAPRI-GTAP 
(Jansson, Kuiper and Adenäuer, 2009), MONASH-MRF (Peter et al., 1996) and 
MIRAGE-DREAM (Jean and Laborde, 2004) models are examples of large-scale 
                                                 
1
 GTAP is the acronyms for Global Trade Analysis Project. The MEGABARE model has been 
developed by ABARE (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resources Economics). MIRAGE 
stands for Modelling International Relationships in Applied General Equilibrium, it has been 
developed by CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales). 
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global CGE trade models which also include many regions.2 MONASH-MRF refers 
to the Australian regions, CAPRI-GTAP is specific to the agriculture sector of the 
EU and MIRAGE-DREAM considers the NUTS (Nomenclature d’Unités 
Statistiques) regions of the 25 members of the EU (Romania and Bulgaria did not 
belong to the EU in 2004).3 
There are so few models because there is a lack of well-suited regional data 
concerning foreign trade. For instance, in the EU there is no complete dataset on 
foreign trade that is available for the NUTS regions. Concerning foreign trade, some 
information is available for some countries at the regional level, but this is not 
systematically the case. Thus, simplifying assumptions must be made to make the 
models manageable. In addition, this kind of model is very demanding both in terms 
of data and computational resources. Research teams, supported by public 
institutions, work on these models which are highly disaggregated at the 
geographical level.  
The objective of this thesis is to build a global CGE trade model at the NUTS 1 
level for the 68 regions within the first 15 member states of the European Union. The 
aim is not to exactly reproduce the models mentioned above but, taking advantage of 
my work experience at CEPII, the aim is to build a simple parsimonious CGE model. 
Data on value added, skilled labour and unskilled labour are available at the NUTS 1 
level while simplifying assumptions arise for the remaining variables. Therefore a 
CGE trade model is built in which only the production is specified at the NUTS 1 
level.  
This type of model should allow the consequences of trade policy in Europe to be 
investigated at a disaggregated geographical level while maintaining a global 
approach. This is of interest at both the theoretical and empirical levels. 
                                                 
2
 CAPRI is an acronym for Common Agricultural Policy Regional Impact Analysis. MONASH-
MRF model has been developed at Monash university, MRF stands for Multi-Regional Forecasting. 
DREAM stands for Deep Regional Economic Analysis Model. 
3
 The Nomenclature d’Unités Statistiques is a sub-national geocode standard developed by the 
European Union for referencing the subdivisions of European countries for statistical purposes. There 
are three level of aggregation: level 1 (more aggregated), level 2 (medium aggregated) and level 3 
(less aggregated). 
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It is of theoretical interest because it helps one to understand how this kind of 
model works from an economic point of view. Its relative simplicity allows the 
results to be interpreted.     
It is of empirical interest because the knowledge gained about the geographical 
disaggregated effects could be useful information for the policy maker. In fact, trade 
liberalization implies strong distributional effects not only across people but also 
across the regions of a given country. Just as there can be winner and loser countries, 
there can also be winner and loser regions and the policy maker could be interested in 
compensating loser regions for equity.  
The model is used to analyse the output reallocation across sectors in each region 
after a trade shock and this source of information could be useful for a policy maker 
in order to implement, for example, the right outplacement policy. 
The EU economy is very diversified and world trade agreements do not take into 
account  the disparities existing at regional level. This geographical heterogeneity in 
the EU should be considered in WTO negotiations. In addition, it is of interest to 
assess how European workers respond to trade shock. Will they migrate to another 
European region?  
All of this calls for an assessment of the possible impact of trade policy at the 
regional NUTS level. The evaluation could help in making suitable policy choices 
given that cohesion policy is an important competence of European Union. 
The thesis is organized as follows.  
In the first chapter, I set out the global CGE trade models.4 In section 1 some 
relevant theoretical assumptions are laid out from the most traditional ones, such as 
the Armington hypothesis (1969) to the most recent ones, such as the firm 
heterogeneity (Melitz, 2003). Section 2 is devoted to a crucial issue concerning CGE 
approach, i.e. the sensitivity of simulation results to key hypotheses such as 
assumptions about Armington elasticity, firm conduct and the labour market. In 
section 3, I describe three main global CGE trade models used by international 
institutions: the GTEM, GTAP and MIRAGE models. Special attention is given to 
                                                 
4
 I neglect short-run analysis and the link between real variables and financial variables. These 
aspects are the focus of Structuralist-Keynesian CGE models. 
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the MIRAGE model, which I used at CEPII. At the end of Chapter 1 in section 4 
some global CGE trade models at the sub-national level are presented: MONASH-
MRF, CAPRI-GTAP and MIRAGE-DREAM. This section serves as an introduction 
to Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 2 I set out a global CGE trade model at the NUTS level with perfect 
competition in the goods market. This kind of model is built by starting from 
MIRAGE but is original, in that the basic structure was greatly modified with respect 
to MIRAGE. It is applied to all NUTS 1 regions within the EU15. In section 1, I 
introduce the model. In section 2, I illustrate the data, especially describing the 
procedure used to match the two datasets, the national and sub-national ones. In 
section 3, sectoral and geographical aggregations are displayed. There is a set of 4 
sectors. Two geographical levels define the model: one for the groups of countries in 
the world and the other one is for the NUTS 1 regions in the EU15. In section 4, the 
theoretical structure is laid out: the demand side, the supply side, factor markets and 
macroeconomic closure. The calibration strategy is presented in section 5 where I 
explain the simplifying assumptions that I use to determine some parameters and 
variables at the sub-national level. The trade policy experiment, presented in section 
6, is conducted on the 68 NUTS 1 regions in the EU15. The trade shock is a world 
liberalization in agriculture.5 Even if the model is used to assess tariff liberalization 
in agriculture, it is can applied to other sectors according to the special interest of the 
researcher. In section 7, the results are shown such as the production reallocation 
across sectors in each region. In addition, sensitivity analysis on production 
reallocation is conducted by the introduction of skilled/unskilled labour mobility 
within the EU15. Further interesting results are presented such as the variation in 
regional value added, the unskilled/skilled migration within the EU15 and the 
welfare change. A major limitation of the CGE models is that they are difficult to 
interpret because of many variables and equations, which make them a “black box” 
(Panagariya and Duttagupta, 2001). Thus, in section 8, I build a stylised model in 
order to find a strategy for interpreting the results. 
                                                 
5
 Agriculture is the most protected sector in the world. 
 16 
In Chapter 3, I set out a global CGE trade model at the NUTS 1 level with 
imperfect competition in the goods market. In section 1, I introduce it. The database 
basically does not change nor does the sectoral and geographical aggregations. In 
section 2, I describe the theoretical structure: the demand side, the supply side, factor 
markets and macroeconomic closure. The introduction of the Cournot-Nash scheme 
in firm conduct modifies substantially the demand side. In section 3, I show the 
calibration strategy used to determine the three parameters of imperfect competition: 
the elasticity of substitution between firm-specific varieties, the mark-up and the 
number of firms. In section 4, I present the results and compare them with the perfect 
competition version of the model. In section 5, an interpretation of the results is laid 
out for the case of imperfect competition. 
Appendices A1, A2, A3 and A4, respectively, display notation, list of variables, 
the parameters and the equations of the model with both perfect and imperfect 
competition.  
At the end of thesis, the main findings are illustrated and possible extensions for 
further research are discussed. 
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Chapter 1 
Global CGE trade models 
 
 
1.1  Relevant theoretical assumptions 
 
In this first section, I describe some important theoretical assumptions which are 
introduced or can be introduced into global CGE trade models, where global means 
that all of the countries or  groups of countries in the world (e.g. Asia, the EU or 
Africa) are considered simultaneously in the same model.1  
Global CGE trade models, basically, have a Walrasian structure. Money is 
neutral, factors are fully employed and the Walras law is respected.2 In addition, 
macro-economic closure is neoclassical as investments are driven by savings. Trade 
balance is determined endogenously.  
However, some relevant non-Walrasian hypotheses can be made. I identify four 
main features that depart from the classical Walrasian framework and Heckscher-
Ohlin trade theory (1991): geographical product differentiation, horizontal product 
differentiation in the goods market, dynamic set-up and firm heterogeneity. The 
sequence is not random but follows the “historical” evolution in modelling 
theoretical assumptions of CGE trade models.                 
 
 
1.1.1 Geographical product differentiation: the Armington hypothesis 
 
The Armington hypothesis (1969) considers the imported good to be an imperfect 
substitute of the domestic good. This is the first violation of the Walras and 
                                                 
1
 Clearly, the geographical and sectoral aggregations are chosen to be consistent with the special 
objective of the researcher. 
2
 The Walras law asserts that if n-1 markets are in equilibrium in an economy, then the remaining 
market is also in equilibrium, what implies a redundant equation in the general equilibrium system of 
equations.   
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Hechscher-Ohlin scheme where the imported good and the domestic good are perfect 
substitutes. This geographical product differentiation is introduced into CGE trade 
models to give a greater realism to the simulation results. The Heckscher-Ohlin 
model fails to replicate the cross-hauling flows that are observed in the trade data.3 
Furthermore, in this type of model a small trade shock is sufficient to cause an 
unrealistic specialization phenomenon with enormous variations in the sectoral 
production of a country. 
The idea that imported and domestic goods are imperfect substitutes implies that 
they have different prices. This can be achieved through a CES (Constant Elasticity 
of Substitution) or a Cobb-Douglas function which model the demand for the 
country. 
In the case of a CES function with C countries, the Armignton assumption for the 
general country c and sector i can be written in two stages. The first concerns the 
degree of substitution between the domestic and imported good. It is given by: 
 
 
, , , , , ,
min i c i c i c i c i c i cPDTOT DTOT PD D PM M= +   (1.1) 
 
 
1 1/ 1 1/ 1 1/
, , ,
. .   
ARM ARM ARMi i i
i c i c i cs t DTOT D M
σ σ σ− − −
= +   (1.2) 
 
where DTOTi,c, Di,c and Mi,c are, respectively, total, domestic and aggregated 
import demand in country c and sector i, PDTOTi,c, PDi,c and PMi,c are, respectively, 
the price of total, domestic and import demand in country c and sector i and 
iARM
σ parameter is the elasticity of substitution in sector i between the imported and 
domestic goods (so-called Armington elasticity). 
The second stage concerns the degree of substitution across imports of country c 
in sector i. It is the following: 
 
 
, , , *, , *,
*
min i c i c i c c i c c
c c
PM M PDEM DEM
≠
= ∑  (1.3) 
                                                 
3
 A country can export and import the same good. 
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1 1/ 1 1/
, , *, , *,
*
. .   
IMP IMPi i
i c i c c i c c
c c
s t M IMP DEMσ σα− −
≠
= ∑   (1.4) 
 
where DEMi,c*,c is the good which is exported from country c* to country c in 
sector i, PDEMi,c*,c is the associated price,
iIMP
σ parameter is the elasticity of 
substitution across the imports of country c and αIMP is a parameter of the CES 
function. 
The Armington assumption is now a standard hypothesis for modelling trade in 
CGE models. The Armington and import elasticities (σARMi and σIMPi) cannot be 
directly calibrated in the CES function; they must be estimated econometrically or 
derived from trade literature. With the CES function, Brown (1987) shows that 
greater substitutability across imports (greater σIMPi) implies reduced trade effects in 
the countries which experience the tariff change. On the other hand, greater 
substitutability across domestic and imported goods (greater σARMi) implies increased 
trade effects in the country which experiences the tariff change. 
A main criticism of the Armington assumption  concerns the source of product 
differentiation. Taylor and Von Armin (2006, p.14) note that ‘national product 
differentiation ignores the fact that companies, not countries, increasingly determine 
the characteristics of products. In other words, much international trade is intra-
company, which make the Armington set-up irrelevant’. 
Other sources of product differentiation can be introduced; horizontal product 
differentiation is an important example. The next subsection will examine this aspect 
in more detail. 
 
 
1.1.2 Horizontal product differentiation 
 
The introduction of horizontal product differentiation into CGE models stems 
from the Krugman theoretical model (1979).  Krugman applies the “love of variety” 
approach, introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), to international trade theory. To 
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summarize, his model contains two predictions concerning the impact of trade on the 
productivity of firms: the scale effect as surviving firms expand their outputs, and the 
selection effect, as some firms are forced to exit from the market; however, aggregate 
productivity does not change and all the firms are symmetric.    
In his pioneering work, Harris (1984) incorporates elements of new trade theory, 
such as strategic price-setting behaviour and increasing returns to scale, into a 
standard computable general equilibrium model for the Canadian economy. 
Since Harris, imperfect competitive CGE models have been widely used to assess 
trade liberalization issues, particularly in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the European single market program and the Uruguay and Doha 
negotiations. For example, Harrison et al. (1997) build a global CGE trade model to 
quantify the Uruguay Round. Increasing returns to scale are introduced and firms 
compete in a quantity adjusting oligopoly framework.  
Norman (1990) explains the need to consider economies of scale and imperfect 
competition to analyse the consequences of trade liberalization. By using simplified 
models, he finds that imperfect competition makes a significant quantitative 
difference (compared to the standard, perfectly competitive theory) to the effects of 
trade liberalization on inter-industry trade patterns. In addition, the Armington 
assumption is not a good approximation of product differentiation and oligopolistic 
interaction.   
Horizontal differentiation in the goods market can be modelled in different ways. 
Following Willenbockel (2004), I identify four types of imperfect competition 
schemes used in CGE trade models. In Bertrand oligopoly, each firm conjectures that 
the supply prices of the rivals in the goods market do not respond to changes in its 
own supply price. In oligopoly with conjectural price variations, each firm 
conjectures that the supply prices of the rivals in the goods market respond to 
changes in its own price through a certain non-zero price reaction as in Delorme and 
van der Mensbrugghe (1990). In Cournot oligopoly, each firm conjectures that the 
supply quantities of  the rivals in the goods market do not respond to changes in its 
own supply quantity; this approach is used by Harrison et al. (1996), Willenbockel 
(1994), Burniaux and Waelbroeck (1992) and Capros et al. (1998). In oligopoly with 
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conjectural output variations, each firm conjectures that the supply quantities of the 
rivals in the goods market respond to changes in its own supply quantity according to 
a certain output response. 
Problems can arise if imperfect competition is introduced into CGE trade models. 
Mercenier (1995) shows that in a CGE model for the European integration program 
with economies of scale and imperfect competition, the equilibrium solution is not 
unique. He finds that the trade experiment, consisting of forcing individual firms to 
switch from their initial segmented-market pricing strategy to an integrated market 
pricing strategy, causes two different equilibria. The non-uniqueness of solution in 
CGE models with imperfect competition is often ignored from model builders and 
users. Nevertheless it can be a serious matter in the interpretation of trade policy 
experiments. 
Another issue is the dependency of imperfect competition equilibrium on the 
choice of numeraire. Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) present this property of theoretical 
general equilibrium models with imperfect competition. Ginsburgh (1994) gives 
numerical examples for CGE models. However, the normalisation problem can be 
avoided in CGE models by “reasonable” restrictions on the information set of the 
oligopolistic firm (Willenbockel, 2003). For example, when firms rule out the 
possibility that their production decision influences the aggregate income via factor 
prices and profit feedback effects (the so-called Ford effect), the numeraire matter 
can be neglected.  
 
 
1.1.3 From a static to dynamic model 
 
Theoretical growth literature has shown that trade liberalization may affect capital 
stock accumulation or human capital accumulation and technology. These processes 
are intrinsically dynamic. Thus, the impact of trade liberalization on output and 
welfare could be misleading if only the static effect, that is linked to the efficient 
allocation of factors, is considered.   
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Concerning capital stock accumulation, the Baldwin theoretical model (1989) 
shows that trade policy may change income or  the endogenous saving rate, that, in 
turn, influences the stock of capital. In addition, François et al. (1995) and Baldwin 
(1989, 1992) argue that the magnitude of the trade policy effect could be greater than 
in the static model.4 With respect to the second aspect, human capital accumulation 
and technology, Baldwin and Forslid (1999) find analogous results when 
technological externality is introduced. Empirical studies do not give a definitive 
answer about the existence of such growth effects (see e.g. Fontagné and Guérin, 
1997, for a survey of this literature). Thus, no clear and robust conclusion is possible. 
The simplest way to interpret the effects of trade policy liberalization in global 
CGE models is through comparative static. Basically, a parameter, such as a barrier 
tariff, is modified. The new equilibrium solution is compared with the equilibrium 
solution in the baseline model. The consequent changes can be considered long-term 
or short-term effects according to the assumption about factor mobility, in particular, 
the capital factor. Harrison et al. (1997) and François et al. (1995) use this approach. 
They allow the rental rate of capital to vary within each country, while holding 
constant the aggregate stock of capital in order to assess short-term effects of trade 
policy liberalization. In contrast, they allow aggregate stock capital to vary, holding 
the rental rate of capital constant in order to assess the long-term or steady state 
impact of the shock. They find that long-term welfare gains are two to four times 
higher than the short-run estimates.5     
Even if this type of model distinguishes between long-term and short-term effects, 
essentially, they are still a comparison between two equilibria and do not capture the 
trade impact on human and capital accumulation. For this reason, the latest 
generation of global CGE models incorporate time into their general structure. 
                                                 
4
 For example, “the additional dynamic gain on welfare is positive if liberalization raises the return 
to capital; if the liberalization lowers the return to capital, the dynamic welfare effects tend to offset 
the static gains from trade” (Baldwin, 1992, p. 166). 
5
 Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the long-term effects of this type of model do not 
consider that in a fully dynamic framework, consumption decreases to achieve the higher capital 
stock. Thus, Harrison et al (1996, 1997) and Rodrik (1997) highlight that these models tend to 
overestimate the overall welfare gain.        
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For example, MIRAGE, GTAP and GTEM all have a dynamic version but It is 
very rough because no intertemporal dynamic optimisation is taken into account. 
Basically, the model is solved recursively. In each period, investment is 
endogenously determined and is added to the depreciated capital in the next period. 
The growth rate of factors, with the exception of capital, is set exogenously. The time 
span can be freely chosen, usually 15 to 20 years. These assumptions imply temporal 
inconsistency in the behaviour of economic agents. 
 
 
1.1.4 Firm heterogeneity: the Melitz model 
 
In recent years, there has been a growing development of a new generation of 
theoretical trade models based on the assumption of heterogeneous firms. The “New 
trade theory” associated with Krugman (1979) and others introduced Dixit-Stiglitz 
monopolistic competition and scale economies to allow for intra-industry trade 
across countries observed in the data6, thereby overcoming a limitation of traditional 
Heckscher-Ohlin model. However, it did not explain why some firms in the same 
sector export while others do not.  
For this reason, in 2003 Melitz built one of the first models that had 
heterogeneous firms and sunk costs of exporting. These hypotheses are fundamental 
in order to explain the difference between exporting and non-exporting firms within 
the same industry. 
Other works followed that of Melitz, in particular Helpman et al. (2004) and 
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007). The Bernard-Redding-Schott model inserts the 
traditional endowment-based comparative advantages into the new theoretical 
framework of heterogeneous firms.  
The Melitz model is a dynamic single industry model with heterogeneous firms. It 
considers a Krugman structure with monopolistic competition and increasing returns 
while adding productivity heterogeneity across firms. The productivity distribution 
                                                 
6
 As shown in subsection 1.1.1, computable general equilibrium approach solves cross-hauling 
problem through the introduction of the Armington hypothesis.   
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can belong to one of the several common distribution families: lognormal, 
exponential, gamma, Weibul, truncation on (0, +∞) of the normal, logistic, extreme 
value, Laplace and Pareto distributions. 
The productivity heterogeneity is crucial in order to show the gain in the level of 
aggregate productivity or welfare obtained in the transition from autarky to free 
trade, or in response to a more liberalised environment. In fact, these processes 
determine a selection effect and a reallocation of market shares because the less 
productive firms are replaced by the more productive foreign firms.  
A curious effect is the anti-variety Krugman effect that occurs in the Melitz model 
when the export costs are high and foreign firms replace a larger number of domestic 
firms in the transition from autarky to free trade. However the overall effect on 
welfare remains positive because of the increased productivity. 
As Kehoe points out (2005), a main weak link in CGE approach is that models do 
not allow trade policy to influence aggregate productivity and induce trade growth 
along the extensive margin, i.e. the number of exporting firms and traded goods. On 
the contrary, the policy maker is often interested in assessing the aggregate 
productivity gain of trade policy. Inserting the Melitz assumption into the 
computable general equilibrium framework could satisfy this need.    
Global CGE trade models, such as GTAP, GTEM and MIRAGE, do not 
incorporate Melitz hypothesis about firm heterogeneity because it is too recent. 
However, two applications of the Melitz assumption to CGE trade models exist: 
Balistreri, Hillberry and Rutherford (2007) and Zhai (2008).          
Zhai builds a global CGE trade model with twelve macro-areas, fourteen sectors 
and five production factors. Within the fourteen sectors, the agriculture and energy 
sectors produce homogenous products.7 In each of these two sectors, there is a 
representative firm operating under constant returns to scale technology. The other 
manufacturing and service sectors produce differentiated products. In these sectors, 
the production and trade structures of the CGE model closely follow the Melitz 
model. Different from Melitz, the Zhai CGE model is not characterised by a steady 
                                                 
7
 The agriculture and energy sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive, also in the Mirage 
model (see subsection 1.3.3).    
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state equilibrium, but rather a static equilibrium. A Pareto distribution is used to 
model the productivity heterogeneity.  
The results of trade policy simulation, a 50% global manufacturing tariff cut, are 
compared with the results of a standard Armington CGE model with constant returns 
to scale and representative firm. The model predicts a global welfare gain of $91.6 
billion, measured in equivalent variation (EV), more than double of the estimated 
gain in the standard Armington CGE model. In addition, as predicted by the 
theoretical model, trade policy simulation increases the number of exporting firms, 
decreases the number of domestic firms and increases the aggregate manufacture 
productivity. However, it should be emphasized that the shape parameter in Pareto 
productivity distribution plays an important role in determining the impact of trade 
barriers on trade flows. 
Balistreri, Hillberry and Rutherford use an original approach to insert the Melitz 
assumptions in their model which is, indeed, a mix of a numerical general 
equilibrium (GE) and partial equilibrium (PE) model. Two steps are needed to solve 
the model. In the first step, a PE model is solved for each commodity in order to 
obtain the industrial organization of heterogeneous firms (i.e. the number of firms 
operating within and across borders). The PE model takes aggregate income levels 
and resources supply schedules as given. The second module is a GE model of global 
trade in all products. The GE model takes industrial structure as given and determine 
relative prices, comparative advantages and terms of trade. Then, they iterate 
between these two models in policy simulation as long as the PE and GE models are 
mutually consistent. They find that in the case of a 50% tariff reduction in trade 
manufactured goods, the global welfare gains are four times greater than in the 
standard Armington CGE models. As in the Zhai application, trade policy  increases 
the number of exporting firms, decreases the number of domestic firms and increases 
the aggregate manufacture productivity. 
Both the Zhai and Balistreri, Hillberry and Rutherford models are calibrated on 
the GTAP database. Zhai sets exogenously the relevant parameters of firm 
heterogeneity, e.g. shape parameter of the Pareto distribution. Balistreri, Hillberry 
and Rutherford develop an original procedure to calibrate these parameters. 
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1.2  Sensitivity of the simulation results to key hypotheses 
 
A crucial issue in the computable general equilibrium approach is the sensitivity 
of the simulation results to key hypotheses. Parameters are generally calibrated by 
using available data, where it is possible, or are set exogenously from econometric 
estimates. Sometimes econometric estimates are not available or robust. This lack of 
econometric foundation makes the CGE effects of trade policy simulations 
vulnerable to key assumptions about the parameter value. CGE models are sensitive 
not only with respect to the value of parameters but also to the hypotheses of the 
model, i.e. the type of equation which defines the equilibrium in the factor or goods 
market or the functional form chosen to model the substitutability across products or 
factors (see McKitrick, 1998). 
In this section I consider three main elements that may affect trade policy results 
in global CGE models: Armington elasticity, firm conduct and labour market. 
 
 
1.2.1 Armington elasticity 
 
CGE modellers typically draw the elasticity value from econometric studies that 
use time series price variations to identify an elasticity of substitution between 
domestic goods and composite imports (Alaouze, 1977; Alaouze et al., 1977; Stern et 
al., 1976; Gallaway et al., 2003). This method has three drawbacks: the use of point 
estimate as true, a downward bias in the point estimates created by problems in 
estimation technique and an inconsistency between the data sample of an 
econometric estimate and the trade policy experiment. Hertel et al. (2007) try to 
overcome these limits by using cross-section price variations in place of  time series 
price variations for the econometric estimate. In addition, they take into account the 
uncertainty regarding the values of Armington elasticity through a Gaussian 
Quadrature numerical integration technique. Basically, the objective is to improve 
the linkage between econometirc estimates of key parameters and their use in CGE 
trade models.  
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The computed elasticity in the study by Hertel et al. (2007) are more 
econometrically founded than elasticity computed by the older methods. 
Nevertheless, the authors admit that the method could underestimate elasticity in 
developing countries, which are likely to import less-differentiated products than 
richer countries, because their estimates stems from a database of seven American 
countries, including the USA.   
Thus, Valenzuela et al. (2008) carry out a sensitive analysis in the GTAP model 
(see subsection 1.3.1) using two different values of Armington elasticity for 
developing countries.   
The results of the study shows, for example, that Saharan Africa loses slightly 
from its own full liberalization because the efficiency gain is more than offset by the 
loss in its terms of trade with the standard Armington elasticity value. Vice versa 
with a doubled Armington elasticity value in developing countries, the efficiency 
gain increases and the loss in terms of trade decreases in Saharan Africa, because the 
export demand elasticities also double in size. Thus, the overall effect on welfare 
after trade liberalization is positive in the area. This is a simple example that shows 
the importance of Armington elasticity value. 
Another problem linked to Armington elasticity is the fiscal bias, which severely 
undermines the welfare calculation. Taylor and von Arnim (2006) set out an example 
concerning the GTAP/LINKAGE model, used by World Bank to simulate trade 
liberalization scenarios. In the basic GTAP model, the Armington assumption 
ensures that if a country removes tariff barriers in a sector, the country will increase 
imports in the sector because of the reduced import price. The GTAP model also 
assumes that a decrease in income tax, following tariff cuts on imports, is perfectly 
compensated by a new tax which distorts neither production nor demand.    
However, the authors demonstrate that the negative direct impact of this new tax 
is greater than the positive indirect effect of tariff reduction via a lower price, if this 
new tax is a simple tax on aggregate consumption. 
The implication is that the World Bank estimates of welfare gains from 
liberalisation are subject to biases because tariff suppression leads to demand 
contraction for imports if this direct effect on aggregate consumption is considered.    
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1.2.2 Firm conduct 
 
The introduction of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale in CGE 
models raises the question whether trade policy simulations are sensitive to the 
hypothesis about firm conduct.  
Willenbockel (2004) provides a systematic synopsis of alternative formulations of 
imperfectly competitive supply behaviour in applied general equilibrium trade 
models. The proposed range of schemes is broad: a domestic Cournot scheme, an 
international Cournot scheme, a domestic Bertrand scheme, an international Bertrand 
scheme and an oligopoly with conjectural price and output variations.8 
Willenbockel build a stylised model with simulated data. There are three countries 
(A, B, C) and two sectors (a perfectly competitive one and an imperfectly 
competitive one). He assumes that country A imposes a tariff in the imperfectly 
competitive sector. Thus, he examines the sensitivity of simulated trade policy 
effects to the specification choice of firm conduct. The firm behaviour is associated 
with different Armington and Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity values. 
In addition, imperfect competition needs to calibrate three parameters: the Dixit-
Stiglitz elasticity of substitution between firm-specific varieties, the mark-ups and 
the number of firms in each sector. Given that these parameters are linked by the 
Lerner equation, in CGE models with imperfect competition two of the three 
parameters are generally set extraneously while the remaining one is calibrated 
residually. At the calibration stage, Willenbockel uses two types of strategies, which 
can also be found in the empirical literature. In the first one, the number of firms and 
Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity are set extraneously while mark-up is calibrated residually 
(e.g. Brown and Stern, 1989). In the second one the number of firms and mark-ups 
are set extraneously, while the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity value is calibrated residually 
(e.g. Gasiorek et al., 1992; Haaland and Norman, 1992; Willenbockel, 1994).   
                                                 
8
 With the domestic Cournot hypothesis, the firm assumes that its conjecture about the reactions of 
rivals only concerns the other domestic firms. With the international Cournot hypothesis, the firm 
assumes that its conjecture about the reactions of rivals also concerns foreign competitors. This 
assumption is not trivial. For example, the international Cournot scheme implies that foreign rival 
quantities remain fixed and foreign rival prices respond to marginal variations in firm output because 
any variation in firm output entails a shift in the demand curves of foreign rivals.          
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The results of trade experiment are very interesting. Willenbockel finds that 
simulated responses to the trade policy shock are robust to the choice of firm 
behaviour. However, the results are very sensitive to the strategy chosen at the 
calibration stage and to the benchmark mark-up values. 
Thus, the main practical implication for applied studies is that it is more important 
to provide clear documentation of the numerical specification at the calibration stage 
than to conduct in-depth sensitivity analysis across a wide range of imperfectly 
competitive models at the theoretical stage. 
 
 
1.2.3 Labour market 
 
The strength of CGE models lies in the possibility of simultaneously considering 
price and quantity interactions in all markets, while taking into account all the direct 
and indirect effects of trade policy. This comprehensiveness is also the weakest point 
of CGE models because it requires a lot of data and, in turn, implies over-
simplification of reality. One of the major simplifications regards the labour market, 
in particular, the assumption that the total level of employment is fixed. 
In reality, trade policy is likely to have an impact on the level of total employment 
and the policy maker is often interested in assessing the effects of trade policy 
liberalization on employment. Standard CGE models do not allow for this kind of 
trade consequences; in fact, most of them assume exogenous unemployment levels. 
As stated by Stiglitz and Charlton (2004, pp. 8-9), ‘CGE models often do not 
account for the presence of persistent unemployment in developing countries. In the 
presence of unemployment, trade liberalization may simply move workers from low 
productivity protected sectors into unemployment’. 
Ackerman (2005, p. 20) stress that this limitation explains ‘why the gains to 
consumers from tariff reductions dominate the model estimates of the benefits of 
liberalization: producer impacts, positive or negative, have been largely suppressed 
by assumption’. 
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Nevertheless, efforts have been made to allow for varying levels of total 
employment. Recent studies for the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), using GTAP model, simulate trade liberalization under 
the assumption that the employment of unskilled labour in developing countries can 
change. In one such study Fernandez de Cordoba and Vanzetti (2005) find that the 
elimination of all industrial tariffs would lead to estimated increases in the 
employment of unskilled labour of between 5% and 8% in most of Asia, Africa and 
Central America. 
The MIRAGE model is another attempt to consider variable total employment 
(see subsection 1.3.3). The labour market structure for developing countries is close 
to the UNCTAD framework but the model predicts different results for agriculture 
liberalization (Bouet et al., 2005). The gains from agricultural trade liberalization are 
limited and are concentrated in developed countries, just as in the standard GTAP 
model. 
 
 
1.3  Main global CGE models for trade policy evaluation 
 
Let us now move on to a description of the main CGE trade models used by 
international organizations, such as the WB, the WTO, the EC and the OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), to simulate trade 
liberalization scenarios, as in the Uruguay and Doha negotiations. Three models are 
examined: GTAP, MEGABARE and MIRAGE. These models are not set out in 
detail because they are very rich and several versions of each model have been 
developed over the years. I will try to give the essence of the models by briefly 
explaining their origin, use and most important features. I will however go into more 
detail for MIRAGE model because I know more about it, having used it during my 
work experience at CEPII.  
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1.3.1. The GTAP model 
 
‘The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) was established in 1992, with the 
objective of lowering the cost of entry for those seeking to conduct quantitative 
analyses of international economic issues in an economy-wide framework’ (Hertel, 
1997, p. 3).  
A fully documented global dataset and a standard modelling framework are the 
two main characteristics of GTAP. In addition, a global network of researchers and a 
consortium of national and international agencies provide support for multi-country 
analyses of trade and resource issues.  
The GTAP database is commonly used in global CGE models to assess trade 
policy reform. As noted in the introduction, the latest version (GTAP 7.0, Narayanan 
and Walmsley, 2008) is a large SAM. Besides providing the values for demand and 
production variables, It also contains complete bilateral trade information and 
transport and protection linkages among 113 countries or groups of countries and 57 
sectors for the base year 2004. The lack of input-output tables makes it necessary to 
aggregate some developing countries. Bilateral trade flows stem from COMTRADE, 
the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database. Tariff barriers are drawn 
from the MAcMap (Market Access Maps) database (Bouet et al., 2004) produced by 
CEPII and the ITC (International Trade Centre) research institutes, located 
respectively in Paris and Geneva. 
I now describe the theoretical framework in the standard GTAP model.  
The nested production technology in GTAP exhibits constant returns to scale and 
every sector produces a single output. Five primary factors are considered: land, 
natural resources, capital, unskilled and skilled capital. A CES technology is used to 
combine the five production factors to obtain the value added and a CES function is 
also used to aggregate the domestic and foreign intermediate inputs. Leontief 
technology uses the value added and the aggregate intermediate inputs in fixed 
proportions to produce output.  
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Among the primary factors, labour and capital are perfectly mobile across sectors, 
while land and natural resources are imperfectly mobile. However, land and natural 
resources are only used in the agricultural and primary energy sources sectors.  
Capital is also perfectly mobile across countries. It is assumed that the other 
primary factors are generally immobile in the country or group of countries 
depending on the chosen geographical aggregation.  
Regarding the demand side, a representative household collects all the income that 
is generated in the country or group of countries (depending on geographical 
aggregation). This income is shared through a Cobb-Douglas function across private 
household expenditure, government expenditure and savings. The constrained 
optimising behaviour of private consumption is represented in the GTAP model by 
the CDE (Constant Difference of Elasticity) implicit expenditure function, which 
takes into account the non-homotetic nature of final consumption. The CDE function 
is less general than the fully flexible functional forms, but is more flexible than the 
commonly used LES-CES (Linear Expenditure System – Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution) function.   
Macroeconomic closure is neoclassical, therefore, investment is savings-driven. 
The international trade is modelled through the Armington assumption, as usual. 
Different versions of GTAP models exist. Imperfect competition can be inserted 
as in Hertel et al. (1997) and François (1998). International technology spillovers 
have also been considered as in van Mejil and van Tongeren (1999). The dynamic 
version of the model, LINKAGE, was developed by Andrerson et al. (2005 a-b) for 
the WB. LINKAGE is solved recursively over a period of fifteen years. The dynamic 
side is represented by population growth and capital accumulation. 
 
 
1.3.2 The MEGABARE model 
 
The MEGABARE model was developed by Hanslow in 1996 at the Australian 
Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics (ABARE). It drew, in part, upon the 
structure and database of GTAP but it also contained significant advancements over 
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the GTAP model of that time. The first major difference was the dynamic set-up of 
MEGABARE. In addition, it was applied not only to global trade liberalization but 
also to a variety of issues as environmental policy. 
MEGABARE has evolved over the years. Its most recent version, GTEM (Pant, 
2002), incorporates additional elements.9 
Each production sector consists of several homogeneous firms that use identical 
technology and produce homogeneous products. There are two exceptions to this 
assumption: the electricity sector and the iron and steel sector. These sectors produce 
homogeneous outputs but employ non-homogeneous technologies. For example, 
electricity can be produced by using coal fire technology or hydroelectric 
technology. 
Technological change is exogenous except for the infant renewable energy sector, 
such as solar, where a “learning by doing” process is modelled and the mining sector, 
where the factor productivity declines as the cumulative level of resource extraction 
increases. 
Each year the labour supply is fixed but it evolves according to participation rates 
within the working-age population. 
The capital account is open. Domestic savers purchase bonds on the global 
financial market and domestic investors sell bonds on the global financial market. A 
flexible global interest rate clears the global financial market. Nevertheless, it is 
assumed that rates of return on money invested in physical capital may differ 
between countries because of the risk characteristic and policy configurations of each 
country. As a result, any differences between the local rates of return on capital and 
the global cost of borrowing is the consequence of policy imperfections on the 
international capital market. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 GTEM stands for Global Trade and Environment  Model. 
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1.3.3 The MIRAGE model 
 
The MIRAGE model was developed by the French research institute CEPII in 
2002 (see Bchir et al.) to simulate trade policy scenarios. At the instigation of the 
European Commission and French Finance Ministry the model was widely used to 
assess the entry of China into the WTO and to analyse the preferential bilateral 
agreements between the European Union and different partners, such as the Mercosul 
and ACP countries.10 
In 2007 Decreux and Valin developed an updated version of the model, funded, in 
part, by the European Commission. 
MIRAGE also uses GTAP and the MAcMap database. As stated above, MAcMap 
database is compiled by the CEPII and ITC. It provides ad valorem equivalent 
measure of specific tariff, ad valorem tariff and tariff quotas. In addition, preferential 
agreements are taken into account. As a result, MIRAGE is based on a description of 
trade barriers that is precise and preserves the bilateral dimension of the information.          
Following, is an illustration of the theoretical structure of the model with 
reference to the latest version (2007). 
Concerning the demand side, in each country or group of countries a 
representative household maximises utility function and owns factor endowments. 
Total demand is comprised up of final consumption, intermediate inputs and capital 
goods. Final consumption is modelled through a LES-CES function. With this kind 
of function, the elasticity of substitution is constant only across the sectoral 
consumptions over a minimum level.  
The representative household includes the government, therefore it pays and earns 
taxes so that the public budget constraint is implicit to meeting the household budget 
constraint. Any decrease in tax revenues (e.g. as a consequence of trade 
liberalization) is assumed to be exactly compensated by a non-distorting replacement 
tax. 
                                                 
10
 Mercosul is a regional trade agreement among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
established in 1991. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela are currently associate 
members. ACP stands for African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States.    
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Horizontal and vertical product differentiation is introduced. Horizontal 
differentiation and increasing returns to scale are very close to the specification of 
Harrison et al. (1997). Each firm produces its own, unique variety. Symmetric firms 
compete in a Cournot-Nash way.  
Vertical product differentiation distinguishes between two quality ranges, defined 
on a geographical basis. The first quality range includes goods produced in 
developing countries, while the second includes goods produced in developed 
countries. This geographical product differentiation leads up to the standard 
Armington level. Elasticity of substitution between the quality ranges is smaller than 
the Armington elasticity. Even if rudimentary, this assumption is a first attempt to 
allow for specialisation in quality ranges, which has been amply illustrated in the 
empirical literature (Fontagné and Freudenberg, 1997; Greenaway and Torstensson, 
2000). 
Now let us move to the supply side. As in the GTAP model, five primary factors 
are considered: land, natural resources, capital and skilled and unskilled capital. 
CES technology uses land, natural resources, unskilled labour and a fictive factor 
to produce value added in each sector. The fictive factor is a CES bundle of capital 
and skilled labour. This structure is intended to take into account the well-
documented complementarity between skilled labour and capital (Duffy, 
Papageorgiou and Perez-Sebastian, 2004). Therefore, the elasticity of substitution 
between skilled labour and capital is smaller than the elasticity of substitution 
between fictive factor and the other primary factors. 
Leontief technology uses value added and intermediate inputs to produce output. 
Intermediate input in each sector is represented by a CES function of  intermediate 
inputs from all the other sectors. As a result, intermediate inputs are imperfect 
substitutes.  
The updated version of MIRAGE introduces interesting elements for modelling 
the labour market. As noted in subsection 1.2.3, a weak point of the CGE approach is 
the fixed labour supply, especially for developing counties. For this reason in 
MIRAGE, a dual labour market is considered for developing countries and unskilled 
labour. It follows the theoretical studies of Lewis (1954) and Harris and Todaro 
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(1970). A modern urban sector (industry and services) pays an efficiency wage to 
unskilled workers. This wage is independent of the labour supply. The traditional 
sector (i.e. agriculture), by contrast, uses a fixed quantity of unskilled labour which is 
paid at the level of its marginal productivity. This assumption stems from the high 
level of underemployment observed in rural areas of some developing countries. As a 
result, unskilled workers can respond to any labour demand in the modern urban 
sector, while their position is filled in the agricultural sector. This specification 
provides a simple way to depart from the standard assumption of exogenous 
unemployment levels used in most CGE models. 
Regarding macroeconomic closure, MIRAGE, unlike the GTAP model, assumes 
that installed capital is immobile in each country or group of countries and in each 
sector; this is the so-called putty-clay hypothesis. In the GTAP model the assumption 
of perfect capital mobility across sectors and countries results in unrealistic cross-
border capital flows. Using the results of econometric estimates directly to calibrate 
parameters would give more realistic results but would lack theoretical consistency. 
Therefore, the putty-clay hypothesis is used in MIRAGE. As a result, investment 
plays an important role because FDI (Foreign Direct Investments) are the only 
device for adjusting capital stock. An original modelling of FDI is used. It is a 
compromise solution between theoretical consistency and empirical realism. The first 
objective requires domestic investment allocation and FDI to be consistent and 
saving behaviour  to be rational. The rate of return to capital in each country or group 
of countries and in each sector is a natural determinant of investment sharing across 
countries and sectors. In addition, the empirical literature (Chakrabarti, 2001) shows 
that this rate of return depends on the main determinants of FDI. For this reason, 
domestic and foreign investments are a function of the initial savings in each country 
or group or countries and the sectoral rate of return to capital in each country or 
group or countries.  
As for the GTAP/LINKAGE and MEGABARE/GTEM models, a dynamic 
version of MIRAGE exists. The model is solved recursively over a period of 15 or 20 
years. Each year, the capital evolves through the above-mentioned FDI mechanism 
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and its depreciation rate while labour force growth is modelled according to the 
World Bank population projections. 
 
 
1.4 Global CGE trade models at the sub-national level 
 
The objective of this thesis is to build a global CGE trade model at the NUTS 1 
level for the regions in the first 15 member states of the European Union (EU15). 
There are CGE trade models at the sub-national level but this kind of model has 
generally been applied to a single region or a handful of regions because they are 
very demanding in terms of data.11 To the best of my knowledge, only Australia and 
the European Union have developed and applied global CGE trade models to a 
considerable number of regions.  
Three examples of this type of model are presented in the following sub-sections: 
the GTAP-CAPRI model, the MONASH-MRF model and the MIRAGE-DREAM 
model. The GTAP-CAPRI, MONASH-MRF and MIRAGE-DREAM models are not 
discussed in detail but the main features of each one will be outlined. 
 
 
1.4.1 The GTAP-CAPRI model 
 
The GTAP-CAPRI model is developed by Jansson, Kuiper and Adenaüer as a part 
of the SEAMLESS project (2009). SEAMLESS stands for System for Environmental 
and Agricultural Modelling: Linking European Science and Society. The project is 
carried out by a consortium of 30 partners, led by Wageningen University 
(Netherlands). Its aim is to combine the detailed modelling of agriculture in CAPRI 
and the economy-wide general equilibrium feedbacks in GTAP. 
CAPRI is a partial equilibrium (PE) model which includes about 200 NUTS 2 
regions of the 27 members of the European Union. The model also considers about 
                                                 
11
 Partridge and Rickman (1998) conduct a survey of such models, mostly for regions in the USA.  
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30 different crop production activities. The animal sector incorporates dairy cows, 
cattle raising as well as eight other animal activities. 
In each NUTS 2 region a representative farm maximises profits subject to 
constraints such as utilisable agricultural area and production quotas.  
As stated above, CAPRI is a PE model because non-agricultural variables, such as 
input prices and consumer income, are exogenous. 
In principle, a joint solution of a GE and PE models is not different from the 
solution of a single extended GE model. Basically, the strategy followed here that 
links the GE and PE models consists in using endogenous outcomes of the GTAP for 
variables which are otherwise exogenous in the CAPRI. The GTAP agricultural 
sector is iteratively adapted to the CAPRI changes through an additional program 
which calibrates standard GTAP parameters to CAPRI results. The iterative process 
is illustrated in Figure 1.1.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The figure is taken from Jansson et al. (2009). 
 
Figure 1.1: Iterative solution process in the GTAP-CAPRI model 
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Upper case letters denote the absolute value of the variable while the lower case 
letters in brackets denote % change from the baseline value. The variables are: the 
prices of GTAP primary factors (W),  aggregate input and output price indexes in 
CAPRI (p), aggregate supply of agriculture in CAPRI (s), input demand for 
agriculture in CAPRI (d), land price in CAPRI (λ) and consumer expenditure in 
GTAP (m).  
Within the CAPRI model, the solution process starts in the SUPPLY module, 
which computes the supply of agricultural goods at the NUTS regional level within 
the EU. The supply is aggregated to the member state level, and the supply functions 
of the MARKET module are recalibrated to replicate the solution of the SUPPLY 
model. The MARKET module is then solved for market clearing prices, using linear 
approximations of the last outcome of the SUPPLY model. To this point, the process 
is the standard CAPRI procedure. However, after the MARKET module has been 
solved, the results are aggregated at the GTAP level and stored in the DP file. The 
SHIFT module uses the p, s, d and λ values, stored in the DP file, and the outcome of 
the previous iteration of GTAP (DG file) to compute the shock to the key parameters 
of GTAP. When GTAP finishes by inserting the new values of W, w and m in the DG 
file, CAPRI resumes the execution and starts a new iteration by solving the SUPPLY 
and MARKET modules. The iteration process stops when the price changes are no 
more than 0.1%.  
While GTAP-CAPRI model allows for very detailed trade policy simulations, the 
model is limited to the analysis of the agricultural sector. 
 
 
1.4.2 The MONASH-MRF model 
 
MONASH-MRF is a multi-regional, multi-sectoral CGE model of the Australian 
economy. The model and its database were developed by Peter, Horridge, Meagher, 
Naqvi and Parmenter in 1996 at the Centre of Policy Studies.13 
                                                 
13
 The Centre of Policy Studies, a research centre at Monash University, is devoted to quantitative 
analysis of issues relevant to Australian  economic policy.  
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MONASH-MRF divides Australia in eight regional economies. There are four 
types of agents in the model: industries, households, governments and foreigners. In 
each region there are thirteen industrial sectors. The regional demand and supply of 
goods are determined by the optimising behaviour of the agents in competitive 
markets. 
Concerning the production side, in each region firms use intermediate inputs and 
primary factors. Production is specified through a three-level nested technology. At 
the first level, the bundle of primary factors (value added) and intermediate inputs is 
modelled by a Leontief technology (i.e. they are used in fixed proportions with 
respect to the output). At the second level the primary factor bundle is a CES 
combination of labour, land and capital, while the intermediate input bundles are a 
CES combination of international imported goods and domestic Australian goods. At 
the third level intermediate inputs of domestic goods are formed as CES combination 
of goods from each of the eight regions while the input of labour is formed as a CES 
combination of labour inputs from eight different occupational categories. Thus, the 
intermediate inputs from different regions are not perfect substitutes in the 
MONASH-MRF model, such as domestic and foreign goods in the case of the 
Armington assumption. 
The demand side is specified through a three-level structure. At the first level, in 
each region the representative household maximises a Stone-Geary utility function, 
leading to the linear expenditure system (LES). At the second level, imported and 
Australian domestic goods are modelled by a CES function as in the standard 
Armington scheme. At the third level a CES function is also used to represent the 
imperfect substitutability among goods from each of the eight regions. The 
MONASH-MRF model includes both the Federal and State governments. A single 
aggregate foreign purchaser of exports is considered. To model export demands, 
goods are divided into two groups, the traditional exports, agriculture and mining, 
and the remaining non-traditional exports. 
MRF model can produce either comparative-static or forecasting simulations 
(dynamic set-up). A comparative static simulation can be interpreted as short-run or 
long-run effects according to the hypothesis about capital mobility. Short-run 
 41 
simulations are characterised by the assumption of fixed industry capital stock. Long 
run simulations assume that the industry capital stock is determined endogenously, 
while the world rate of capital return is exogenous. Finally, forecasting simulations 
allow for capital accumulation over the years and population growth.  
It is important to describe the labour market. The MRF model allows for both: ‘(i) 
an exogenous determination of the regional population, with an endogenous 
determination of at least one variable of the regional labour market, chosen from 
regional unemployment, regional participation rates and regional wage and (ii) an 
exogenous determination of all the previously mentioned variables of the regional 
labour market and an endogenous determination of regional migration, and hence, of 
regional population’ (Peter et al., 1996, p. 50). 
A highly disaggregated version of the MONASH-MRF model was created by 
Horridge et al. in 2003. This version, named TERM model, is typically solved for 
approximately thirty regions and forty sectors.14  
 
 
1.4.3 The MIRAGE-DREAM model 
 
The MIRAGE-DREAM model was developed by Jean and Laborde in 2004 with 
the support of CEPII and European Commission (EC). The model is applied to 119 
NUTS 1 regions in the EU25.  
Jean and Laborde use two different dataset: GTAP and REGIO of EUROSTAT. 
The GTAP 5.3 database (see Dimaranan and Mc Dougall, 2002) is the source of 
national data, while REGIO provides information at the regional NUTS 1 level. 
However, some countries show a high rate of missing data and an excessive level of 
sector aggregation at the regional level. Thus, the authors draw additional data from 
national statistical institutes. Concerning sectoral aggregation, the European NACE 
(Nomenclature Générale des Activités Économiques) classification is mapped into 
                                                 
14
 TERM stands for The Enormous Regional Model. 
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the GTAP one in order to obtain a consistent harmonised dataset. The base year for 
both datasets is 1997. 
Jean and Laborde make use of a two-stage strategy. In the first stage MIRAGE 
calculates the impact of trade policy shock for the EU25 as a whole. In the second 
stage the results of the impact are used as input for the DREAM model, i.e. the 
changes in EU25 import prices and export demand represent the exogenous shock in 
the DREAM model.  
DREAM is a CGE model in which each of the 119 NUTS 1 regions is considered 
separately and the trade relationships of each region are described by the results of 
the MIRAGE model. For this reason, the theoretical structure of the DREAM model 
is as consistent as possible with that of MIRAGE. Nevertheless, some simplifying 
assumptions are introduced in the DREAM model in order to make it possible to 
consider each NUTS 1 region separately. The main simplifications are the following. 
(i)  The country mix of imports, as well as the country mix of exports are assumed 
to be constant across regions within each country in the EU25 according to GTAP 
database. This assumption is required due to the lack of well-suited trade data at the 
NUTS 1 level. 
(ii) Unlike MIRAGE, all the sectors are characterised by perfect competition and  
constant returns to scale.   
(iii) The composition of the intermediate inputs basket for each sector is assumed 
to be fixed (Leontief technology). In the MIRAGE model imperfect substitution 
across intermediate inputs from different sectors is modelled through a CES function. 
Regarding the demand side, in each NUTS 1 region representative household 
maximises a LES-CES utility function, which is non-homotetic due to a minimum 
level of consumption. The main source of income for the household is the returns to 
the production factors it earns. Labour wages are assumed to be earned wholly by the 
representative regional household. In contrast the regional household earns capital 
income generated by the capital stock from different NUTS 1 regions, but the 
production in the region is made using the capital stock installed in the region. 
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The representative household saves a constant share of its disposable income. As 
in MIRAGE, total demand consists of final consumption, intermediate inputs and 
capital goods. 
The geographical distribution of demand follows a three-level structure. At the 
first level, goods are divided into two groups: goods from developed countries and 
goods from developing countries. As in MIRAGE, this assumption allows for 
different product quality ranges. At the second level an Armington specification for 
each country divides the demand between domestic and foreign goods. At the third 
level, for each country within the EU25, a CES function defines the imperfect 
substitution across products from different NUTS 1 regions within the same country. 
The production side is very close to that of MIRAGE. There are five factors of 
production: skilled labour, unskilled labour, capital, land and natural resources. A 
CES bundle is used to take into account the complementarity between capital and 
skilled labour. However, as stated above and unlike MIRAGE, intermediate inputs in 
each sector are used in fixed proportions. 
Concerning the mobility of production factors across regions, land and natural 
resources are immobile in the region and are sector specific. Capital is assumed to be 
perfectly mobile across sectors and regions in the EU25. Unskilled and skilled labour 
is perfectly mobile across sectors. The imperfect labour mobility within each country 
of the EU25 is modelled through a CET function. No sensitivity analysis is 
conducted on the robustness of the results with respect to the different degrees of 
labour mobility. The value of the elasticity of migration is based mainly on 
Eichengreen work (1993).   
The macroeconomic closure is neoclassical, the investment is savings-driven and 
is equal to the savings for the EU25 as a whole. For the EU25, the current balance 
(i.e. the difference between savings and investments) is exogenous and as a result, 
the EU25 current external balance is also exogenous. In contrast, the current account 
is endogenous in each region within the EU25. 
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Chapter 2  
A global CGE trade model at the NUTS 1 
level with perfect competition 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In the first chapter I set out the main global CGE trade models and their evolution 
over the years. Special attention was given to the analysis of global CGE trade 
models at the sub-national level. 
Now I present my version of a global CGE model at the sub-national level. It is 
applied to the 68 NUTS 1 regions within the first 15 member states of the European 
Union (EU15). The model has been built starting from the updated version of the 
MIRAGE model (Decreux and Valin, 2007) but several important changes have been 
introduced. As a result, the model must be considered apart from MIRAGE, as my 
original contribution. 
My approach is also different from that used by Jean and Laborde (2004) in the 
MIRAGE-DREAM model, where a NUTS 1 representative regional household as 
well as a NUTS 1 representative regional firm appear. Their model is very 
demanding both in terms of data and computational resources. However, the lack of 
well-suited data concerning trade across NUTS 1 regions and between NUTS 1 
regions and countries outside of Europe makes it necessary to resort to simplifying 
assumptions. 
In contrast, I have built a parsimonious CGE model which uses relatively little 
information at the NUTS 1 level, i.e. the value added, skilled and unskilled labour. 
Only the production side is considered at the NUTS 1 level. In each NUTS 1 region, 
a representative firm maximises profits. Simplifying assumptions are made for all the 
variables of production other than the value added, skilled and unskilled labour.  
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The demand side continues to be specified at the EU15 level. This means that 
imports, exports, domestic demand, as well as the associated prices, are at the EU15 
level. This implies, for example, that the price of the goods, paid by the EU15 
representative household, is the same in all the NUTS 1 regions. In a perfectly 
competitive equilibrium, the price is equal to the marginal cost. As a result, all the 
firms within the EU15 have the same marginal cost but they use inputs by different 
intensities according to the NUTS 1 region where the production takes place. Thus, 
the focus is on the production side at the NUTS 1 level. 
In addition, the MIRAGE-DREAM model gives a poor economic interpretation of 
trade policy effects. For this reason, I have built a stylised model, which reproduces 
the main features of my big model, in order to better understand the underlying 
economic functioning.  
Unlike the MIRAGE-DREAM model, I conduct a sensitivity analysis on trade 
policy results  according to two different degrees of skilled/unskilled labour mobility 
(perfect immobility at the NUTS 1 level and high mobility within the EU15). 
Moreover, an integrated unskilled/skilled labour market within the EU27 is tested.    
In this chapter I assume perfect competition and constant returns to scale to hold 
in all the sectors; in the third chapter the case of imperfect competition will be 
discussed in-depth.  
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 the two datasets are described, 
the regional one and national one, as well as the procedure used to match them. In 
section 3 the chosen sectoral and geographical aggregations are presented. In section 
4 the theoretical structure is set out. In section 5 the calibration strategy is described. 
In section 6 the trade policy shock is illustrated. In section 7 the results of trade 
policy on production reallocation across sectors in each region are presented as well 
as the results of the sensitivity analysis which is conducted to test the relevance of 
the assumption about skilled/unskilled labour mobility on production reallocation. 
Other interesting results are presented: the unskilled/skilled labour migration within 
the EU15, the change in the value added at the NUTS level and the changes in the 
trade patterns and welfare at the macro-area level. In section 8 a stylised model is 
proposed for interpreting the results. 
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2.2  Database 
 
Two different databases are used: a national database and a sub-national database. 
The national database is GTAP 6 (Dimaranan and Mac Dougall, 2005). It is a large 
SAM for 87 countries or groups of countries and 57 sectors. It contains information 
on bilateral trade flows and transport linkages among countries. It also incorporates 
the MAcMap database for tariff barriers. MAcMap is a highly esteemed dataset on 
trade protection. It includes ad valorem equivalent measure of specific tariffs, ad 
valorem tariffs and tariff quotas. In addition, preferential agreements are taken into 
account in a quasi-exhaustive way. As a result, the description of trade barriers 
preserves the bilateral dimension of the information. A special procedure is designed 
to limit the extension of the bias that occurs when tariffs are aggregated according to 
the nomenclature chosen for the CGE analysis (Bouët et al., 2004). The base year for 
the GTAP 6 version is 2001. 
The sub-national database is derived from EUROSTAT. I draw on the 
methodology used by Laborde and Valin (2007) to obtain value added, skilled and 
unskilled labour at the NUTS 1 level. Laborde and Valin use e2vabp95, 
sbs_r_NUTS_03 and lf2eedu EUROSTAT tables, which consider 247 NUTS 2 
regions in the EU25.1 The e2vabp95 table contains the NUTS 2 value added for 16 
NACE sectors. The sbs_r_NUTS_03 table contains data on employment at the NUTS 
2 level for 63 NACE sectors. The lf2eedu table contains NUTS 2 data on 
employment listed by the highest level of education attained. 
The sbs_r_NUTS_03 table does not contain any precise data for employment in 
the agricultural sector. Thus, it is supplemented by the a2acc797 EUROSTAT table, 
which provides data on the production of 39 agricultural products. The agricultural 
employment is divided among the NUTS 2 regions according to the production share 
of each NUTS 2 region. 
The e2vabp95 table provides data on value added in only 16 NACE sectors. In 
order to have more detailed information, value added in each country is distributed at 
                                                 
1
 Data are not available for Bulgaria, Romania and the French Overseas Territories.  
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a more detailed sector level by using the GTAP 6 database. This new value is then 
distributed among the NUTS 2 regions according to employment share computed in 
the sbs_r_NUTS_03 table. 
To determine skilled and unskilled labour, Laborde and Valin refer to the lf2eedu 
table of EUROSTAT. The table provides the number of low-skilled, medium-skilled 
and high-skilled labour for each NUTS 2 region. The EUROSTAT database defines 
skilled and unskilled labour based on the ISCED (International Standard 
Classification of Education) classification, i.e. according to the highest level of 
education attained. In contrast, GTAP uses the ILO (International Labour 
Organisation) classification. In GTAP, the skilled labour (professional workers) 
category is made up of managers and administrators, professionals and para-
professionals. Trades-persons, clerks, salespersons and personal service workers, 
plant and machine operators and drivers, labourers and related workers, and farm 
workers comprise the unskilled labour (production workers) category. Considering 
that the medium-level in EUROSTAT corresponds to the ISCED levels 3 and 4 and 
that the analysis is conducted over developed countries, Laborde and Valin match 
low and medium-levels of education with unskilled labour and the high level of 
education with skilled labour.         
Unfortunately no data are available from EUROSTAT concerning the distribution 
of skilled and unskilled workers across sectors in the NUTS regions. Thus the 
authors adopt the following methodology to divide skilled and unskilled workers 
across sectors: 
1) At the national level, a mean wage 
,l cW is computed for each labour type l 
(unskilled and skilled) and for each European country c by dividing the country 
remuneration (GTAP data) by the number of employees in 2001 for each labour type 
l (unskilled and skilled) computed by using the lf2eedu table. 
2) For each labour type l, each European country c and each sector i, GTAP data 
are then used to calculate the share αl,c,i of skilled and unskilled labour remuneration 
in the total sectoral remuneration on a national basis.  
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The following formula is used: 
  
 
, ,
1l c i
l
α =∑  (2.1) 
 
3) It is assumed that the remuneration of each NUTS 2 region nut2 within a 
country has the same sectoral skilled/unskilled distribution as the country to which it 
belongs. Thus, it is possible to determine the remuneration REM for each labour type 
l, each sector i and each NUTS 2 region nut2 by multiplying the share αl,c,i (GTAP 
data) by the total NUTS 2 remuneration in each sector i obtained from the 
sbs_r_NUTS_03 and a2acc797 EUROSTAT tables according to the following 
formula: 
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4) Finally, assuming the mean wage 
,l cW  to be homogeneous across sectors in 
each NUTS 2 region within a country, the value of employment EMP in each NUTS 
2 region nut2, sector i and type l  is determined as follows: 
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, 2,
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It should be noted that EUROSTAT tables have some missing values. Filling 
methodologies have been applied by the authors by using other complementary 
tables from EUROSTAT and GTAP information (see Laborde and Valin, 2007). 
Most of the EUROSTAT data are from 2003 which is the most recent year that has 
the smallest number of missing values. However, when no data are available in 2003, 
data from 2001 and 2002 are used. 
 50 
To summarize, I can use a national database (GTAP 6) with 87 countries or 
groups of countries and 57 sectors, and a sub-national database (EUROSTAT) with 
247 NUTS 2 regions and 39 NACE sectors.2 
In the next section the sectoral and geographical aggregations chosen for the 
model are illustrated. 
 
 
2.3  Sectoral and geographical aggregations  
 
In this section I set out the sectoral and geographical aggregations chosen for the 
model and trade policy simulations.  
Two levels define geographical aggregation: one level is for the three macro-areas 
and the other one is for the 68 NUTS 1 regions in the EU15. The macro-area level is 
used to define the demand side variables. There are three macro-areas: the EU15, the 
rest of Europe (REU) and the rest of the world (ROW). I distinguish between the 
EU15 and the REU because the EUROSTAT database is more precise for the first 
fifteen member states of the European Union. In addition, Bulgaria and Romania do 
not figure in the NUTS database. Finally, it is reasonable to think of the EU15 and 
REU as more homogenous economic macro-areas. The  NUTS 1 geographical level 
is used to define production side variables. There are 68 NUTS 1 regions within the 
EU15. ROW and REU production variables continue to be defined at the macro-area 
geographical level.   
Concerning sectoral aggregation, there are four sectors. A small number of sectors 
is preferable because the aim is not to assess trade policy effects with respect to a 
special sector but rather to understand general equilibrium effects of production 
reallocation across the NUTS 1 regions.  
Table 2.1, Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 display chosen aggregations. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 39 is a compromise based on different EUROSTAT tables which have been used in addition to 
the GTAP information incorporated into the NUTS 2 dataset.   
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Table 2.1: NUTS geographical level of aggregation (68 NUTS 1 regions) 
 NUTS 1 regions 
Austria East Austria, South Austria, West Austria 
Belgium Brussels Capital Region, Flemish Region, Walloon Region 
Denmark Denmark 
Finland Mainland Finland, Ǻland 
France Île-de-France, Parisian basin, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, East, West, 
South West, Centre East, Mediterranean 
Germany Baden-Wüttenberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, 
Hamburg, Hessen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Lower-Saxony, 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, 
Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, Thuringia    
Greece Voreia Ellada, Kentriki Ellada, Attica, Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti 
Ireland Ireland 
Italy North West, North East, Centre, South, Islands 
Luxembourg Luxembourg 
Netherlands  North Netherlands, East Netherlands, West Netherlands, South 
Netherlands 
Portugal  Portugal  
Spain  North West, North East, Community of Madrid, Centre, East, 
South  
Sweden  Sweden 
UK North East England, North West England, Yorkshire and the 
Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, 
Greater London, South East England, South West England, 
Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland 
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Table 2.2: Macro-area geographical level of aggregation (three macro-areas) 
Macro-areas  
EU15 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom 
REU Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
ROW Rest of the world 
 
 
Table 2.3: Sectoral aggregation (four sectors) 
Sectors  
AGM Agriculture and minerals 
PRM Primary energy sources (petroleum, coal and gas) 
IND Manufactures 
SERV Services 
 
 
2.4 The theoretical structure of the model 
 
In this section the theoretical structure of the model is explained. The four main 
parts are identified: demand side, supply side, factor markets and macroeconomic 
closure. For notational conventions, list of variables, parameters and equations refer 
to the Appendixes at the end of the thesis. 
 
 
2.4.1 Demand 
 
As stated above, all demand variables are defined at the macro-area level mainly 
because of the lack of well-suited trade data among NUTS 1 regions and between 
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NUTS 1 regions and foreign countries. This implies that the price of each demand 
variable is equal for all the NUTS 1 regions. Unlike the DREAM-MIRAGE approach 
and for the sake of simplicity, trade-relationships are specified for the EU15 as whole 
and not by each single European country. 
As in MIRAGE total demand is made up of final consumption, intermediate 
inputs and capital goods. In each macro-area a representative household chooses the 
optimal sectoral composition of its final consumption by maximising a LES-CES 
utility function subject to the household budget constraint. 
The demand for capital goods in each sector is specified through a CES function. 
The intermediate inputs also enter in the production side, therefore this variable has 
been regionalized. However, the prices of the intermediate inputs are defined at the 
macro-area level.  
The standard Armington assumption is introduced. Product differentiation 
according to the macro-area geographical level of aggregation is modelled by a CES 
function. 
As in MIRAGE, in each macro-area the representative household includes the 
government. The household pays and earns taxes so that the public budget constraint 
is implicit to meet its budget constraint. Any decrease in tax revenues (for example, 
as a consequence of trade liberalization) is assumed to be exactly compensated by a 
non-distorting replacement tax. The representative household owns the factor 
endowments. 
The total demand at EU15 level is equal to the sum of the regional supplies at the 
NUTS level. As a result, it is supposed perfect substitutability across goods produced 
in different NUTS 1 regions (see Eq. (A.1) in the Appendix 4, List of Equations).   
Figure 2.1 illustrates the demand structure in each sector and in each one of the 
three macro-areas. The rectangle shows the variable, the rhomb the functional form 
used; i represents general sectoral index, while 
iARM
σ and 
iIMP
σ are, respectively, 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign aggregate good and elasticity 
across foreign goods (see also Appendix 3, List of parameters). 
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2.4.2 Supply 
 
The supply side is specified at the NUTS 1 level. Its structure is very similar to 
one used in the MIRAGE model, but the latter does not specify the production at the 
sub-national level.    
 
Figure 2.1: Demand structure 
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In each one of the 68 NUTS 1 regions a representative firm maximises profits. It 
uses primary factors to obtain value added and intermediate inputs to obtain 
aggregate intermediate input. Value added and aggregate intermediate input are 
linked by a Leontief technology to produce output. Thus, perfect complementarity is 
assumed between value added and aggregate intermediate input.  
In every sector of each NUTS 1 region aggregate intermediate input is defined by 
a CES function among intermediate goods of all other sectors. Therefore, 
intermediate goods are used as intermediate inputs in the production side but they 
also enter in the demand side together with the final consumption and capital goods. 
For this reason the price of the intermediate inputs are at the macro-area level. This 
means that the all the NUTS 1 regions face the same price of the intermediate inputs 
within the EU15.  
Concerning value added as in GTAP and MIRAGE models there are five primary 
factors: skilled labour, unskilled labour, capital, land and natural resources. The 
value added follows a two stage structure. At the first stage value added is given by a 
CES combination of land, natural resources, unskilled labour and a fictive factor. The 
latter is defined at the second stage. It is a bundle between capital and skilled labour; 
this modelling draws on MIRAGE and allows for the complementarity among the 
two primary factors which has been described in the empirical literature (Duffy, 
Papageorgiou and Perez-Sebastian, 2004). Therefore, as in MIRAGE, this implies 
that the elasticity of substitution between skilled labour and capital (σQ) is smaller 
than the elasticity of substitution between fictive factor and the other primary factors 
(σVA). 
Perfect competition and constant returns to scale hold in all the sectors.  
Figure 2.2 illustrates supply structure for each one of the 68 NUTS 1 regions and 
each one of the four sectors; nut represents the general index for the NUTS 1 region 
while σVA, σINI and σQ are, respectively, elasticity of substitution across primary 
factors, among intermediate inputs and between capital and skilled labour (see also 
Appendix 3, List of parameters). Sector 1 represents any of the four sectors. 
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Figure 2.2: Supply structure 
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2.4.3 Factor markets 
 
Factor endowments are assumed to be fully employed. 
Land and natural resources are immobile in each NUTS 1 region and in each 
sector. However, land is used only in agricultural sector and natural resources are 
only used in the agriculture and primary energy sources sectors. 
Skilled and unskilled labour are perfectly mobile across the sectors. Concerning 
geographical labour mobility, in each macro-area skilled and unskilled workers 
maximise wage income subject to a CET (Constant Elasticity of Transformation) 
constraint. This implies imperfect mobility within the EU15 and different wages 
across the NUTS 1 regions.  
Sensitivity analysis is conducted to test the relevance of the assumption about 
skilled/unskilled labour mobility; two different values (zero and ten) of the elasticity 
of migration in the CET function are simulated to analyse how the results of trade 
policy shock change at the NUTS 1 level by introducing labour mobility within the 
EU15.  
The ROW and REU macro-areas are not divided into regions, thus it does not 
make sense to think about geographical unskilled/skilled labour mobility. 
Nevertheless, an integrated labour market within the EU27 can be considered. In this 
integrated labour market skilled and unskilled workers can move not only within the 
EU15 but also between the EU15 NUTS 1 regions and the rest of Europe (REU). 
Unlike MIRAGE, capital supply is perfectly mobile across sectors and within 
each macro-area. It is then distributed among the sectors and the NUTS 1 regions 
according to the first order conditions for profit maximisation with respect to the 
capital factor. 
 
 
2.4.4 Macro-economic closure 
 
Macro-economic closure is neoclassical. Investment is savings-driven. It is 
determined by the income and the exogenous saving rate for the representative 
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household in the macro-area. In equilibrium, the value of investment equals the value 
of total demand for capital goods. 
The external current account balance is fixed, therefore the net flow of foreign 
income does not depend on a world interest rate. Unlike MIRAGE, the model does 
not take into account the role of FDI, which is useful to analyse especially in a 
dynamic set-up. 
The model is static. As a result, no transitional dynamic is considered. 
Comparative static must be interpreted as medium or long-run effects because capital 
supply is perfectly mobile across sectors and within each macro-area, which are very 
large. 
It is noteworthy to recall that income is defined at the macro-area level. Thus, the 
computation of welfare change by the standard equivalent variation measure cannot 
be carried out at the NUTS 1 level. As stated above, the focus of this work is on the 
production side, in particular the production reallocation across sectors at the NUTS 
1 level. 
 
 
2.5 Calibration 
 
Calibration is a very important stage in the building of a CGE model. The 
calibration strategy is crucial as we saw in the first chapter because trade policy 
effects can be very sensitive to the value of the parameters. 
In this model value added (VA), unskilled labour (L) and skilled labour (H) are 
taken from EUROSTAT database. Simplifying assumptions arise to determine the 
other variables of the production side. For this reason the repartition key of value 
added at the NUTS 1 level is used to regionalize the other production variables, 
according to the following formulas: 
 
 
,
,
, 15
i nut
i nut
i EU
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KEYVA
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=  (2.4) 
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, , , 15i nut i nut i EUTE KEYVA TE=  (2.5) 
 
 
, , , 15i nut i nut i EURN KEYVA RN=  (2.6) 
 
 
, , , 15i nut i nut i EUK KEYVA K=  (2.7) 
 
 
, , , , , 15j i nut i nut j i EUINI KEYVA INI=  (2.8) 
 
where nut represents the general index for the NUTS 1 region, i and j are sector 
indexes and KEYVA is the repartition key of value added; TE, RN, K and INI are, 
respectively, land, natural resources, capital and intermediate inputs (sold by sector j 
to sector i).3 Eq. (2.8) implies an additional assumption for the intermediate inputs, 
i.e. the distribution of the intermediate inputs among the NUTS 1 regions in sector i 
does not depend on sector that sells the intermediate good. 
It is reasonable to think that a greater valued added in the NUTS 1 region means a 
greater use of primary factors and intermediate inputs. However, this hypothesis 
neglects the fact that two equal NUTS 1 regions in terms of value added can use 
primary factors and intermediate inputs through different intensities, i.e. they can 
have different technologies. Data constraints force me to make this choice.  
Thus, skilled and unskilled labour are the only two factors which preserve their 
original heterogeneity at the NUTS 1 level. In section 2.8 it will be shown that they 
are decisive for  explaining trade policy effects. 
All the variables and parameters are calibrated to reproduce the SAM in the base 
year (2001). Most of the parameters can be directly determined through the available 
data. However, for some such as the CES elasticities, this operation is not feasible 
and, therefore, I explicitly refer to the latest version of MIRAGE model (Decreux 
and Valin, 2007), which, in turn, draws elasticities from empirical literature or 
plausible assumptions.  
                                                 
3
 See also Appendix 1 and 2 at the end of the thesis for clarification about notation and variable 
definitions. 
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Final consumption, capital goods and intermediate inputs all have the same 
elasticity of substitution across sectors. Its value is 0.6 for all three variables.  
The elasticity of substitution across unskilled labour, land, natural resources and 
fictive factor ( )VAσ is equal to 1.1 for all four sectors. The fictive factor is a 
combination between capital and skilled labour. As noted above, the fictive factor 
allows for skill labour/capital complementarity. For this reason the elasticity of 
substitution between skilled labour and capital ( )CAPσ is less than 1.1 and it is equal 
to 0.6.4    
The elasticities of substitution between domestic and foreign aggregate good 
( )iARMσ , i.e. Armington elasticities, are drawn from the GTAP 6 database. The 
Armington elasticity and the elasticity of substitution across foreign goods ( )iIMPσ  
are linked by the following relation: 
 
 ( )1 2 1i iIMP ARMσ σ− = −  (2.9) 
    
In the model the Armington elasticity is set exogenously and only depends on the 
sector; for agriculture it is equal to about 3.4, for primary energy sources 10.9, for 
manufactures 4.6 and for services 2.9. The elasticity of substitution across foreign 
goods is then calibrated residually using Eq. (2.9). 
Another important parameter is the elasticity of migration in the CET function, 
which determines skilled and unskilled labour supplies in each NUTS 1 region. 
Putting this parameter equal to zero means perfect immobility at the NUTS 1 level. 
As the value increases, labour mobility within the EU15 increases. 
In MIRAGE-DREAM the elasticity value of migration is chosen mainly on the 
basis of Eichengreen work (1993). Using a panel data analysis, Eichengreen finds 
that the elasticity of inter-regional migration with respect to unemployment and wage 
                                                 
4
 According to many studies (see Cahuc and Zylberberg for a survey, 1996) the elasticity of 
substitution between skilled labour or capital and unskilled labour is close to unity. However, Decreux 
et al. (2003) show that the true value of the parameter also depends on the level of sectoral 
aggregation.    
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differentials is smaller in the United Kingdom and Italy than that observed in the 
United States. This suggests that migration is less responsive to demand shocks in 
these European countries than in the United States. 
A Policy maker is likely to be interested in labour reallocation across the NUTS 1 
regions after a trade policy reform. Therefore, the elasticity of migration is a very 
interesting parameter. For this reason and unlike to MIRAGE-DREAM model, a 
sensitivity analysis has been conducted to test the relevance of this parameter for the 
determination of trade policy results. As a result, the parameter can assume two 
different values (zero and ten) according to the simulated scenario. 
The numeraire is the utility price of the representative household in the ROW 
macro-area. 
 
 
2.6 Trade policy simulation 
 
CGE models are widely used to simulate scenarios of trade policy liberalization, 
for example in the Uruguay and Doha rounds. The latter is the current trade 
negotiations of the WTO. Its objective is to lower trade barriers around the world to 
help the development of the international trade. The Doha round started in 2001 and 
it still has not been accomplished.  
Doha negotiations can be very complex. Indeed, the agreement must be accepted 
by all 153 WTO members (unanimity principle) and tariff cuts are harmonised in 
order to reduce trade distortions among countries.5 In addition, the WTO fully 
recognizes the heterogeneity among its members; therefore no commitment is 
required from the least developed countries and less commitment is expected from 
the middle income countries. This means smaller rate cuts for tariffs and subsidies 
and longer implementation periods. 
My model does not try to exactly simulate scenarios of trade policy liberalization 
in the current Doha round. The main objective is to shed light on possible outcomes 
                                                 
5
 For example, the so-called Swiss formula tends to cut higher tariff rates more than lower ones, 
since the latter are supposed to be less trade-distorting. 
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of global trade liberalization at the NUTS 1 level and to interpret the results. As 
noted above, the focus in on the production side. 
I start from MIRAGE to model trade barriers. The picture of trade barriers is rich 
in the latest version of MIRAGE (Decreux and Valin, 2007).  
The market access measure stems from the MAcMap database.6 Domestic 
supports on land and output are also introduced; they are assumed to be proportional 
to the volume of output or factor. Production quotas are considered; they generate 
rents.  
MIRAGE also introduces a price intervention mechanism to give more realism to 
the European agricultural trade policy and to make exportation subsidies 
endogenous. Basically three options are possible. When internal prices are higher 
than the intervention price (first option), no export support is given. When internal 
prices are lower than the intervention price (second option), producers receive 
subsidies to sustain production prices at the intervention level. Finally, an equation in 
the model forces the subsidies for exports to stay below the WTO ceiling (third 
option). For countries other than those in the European Union the export subsidy rate 
is set exogenously. 
In my model the rich picture of trade barriers is put aside and attention is focused 
on the market access measure. This was done for two reasons: first, to preserve the 
simplicity of the model in order to be able to better interpret its outcomes at the 
NUTS 1 level, second, to make the most of the MAcMap database. 
MAcMap (Bouet et al., 2004) is the most comprehensive tariff database currently 
available. It was expressly created for CGE trade models. As stated above, MAcMap 
provides a good measure of market access. This measure is a consistent ad valorem  
equivalent of specific tariffs, ad valorem tariffs and tariff quotas. Moreover, this 
dataset allows for preferential agreements, preserving the information at the bilateral 
level. Before the creation of the MAcMap database, assessment of multilateral trade 
policy liberalization was carried out without taking into account specific tariff nor 
preferential agreements. 
                                                 
6
 Market access for goods in the WTO consists of tariff and non-tariff measures. Non-tariff 
measures concern specific WTO agreements, such as the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Trade Regulations. In this thesis it is supposed that market access only concerns tariffs.  
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A good point for CGE modellers and researchers is the special procedure, which 
is designed to limit the extension of the bias occurring when tariffs are aggregated 
according to the nomenclature chosen for the CGE analysis. In fact, in CGE trade 
models every sector aggregates a number of products. If one product is protected by 
a prohibitive tariff, it will probably be aggregated with products, with lower 
protection and significant initial imports. The average tariff computed for the sector 
would lead to overstate the impact of a tariff cut. Alternatively, the method 
consisting in using an import-weighted average suffers from a serious problem of 
endogeneity because the higher the tariff the lower the import flow. Using instead 
world imports as a weighting scheme, as proposed by Leamer (1974), avoids the 
endogeneity but fails to account for the specificity of each economy.  
The solution adopted in MAcMap is a compromise between the need to avoid the 
endogeneity and the need to consider the specificity of each economy. Basically, 
imports from a reference group of similar countries are used as weights for the 
tariffs. Five groups of similar countries are identified according to a PPP GDP  and a 
trade openness criteria. Total import by a group has to be normalized to account for 
the size of each economy. 
The 2004 version of MAcMap is incorporated in the GTAP 6 database; the base 
year is 2001. The most recent version of MAcMap (see Boumellassa, Laborde and 
Mitaritonna, 2009) is used in GTAP 7; the base year is 2004. In my model GTAP 6 is 
used, thus the older version of the MAcMap database. However, global market 
access has not changed substantially from 2001 to 2004 mainly because the Doha 
round is still ongoing. Overall average tariff protection has decreased by 0.5 % from 
5.6 % in 2004 to 5.1% in 2001. This reduction is primarily due to the middle income 
countries, which had to achieve their Uruguay round commitments within 2004 and 
to unilateral liberalizations.7       
According to the MAcMap database and its ad valorem equivalent measure, the 
market access is the following in 2001. Agriculture is the most protected sector. The 
world average is 19.1%. Average agricultural protection ranges from 2.7% in 
                                                 
7
 China and India, for example, unilaterally cut tariffs for their industrial products to complete their 
WTO accession. 
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Australia to 59.6% in India. Manufacturing products outside textile and apparel are 
the least protected sector on average (4.2%). However, tariffs are low in developed 
countries but remain high in developing country. Tariffs in the textile and apparel 
sectors are also high in both developed and developing countries. Service market 
access is a problematic concept, since explicit tariffs do not exist. Sometimes 
equivalent tariffs for services are estimated using gravity equations. In my approach I 
only consider explicit tariffs.                
Table 2.4 shows the ad valorem tariff rate for the geographical and sectoral 
nomenclature chosen in my model. Basically, the parameter enters in the demand 
side  by the following equation: 
 
 ( ), , * , , , *1i mac mac i mac i mac macPDEM PY ATR= ⋅ +  (2.10) 
 
where PDEM is the price for the good i produced in the macro-area mac and paid 
by the macro-area mac*, PY is the price (marginal cost) for the good i produced in 
macro-area mac and the parameter ATR is the ad valorem tariff rate applied by the 
macro-area mac* and paid by the macro-area mac for the good i. Table 2.4 confirms 
the previous facts about trade barriers.8 Since the agricultural sector is the most 
protected one, I decide to implement a multilateral tariff liberalization in agriculture. 
Therefore, all the ad valorem tariff rates are set to zero in the agricultural sector for 
all the macro-areas (values in bold in Table 2.4). 
As noted at the beginning of this section, the trade policy simulation does not try 
to reproduce the current Doha round. Especially for the market access in the 
agricultural sector the definition of the tariff reduction involves very technical issues, 
such as the formula adopted for the cuts, the definition of the “sensitive products”, 
which are partly excluded from the general tariff reduction, and the commitments for 
the developing countries (Anania and Bureau, 2005). 
                                                 
8
 Not surprisingly, tariff barriers appear between EU15 and the rest of Europe, as 12 countries 
were not European members in 2001. 
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Consequently, the trade policy simulation in this model has to be interpreted as an 
illustrative exercise on the possible effects at the NUTS 1 level of a multilateral tariff 
liberalization in agriculture.            
The role of export subsidies and domestic supports in agricultural trade 
liberalization is not assessed. However, it can be useful to recall a study of Hertel and 
Keeney (2005). The authors use the GTAP model to simulate a full liberalization of 
the agricultural sector by high-income countries. According to this work, full 
liberalization of agricultural sector determines an overall $47.6  billion gain. More 
than 90% of the benefits come from improved market access, i.e. the removal of the 
ad valorem equivalent tariffs, while the impact of supports and export subsidies is 
limited.9  
Even if this model is used to assess tariff liberalization in agriculture, it can be 
applied to other sectors according to the special interest of the researcher.                 
 
 
Table 2.4: Ad valorem tariff rates 
  ROW EU15 REU 
AGM ROW 14.73% 5.27% 5.65% 
AGM EU15 10.70%  10.37% 
AGM REU 12.69% 4.95% 6.11% 
PRM ROW 1.64%  0.20% 
PRM EU15 0.01%  0.00% 
PRM REU 0.30%  0.88% 
IND ROW 5.10% 2.83% 6.85% 
IND EU15 6.10%  3.38% 
IND REU 6.97% 0.76% 3.97% 
 
Notes: the second column shows macro-area paying tariff, the first row macro-area applying tariff. 
Source: GTAP 6 database.  
                                                 
9
 Hertel and Keeney use MACMAP database for tariff barriers and OECD estimates for producer 
support in agriculture. The authors use data assembled by Aziz Elbehri of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s Economic Research Service for export subsidies. All the datasets are incorporated in 
GTAP 6 having 2001 as the reference year.    
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2.7 Simulation results 
 
In this section the results of trade policy simulation (world agriculture 
liberalization) are presented. GAMS software and the CONOPT 3 algorithm are 
used; there are 5197 equations and 5197 variables. 
In subsection 2.7.1 the production reallocation in volume across sectors in the 
NUTS 1 regions is shown. In subsection 2.7.2 the impact of unskilled/skilled labour 
mobility on the results of previous subsection is assessed. Finally, in subsection 2.7.3 
further interesting results such as unskilled/skilled labour migration within Europe 
and the change in total value added at the NUTS 1 level are illustrated; the changes 
in the trade patterns and welfare are also displayed at the macro-area level. 
 
 
2.7.1 Production reallocation across sectors in the NUTS 1 regions after a 
world trade liberalization in the agricultural sector 
 
In this section the results are shown regarding the production reallocation in 
volume across the four sectors in each of the 68 NUTS 1 region within the EU15 
after a world trade liberalization in agricultural sector. In order to have an overview 
of the sectoral weight in the EU15 the value of each sector in 2001 (the base year in 
GTAP 6) is reported in Figure 2.3. Not surprisingly, services (SERV) is the most 
important sector (more than 2001 $8000 billion), followed by manufactures (IND) 
and the agricultural sector (AGM). The weight of primary energy sources is very 
small. 
The results of this subsection are obtained under the assumption of  
unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level, i.e. workers have to stay in 
the NUTS 1 region to which they belong. This hypothesis is formalized by assuming 
that the elasticity of migration in the CET functions (see Appendix 4) is equal to 
zero, and denoting with the σL and σH, respectively, the elasticity of migration for the 
unskilled factor and skilled factor. 
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Figure 2.3: Production by sector in the EU15 macro-area  
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Source: GTAP 6 database.  
Notes: Tens of $ billion in 2001 . 
 
 
Before showing results at the NUTS 1 level, simulated effects of liberalization at 
the macro-area level are reported in Table 2.5. In the EU15 the AGM sector is 
affected the most, the production decreases in volume by about 1%. Variations are 
small in the other sectors and macro-areas. Thus, it is interesting to assess if 
reallocation effects are more important at the NUTS 1 level.  
 
 
Table 2.5: % Production change in volume at the macro-area level 
 ROW EU15 REU 
AGM 0.32% -0.93% -0.58% 
PRM -0.10% 0.07% 0.01% 
IND 0.01% 0.00% 0.05% 
SERV -0.02% 0.05% 0.04% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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Table 2.6 reports these effects for each one of the 68 NUTS regions. At first 
glance, it appears that positive and negative magnitudes are higher than the ones 
observed at the macro-area level. In addition, the changes are negative for all the 
NUTS 1 regions in the agricultural sector and both negative and positive in 
manufactures and services.  
 
 
Table 2.6: % Production change in volume at the NUTS 1 level  
 AGM PRM IND SERV 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.81% 0.05% 0.60% -0.18% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.86% 0.05% 0.36% -0.11% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.77% 0.05% 0.56% -0.11% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.91% 0.06% 0.61% -0.26% 
Sweden -0.86% 0.07% 0.15% -0.06% 
Denmark -0.83% 0.05% 0.10% -0.02% 
Mainland Finland (Finland) -0.86% 0.08% 0.08% -0.03% 
Åland (Finland) -0.84% 0.05% -0.36% 0.07% 
Ireland -2.15% 0.06% 7.02% -2.31% 
North East England (United Kingdom) -0.76% 0.07% -0.23% 0.06% 
North West England (United Kingdom) -0.72% 0.10% -0.51% 0.14% 
Yorkshire and the Humber (United Kingdom) -0.71% 0.08% -0.35% 0.10% 
East Midlands (United Kingdom) -0.74% 0.07% -0.24% 0.09% 
West Midlands (United Kingdom) -0.76% 0.07% -0.29% 0.10% 
East of England (United Kingdom) -0.74% 0.13% -0.55% 0.13% 
Greater London (United Kingdom) -0.76% 0.06% -0.73% 0.06% 
South East England (United Kingdom) -1.00% 0.11% -0.28% 0.05% 
South West England (United Kingdom) -0.80% 0.07% -0.29% 0.07% 
Wales (United Kingdom) -0.94% 0.07% -0.04% 0.02% 
Scotland (United Kingdom) -0.82% 0.08% -0.24% 0.05% 
Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) -1.10% 0.08% 0.89% -0.18% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
 
 69 
cont Table 2.6: % Production change in volume at the NUTS 1 level  
 AGM PRM IND SERV 
East Austria (Austria) -1.74% 0.06% 2.40% -0.59% 
South Austria (Austria) -2.47% 0.06% 2.99% -1.15% 
West Austria (Austria) -1.95% 0.06% 1.55% -0.63% 
Baden-Württemberg (Germany) -0.83% 0.09% -0.30% 0.23% 
Bavaria (Germany) -0.90% 0.10% -0.14% 0.09% 
Berlin (Germany) -0.76% 0.08% -0.60% 0.11% 
Brandenburg (Germany) -0.92% 0.11% -0.48% 0.14% 
Bremen (Germany) -0.73% 0.00% -0.37% 0.14% 
Hamburg (Germany) -0.76% 0.08% -0.50% 0.11% 
Hessen (Germany) -0.78% 0.10% -0.47% 0.20% 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) -1.19% 0.09% 2.10% -0.50% 
Lower Saxony (Germany) -0.79% 0.10% -0.29% 0.13% 
North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany) -0.78% 0.10% -0.35% 0.16% 
Rhineland-Palatinate (Germany) -0.83% 0.10% -0.21% 0.11% 
Saarland (Germany) -0.76% 0.10% -0.37% 0.19% 
Saxony (Germany) -0.87% 0.11% -0.33% 0.14% 
Saxony-Anhalt (Germany) -0.79% 0.11% -0.46% 0.15% 
Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) -0.81% 0.09% -0.45% 0.15% 
Thuringia (Germany) -0.83% 0.11% -0.38% 0.19% 
Luxembourg -1.10% 0.05% 1.06% -0.27% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) -1.06% 0.06% 1.94% -0.27% 
Flemish Region (Belgium) -0.94% 0.06% 0.29% -0.11% 
Walloon Region (Belgium) -0.96% 0.07% 0.32% -0.08% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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cont Table 2.6: % Production change in volume at the NUTS 1 level  
 AGM PRM IND SERV 
Portugal -1.47% 0.10% -0.69% 0.47% 
North West (Spain) -0.89% 0.09% -0.46% 0.21% 
North East (Spain) -0.78% 0.07% -0.59% 0.39% 
Community of Madrid (Spain) -0.79% 0.09% -1.15% 0.27% 
Centre (Spain) -0.85% 0.09% -0.10% 0.11% 
East (Spain) -0.77% 0.08% -0.84% 0.43% 
South (Spain) -0.85% 0.08% -0.45% 0.15% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -1.10% 0.08% 0.17% 0.10% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -0.93% 0.07% -0.35% 0.30% 
Attica (Greece) -1.44% 0.07% -1.38% 0.47% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -0.55% 0.07% -7.62% 1.62% 
North West (Italy) -0.78% 0.05% -0.29% 0.20% 
North East (Italy) -0.81% 0.07% -0.30% 0.23% 
Centre (Italy) -0.88% 0.07% -0.25% 0.10% 
South (Italy) -1.08% 0.07% 0.04% 0.04% 
Islands (Italy) -0.97% 0.08% 0.02% 0.03% 
Île-de-France (France) -0.92% 0.07% 0.01% -0.02% 
Parisian basin (France) -0.73% 0.09% -0.20% 0.10% 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (France) -0.82% 0.17% -0.13% 0.05% 
East (France) -0.78% 0.07% -0.17% 0.09% 
West (France) -0.81% 0.06% 0.01% 0.03% 
South West (France) -0.84% 0.06% -0.10% 0.05% 
Centre East (France) -0.91% 0.09% -0.23% 0.11% 
Mediterranean (France) -0.78% 0.07% -0.60% 0.11% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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In Tables 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 attention is focused on the ten greatest (positive and 
negative) changes in the AGM, IND and SERV sectors. PRM is neglected because 
the variations are generally small and the overall weight is not relevant in the EU15 
economy. 
Summarizing, South Austria and Ireland display, at the same time, the greatest 
decrease in agriculture, 2.47% and 2.15%, respectively, the highest increase in 
manufactures, 2.99% and 7.02%, respectively and the greatest decrease in services, 
1.15% and 2.31%, respectively. In contrast, Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) and Attica 
(Greece) have the greatest decrease in the IND sector (7.62% and 1.38%) but the 
greatest increase in the SERV sector (1.62% and 0.47%). 
Using the MIRAGE-DREAM model and simulating a full agricultural 
liberalization (domestic support and export subsidies included), Jean and Laborde 
(2004) find that Ireland, Portugal, the NUTS 1 regions of Greece except Athens area, 
Central and Southern Spain  and Southern Italy experience the greatest decreases of 
agricultural value added in volume. 
Consistent with the previous results, in this model the ten strongest production 
decreases in the AGM sector include Voreia Ellada (Greece), Portugal and Ireland 
but also Austrian NUTS 1 regions are affected by the shock. 
However, in the Jean and Laborde approach (2004) unskilled and skilled labour is 
imperfectly mobile within each European country of the EU25 and no alternative 
scenario is given. For this reason in the next subsection the role carried out by the 
labour mobility is looked at in-depth. 
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Table 2.7: The ten greatest % production decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 level   
 AGM 
South Austria (Austria) -2.47% 
Ireland -2.15% 
West Austria (Austria) -1.95% 
East Austria (Austria) -1.74% 
Portugal -1.47% 
Attica (Greece) -1.44% 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) -1.19% 
Northern Ireland -1.10% 
Luxembourg -1.10% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -1.10% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
 
  
Table 2.8: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the 
NUTS 1 level  
 IND 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -7.62% 
Attica (Greece) -1.38% 
Community of Madrid (Spain) -1.15% 
Luxembourg 1.06% 
West Austria (Austria) 1.55% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) 1.94% 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) 2.10% 
East Austria (Austria) 2.40% 
South Austria (Austria) 2.99% 
Ireland 7.02% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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Table 2.9: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the 
NUTS 1 level  
 SERV 
Ireland -2.31% 
South Austria (Austria) -1.15% 
West Austria (Austria) -0.63% 
East Austria (Austria) -0.59% 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) -0.50% 
North East (Spain) 0.39% 
East (Spain) 0.43% 
Portugal 0.47% 
Attica (Greece) 0.47% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 1.62% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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2.7.2 Sensitivity analysis on production reallocation with the introduction of 
unskilled/skilled labour mobility 
 
In this scenario it is supposed that skilled and unskilled workers can respond to 
trade policy shock by moving from the NUTS 1 region, to which they belong. There 
are two possible options. In the first one EU15 workers can move only towards other 
NUTS 1 region within the EU15. In the second option, EU15 workers and REU 
workers can move within the EU27. As explained in the section 2.4.3, the 
unskilled/skilled labour mobility is modelled through a CET function in which σL and 
σH represent the elasticity of migration for unskilled factor and skilled factor, 
respectively. In the first option these parameters refer to the EU15 labour market 
while in the second option they refer to the EU27 labour market. 
Jean and Laborde (2004) use elasticity of migration based on Eichengreen work 
(1993). As stated above, Eichengreen draws the value of this parameter from data of 
the United Kingdom and Italy and no distinction is made between unskilled and 
skilled labour. To the best of my knowledge no specific econometric estimates exist 
to calibrate unskilled/skilled elasticity of migration for the EU15 and the EU27 in 
CGE models. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis was carried out to evaluate the impact 
of the labour mobility hypothesis on trade policy results. As a result, the elasticity 
values of migration (σL and σH) are set to 10. Thus, the scenario of previous 
subsection, characterised by unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level, 
can be compared with the present one, characterised by high mobility within the 
EU15 or the EU27.    
Table 2.10 reports results for production change in volume at the macro-area level 
under the assumption of unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions 
within the EU15. The results in Table 2.10 compared to those in Table 2.5 confirm 
that the AGM is the most affected sector in the EU15 macro-area even if the percent 
change (-0.76%) is less in magnitude than in the case of labour immobility. The 
economic responses in services and manufactures remain about the same except for 
the EU15 manufactures, which are characterised by an increase of 0.13%. 
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Table 2.10: % Production change in volume at the macro-area level  
 ROW EU15 REU 
AGM 0.32% -0.76% -0.57% 
PRM -0.07% 0.16% 0.05% 
IND 0.01% 0.13% 0.05% 
SERV -0.02% 0.08% 0.04% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
 
Table 2.11, Table 2.12 and Table 2.13  display the results of the ten greatest 
(positive and negative) changes in the AGM, IND and SERV sectors at the NUTS 1 
level.  
According to Table 2.11, the Austrian agricultural sector is the most stricken 
because all three of its NUTS 1 regions (South Austria, West Austria and East 
Austria) are in the first three position of the ranking, however the changes are not 
great (between 1% and 2%). 
In contrast, Table 2.12 and Table 2.13 show a very strong reallocation of 
production in manufactures and services with inverse patterns for some NUTS 1 
regions. Indeed, two Greek NUTS 1 regions, Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti and Kentriki 
Ellada, have the highest positive values for production change in services, 18.64% 
and 7.53%, respectively, and the greatest negative values for production change in 
manufactures, -90.00% and -21.04%, respectively. Conversely, Luxembourg and 
Ireland have the highest positive values for production change in manufactures, 
23.33% and 31.40%, respectively, and the greatest negative values for production 
change in services, -6.06%and -11.09%, respectively. These results do not intend to 
be realistic because the labour mobility is likely to be too high, but they are a guide 
to the relevance of the assumption about labour mobility.  
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Table 2.11: The ten greatest % production decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 level 
 AGM 
South Austria (Austria) -1.72% 
West Austria (Austria) -1.43% 
East Austria (Austria) -1.28% 
Ireland -1.28% 
Portugal -1.27% 
Attica (Greece) -1.22% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -0.95% 
Luxembourg -0.94% 
South (Italy) -0.91% 
Islands (Italy) -0.82% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
Table 2.12: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the 
NUTS 1 level  
 IND 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -90.00% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -21.04% 
Attica (Greece) -10.24% 
Portugal -9.51% 
Île-de-France (France) 10.93% 
East Austria (Austria) 11.19% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) 11.23% 
Brussels Capital Region (Belgium) 17.87% 
Luxembourg 23.33% 
Ireland 31.40% 
 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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Table 2.13: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the 
NUTS 1 level 
 SERV 
Ireland -11.09% 
Luxembourg -6.06% 
East Austria (Austria) -3.19% 
North East (Spain) 2.99% 
East (Spain) 3.25% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 3.41% 
Attica (Greece) 3.56% 
Portugal 5.61% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 7.53% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 18.64% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
Table 2.14 reports the results for production change in volume at the macro-area 
level under the assumption of unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 
regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe (REU) within the EU27 (σL = σH = 10). Table 
2.14 confirms the results of Table 2.10 with the exception of the REU macro-area, 
which takes advantage of the integrated labour market within the EU27. Indeed, with 
respect to Table 2.10 the Rest of Europe shows a lesser AGM decrease (-0.46%) and 
a greater IND and SERV increase (0.17% and 0.14%). 
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Table 2.14: % Production change in volume at the macro-area level  
 ROW EU15 REU 
AGM 0.32% -0.76% -0.46% 
PRM -0.06% 0.16% 0.15% 
IND 0.01% 0.13% 0.17% 
SERV -0.02% 0.08% 0.14% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
Table 2.15, Table 2.16 and Table 2.17  display the results of the ten greatest (positive 
and negative) changes in the AGM, IND and SERV sectors for the 68 NUTS 1 
regions. The results of these three tables do not significantly change with respect to 
Tables 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13.  
 
 
Table 2.15: The ten greatest % production decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 level  
 AGM 
South Austria (Austria) -1.74% 
West Austria (Austria) -1.44% 
Ireland -1.30% 
East Austria (Austria) -1.29% 
Portugal -1.27% 
Attica (Greece) -1.22% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -0.94% 
Luxembourg -0.94% 
South (Italy) -0.91% 
Islands (Italy) -0.81% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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Table 2.16: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the 
NUTS 1 level  
 IND 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -95.00% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -21.28% 
Attica (Greece) -10.46% 
Portugal -9.65% 
Île-de-France (France) 10.79% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) 11.24% 
East Austria (Austria) 11.67% 
Brussels Capital Region (Belgium) 18.23% 
Luxembourg 23.34% 
Ireland 32.84% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
Table 2.17: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the 
NUTS 1 level  
 SERV 
Ireland -11.60% 
Luxembourg -6.08% 
East Austria (Austria) -3.34% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) -3.05% 
East (Spain) 3.29% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 3.48% 
Attica (Greece) 3.61% 
Portugal 5.65% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 7.60% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 19.64% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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2.7.3 Further interesting results 
 
In this subsection further interesting results of trade policy simulation are 
presented. The policy maker is likely to be interested in labour reallocation across the 
NUTS 1 region after the agricultural liberalization. For this reason in Tables 2.18 and 
2.19 migration results are reported for unskilled and skilled labour levels, 
respectively, under the assumption of unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the 
NUTS 1 regions within the EU15. 
 
 
Table 2.18: Unskilled labour migration within the EU15 
 Change in L supply 
Ireland 1.29% 
Luxembourg 0.67% 
Brussels Capital Region (Belgium) 0.55% 
Île-de-France (France) 0.41% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.36% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.35% 
East Austria (Austria) 0.31% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.28% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.24% 
Brandenburg (Germany) -0.27% 
Community of Madrid (Spain) -0.28% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -0.32% 
South (Spain) -0.32% 
Centre (Spain) -0.33% 
North West (Spain) -0.33% 
Attica (Greece) -0.37% 
North East (Spain) -0.37% 
East (Spain) -0.39% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -0.55% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -0.96% 
 
Notes: The 20 greatest % increases or decreases in unskilled labour supply (σL = 10). 
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Table 2.19: Skilled labour migration within the EU15 
 Change in H supply 
Portugal 2.00% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 1.90% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 1.11% 
Attica (Greece) 0.77% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 0.67% 
East (Spain) 0.49% 
Centre (Spain) 0.44% 
North West (Spain) 0.44% 
South (Spain) 0.41% 
North East (Spain) 0.40% 
Brandenburg (Germany) 0.39% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.41% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.44% 
East Austria (Austria) -0.51% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.57% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.59% 
Brussels Capital Region (Belgium) -0.67% 
Île-de-France (France) -0.74% 
Ireland -1.55% 
Luxembourg -1.73% 
 
Notes: The 20 greatest % increases or decreases in skilled labour supply (σH = 10). 
 
 
It is interesting to note that the NUTS 1 regions displaying the highest sectoral 
production reallocation also show the highest levels of unskilled/skilled labour 
reallocation. The labour reallocation follows an inverse pattern in these NUTS 1 
regions according to their sectoral specialisation. For example, Ireland and 
Luxembourg absorb unskilled labour because they increase production in the IND 
sector and decrease production in the SERV sector after the trade shock while 
Kentriki Ellada and Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti absorb skilled labour because they decrease 
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production in the IND sector and increase production in the SERV sector. Basically, 
the results do not change with the integrated labour market within the EU27 for the 
NUTS 1 regions, as it is shown in Tables 2.20 and 2.21. However, it can be noted 
that the REU experiences an unskilled/skilled labour immigration. 
 
 
Table 2.20: Unskilled labour migration within the EU27 
 Change in L supply 
REU (Rest of Europe) 0.24% 
Ireland 1.34% 
Luxembourg 0.66% 
Brussels Capital Region (Belgium) 0.56% 
Île-de-France (France) 0.40% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.35% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.34% 
East Austria (Austria) 0.31% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.27% 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) 0.24% 
Brandenburg (Germany) -0.28% 
Community of Madrid (Spain) -0.30% 
South (Spain) -0.34% 
Centre (Spain) -0.34% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -0.34% 
North West (Spain) -0.35% 
North East (Spain) -0.39% 
Attica (Greece) -0.39% 
East (Spain) -0.41% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -0.57% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -1.03% 
 
Notes: The 20 greatest % increases or decreases in unskilled labour supply (σL = 10). REU change in 
unskilled labour supply is also included. 
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Table 2.21: Skilled labour migration within the EU27 
 Change in H supply 
REU (Rest of Europe) 0.16% 
Portugal 2.00% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 1.98% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 1.11% 
Attica (Greece) 0.77% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 0.67% 
East (Spain) 0.49% 
Centre (Spain) 0.44% 
North West (Spain) 0.44% 
South (Spain) 0.41% 
North East (Spain) 0.41% 
Brandenburg (Germany) 0.37% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.42% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.45% 
East Austria (Austria) -0.55% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.58% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.60% 
Brussels Capital Region (Belgium) -0.68% 
Île-de-France (France) -0.74% 
Ireland -1.62% 
Luxembourg -1.74% 
 
Notes: The 20 greatest % increases or decreases in skilled labour supply (σH = 10). REU change in 
skilled labour supply is also included. 
 
  
Welfare analysis cannot be carried out at the macro-area level. Therefore, a 
Laspeyres index is used to evaluate the percent change in the overall value added at 
the NUTS 1 level. Table 2.22, 2.23 and 2.24 display value added changes 
corresponding to the three different scenarios about labour mobility.  
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Table 2.22: The 20 greatest % value added increases or decreases within the EU15  
 Change 
Ireland 0.45% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 0.28% 
Attica (Greece) 0.06% 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) 0.06% 
Portugal 0.04% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 0.04% 
East (Spain) 0.03% 
North East (Spain) 0.02% 
Community of Madrid (Spain) 0.02% 
North East (Italy) 0.02% 
Brussels Capital Region (Belgium) -0.02% 
Île-de-France (France) -0.02% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.02% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.03% 
South Austria (Austria) -0.03% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.03% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.03% 
West Austria (Austria) -0.04% 
East Austria (Austria) -0.05% 
Luxembourg -0.07% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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Table 2.23: The 20 greatest % value added increases or decreases within the EU15 
 Change 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 3.47% 
Ireland 1.75% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 1.18% 
Portugal 0.90% 
Attica (Greece) 0.62% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 0.51% 
East (Spain) 0.34% 
North East (Spain) 0.27% 
North East (Spain) 0.18% 
Flemish Region (Belgium) -0.19% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.20% 
Greater London (United Kingdom) -0.20% 
Denmark -0.21% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.28% 
Brussels Capital Region (Belgium) -0.31% 
East Austria (Austria) -0.32% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.35% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.47% 
Île-de-France (France) -0.79% 
Luxembourg -1.48% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 region within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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Table 2.24: The 20 greatest % value added increases or decreases within the EU27  
 Change 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 3.64% 
Ireland 1.83% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 1.18% 
Portugal 0.88% 
Attica (Greece) 0.62% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 0.51% 
East (Spain) 0.34% 
North East (Spain) 0.27% 
North East (Spain) 0.18% 
Flemish Region (Belgium) -0.20% 
Greater London (United Kingdom) -0.21% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.21% 
Denmark -0.22% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.28% 
Brussels Capital Region (Belgium) -0.31% 
East Austria (Austria) -0.35% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.36% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.48% 
Île-de-France (France) -0.79% 
Luxembourg -1.50% 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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The changes are small in the first scenario (labour immobility) but not negligible 
in the second and third ones (labour mobility within the EU15 and the EU27). The 
NUTS 1 regions, characterised by a stronger production reallocation, are the ones 
which experience the most important gains from trade policy reform in terms of 
increase of value added (Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti, Kentriki Ellada, Ireland, Portugal) and 
the most important losses from trade policy reform in terms of decrease of value 
added (West Netherlands and Luxembourg). 
The changes in the trade patterns, i.e. the change in the sectoral imports and 
exports at the macro-area level, are set out in Tables 2.25, 2.26 and 2.27.  
 
 
Table 2.25: % Trade pattern change in volume at the macro-area level  
  ROW EU15 REU 
AGM ROW 53.80% 18.80% 15.00% 
AGM EU15 31.59% -5.09% 39.78% 
AGM REU 43.68% 18.48% 18.49% 
PRM ROW -0.11% -0.08% -0.09% 
PRM EU15 0.06% 0.09% 0.08% 
PRM REU 0.01% 0.04% 0.02% 
IND ROW -0.01% 0.02% -0.07% 
IND EU15 -0.04% 0.00% -0.11% 
IND REU 0.09% 0.12% 0.02% 
SERV ROW -0.07% -0.28% -0.19% 
SERV EU15 0.25% 0.04% 0.13% 
SERV REU 0.09% -0.12% -0.03% 
 
Notes: The second column shows the exporting macro-area, the first row the importing macro-area. 
Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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Table 2.26: % Trade pattern change in volume at the macro-area level 
  ROW EU15 REU 
AGM ROW 53.80% 19.00% 15.00% 
AGM EU15 31.62% -4.91% 39.81% 
AGM REU 43.68% 18.68% 18.49% 
PRM ROW -0.11% 0.25% -0.10% 
PRM EU15 -0.16% 0.19% -0.16% 
PRM REU 0.04% 0.40% 0.05% 
IND ROW -0.02% 0.06% -0.11% 
IND EU15 0.04% 0.14% -0.05% 
IND REU 0.09% 0.17% -0.01% 
SERV ROW -0.07% -0.29% -0.19% 
SERV EU15 0.30% 0.08% 0.18% 
SERV REU 0.08% -0.14% -0.04% 
 
Notes: The second column shows the exporting macro-area, the first row the importing macro-area. 
Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
Table 2.27: % Trade pattern change in volume at the macro-area level 
  ROW EU15 REU 
AGM ROW 53.80% 19.00% 15.07% 
AGM EU15 31.62% -4.91% 39.90% 
AGM REU 43.76% 18.75% 18.64% 
PRM ROW -0.11% 0.26% 0.01% 
PRM EU15 -0.17% 0.19% -0.05% 
PRM REU 0.04% 0.41% 0.17% 
IND ROW -0.02% 0.06% -0.05% 
IND EU15 0.04% 0.14% 0.01% 
IND REU 0.18% 0.26% 0.14% 
SERV ROW -0.07% -0.30% -0.13% 
SERV EU15 0.30% 0.07% 0.24% 
SERV REU 0.13% -0.09% 0.07% 
 
Notes: The second column shows the exporting macro-area, the first row the importing macro-area. 
Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe (REU) 
within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 89 
Not surprisingly, the greatest variations strike the AGM sector. It should be noted 
that, even if export changes are small in the other sectors at the macro-area level, the 
NUTS 1 regions experience appreciable reallocation effects in production volume, 
which makes the NUTS model useful.  
Finally, welfare analysis is carried out at the macro-area level. Table 2.28 lays out 
the welfare gains measured in equivalent variation (EV) $ million under the three 
different labour market scenarios.  
 
 
Table 2.28: Equivalent variation at the macro-area level 
 ROW EU15 REU 
σL =  σH = 0 within EU15 5462 157 75 
σL =  σH = 10 within EU15 5616 176 87 
σL =  σH = 10 within EU27 5618 -160 408 
 
Notes: $ million.  
 
 
Under the assumption of unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level 
within the EU15, ROW gains about $5462 million. The gain are limited for the EU15 
and REU, $157 and $75 million, respectively.  
Increasing labour mobility within the EU15 in the second scenario results in a 
slight improvement in welfare. Indeed, the ROW gains $5616 million and the EU15 
and REU, $176 and $87 million, respectively. However the gain for Europe as a 
whole continues to be almost insignificant.  
Finally, assuming an integrated labour market within the EU27, the welfare 
increase for the ROW macro-area is only $2 million. Interestingly, the EU15 loses 
and the REU wins in the third scenario. The liberalization of agriculture determines a 
gain of about $408 million for the REU and a loss by $160 million for the EU15. 
Nevertheless, gains and losses continue to be almost insignificant for Europe. 
It is worth noting that other studies produce much higher estimates of equivalent 
variation. For example, using the GTAP model with perfect competition and constant 
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returns to scale in all the sectors, Hertel and Keeney (2005) find that full 
liberalization of agriculture (market access, domestic support and export subsidies) 
produce a $55 billion gain for the world as a whole. Using MIRAGE model with 
imperfect competition in services and manufactures, Bouet et al. (2005) implement a 
likely Doha round agricultural liberalization. They find a $18 billion gain for the 
world as a whole.  
In addition in both these two studies, the baseline equilibrium, in which trade 
liberalization is implemented, considers as achieved the European enlargement and 
other commitments that took place by the end of 2004 (e.g. China accession in the 
WTO). As a result, my model is likely to overestimate further the welfare gain of the 
tariff liberalization in agriculture because the world picture of tariff barriers refers to 
that of 2001. These different results could depend on the NUTS regional level 
adopted to define the production structure.  
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2.8 Interpretation of the results 
 
CGE trade models are criticized because they do not allow the results to be 
interpreted adequately. As stated by Panagariya and Duttagupta (2001, p. 3), 
‘unearthing the features of CGE models that drive them is often a time-consuming 
exercise. This is because their sheer size, facilitated by recent advances in computer 
technology, make it difficult to pinpoint the precise source of a particular result. 
They often remain a black box. Indeed, frequently, authors are themselves unable to 
explain their results intuitively’. 
For this reason I have built a stylised model in order to interpret the results and 
better understand the economic functioning of the big model.  
The focus of this model is on the production side. Welfare analysis can be carried 
out only at the macro-area level. Therefore, the interpretation is given for the 
production reallocation across sectors in each NUTS 1 region after the tariff 
liberalization in agriculture under the hypothesis of perfect unskilled/skilled labour 
immobility at the NUTS 1 level. In fact, this kind of effect can be considered as the 
most important result in the model. 
There are two main features concerning the results of trade policy simulation:  
 different negative magnitudes of production change in the agricultural sector 
(AGM) across the NUTS 1 regions, 
 different (positive and negative) magnitudes of production change across the 
NUTS 1 regions in the other sectors, manufactures (IND) and services 
(SERV).  
The stylised model aims at explaining the reasons for such results. 
Before the presentation of the stylised model, it is worth noting that skilled and 
unskilled labour are the only two primary factors for which data at the NUTS 1 level 
are available. As a results, they can be considered as the main source of 
heterogeneity across the NUTS 1 regions. It is possible to understand this by looking 
at the formula of the value added for the general NUTS 1 region at the calibration 
stage.  
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According to Eqs. (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) value added (VA) can be written as: 
 
 ( ), , , 15 , 15 , 15 , ,i nut i nut i EU i EU i EU i nut i nutVA KEYVA TE RN K L H= + + + +  (2.11) 
 
All the land (TE), natural resources (RN) and capital (K) variables use the 
repartition key of valued added (KEYVA)  to determine their NUTS 1 level. It is 
assumed that all the prices associated with the above-mentioned variables are 
initialised to unity at the calibration stage. Using Eq. (2.4), the Eq. (2.11) can be 
rearranged as: 
 
 ( ) ( )
, 15
, , ,
, 15 , 15 , 15 , 15
i EU
i nut i nut i nut
i EU i EU i EU i EU
VA
VA L H
VA TE RN K
= +
− + +
 (2.12) 
 
In the Eq. (2.12) it is clear that the source of the value added heterogeneity across 
the NUTS 1 regions stems from the skilled and unskilled labour at the NUTS 1 level. 
Let us now move on to the description of the stylised model. The assumptions of 
the stylised model  are the following: 
1) two countries (home and foreign countries), 
2) two regions (A and B regions) which both belong to the home country, 
3) two factors, the unskilled labour (L) and skilled labour (H), which are assumed 
to be perfectly immobile at the regional level and perfectly mobile across 
sectors, 
4) two sectors, sector 1 that is unskilled labour intensive, and sector 2 that is 
skilled labour intensive, 
5) a CES function, which uses unskilled and skilled labour to produce value 
added, and a Leontief technology which uses value added and intermediate 
inputs to produce output, 
6) constant returns to scale and perfect competition in both sectors, 
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7) a demand structure which reproduces that used in the big model (the 
Armington hypothesis is used to model the foreign trade). The elasticities of 
substitution in the CES functions are the same of those used in the big model.  
Assumption 4, in turn, implies that: 
 
 
1, 2,
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>  (2.13) 
   
 
1, 2,
1, 2,
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α α
α α
>  (2.14) 
 
where αL and αH are parameters of the CES value added function for the 
unskilled and skilled factors. These parameters can be considered as factor intensity 
indicators.  
Given that in the big model a full tariff liberalization is implemented in the 
agricultural sector, I suppose that all the tariffs are removed in the unskilled intensive 
sector (sector 1) for both home and foreign countries in the stylised model.  
Two cases are given for the stylised model. In the first case, A and B regions have 
the same technologies:  
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Eqs (2.15) and (2.16), in turn, imply that A and B have the same ratio of the 
unskilled/skilled labour endowments: 
 
 
A B
A B
L L
H H
=  (2.17) 
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Trade liberalization in the unskilled labour intensive sector is simulated for the 
case 1. The results for the production relative change (∆Y/Y) are the following: 
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From Eqs. (2.18) and (2.19) it is clear that different technologies between A and B 
regions are crucial to explain different magnitudes of the production relative change 
between A and B regions. This result does not depend on the region size, i.e. the 
factor endowments of the regions. 
The first case of the stylised model helps one to understand that different 
technologies are decisive in order to explain the different magnitudes of trade policy 
shock but does not help to understand which characteristics the technologies must 
have across sectors and regions in order to replicate the two main features of trade 
policy simulation in the big model. The second case of the stylised model meets this 
need. In the case 2 it is supposed that A and B regions have different technologies: 
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One condition is needed in the stylised model to replicate the results of the big 
model:  
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Eq. (2.22) is a technological condition on the sectoral difference between the 
ratios of the unskilled labour intensity to the skilled labour intensity. Both the left 
and right members of Eq. (2.22) have to be positive because they are the difference 
of the ratios between the unskilled and skilled labour intensive sector.    
In case 2 Eq. (2.22) determines the following results: 
    
 
1, 1,
1, 1,
0B A
B A
Y Y
Y Y
∆ ∆
< <  (2.23) 
 
 
2, 2,
2, 2,
0B A
B A
Y Y
Y Y
∆ ∆
> >  (2.24) 
 
In the big model there are four sectors while in the stylised model there are only 
two sectors. The result of this simplification is that the different (positive and 
negative) magnitudes in the IND and SERV sectors become different positive 
magnitudes in the skilled labour intensive sector. It can also be noted that a region 
(B) experiences the largest production reallocation across sectors. 
In order to explain the production reallocation across sectors in each NUTS 1 
region, I concentrate my attention on Eq. (2.22), the technological condition which 
gives the key parameter for interpreting the results, i.e. the sectoral difference 
between the ratios of the unskilled labour intensity to the skilled labour intensity. I 
use the following parameter in the big model as proxy of the key parameter in Eq. 
(2.22): 
 
 
,,
, ,
j nuti nut
i nut j nut
LL
Q Q
αα
α α
−  (2.25) 
 
where i and j are sector indexes, nut is the index of the NUTS 1 regions and αL 
and αQ are parameters of the CES value added function for the unskilled and fictive 
factors. It is noteworthy to recall that the fictive factor (Q) is a CES bundle of capital 
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and skilled labour (see the list of variables in Appendix 2). Indeed, in the big model 
the valued added is specified through a two-level nested technology (see Figure 2.2). 
To show how the parameter determines the % production changes, in Table 2.29 
and Table 2.30 I match the ten greatest % production decreases in volume at the 
NUTS 1 level for the AGM sector with the ten highest values of the α(agm/ind) and 
α(agm/serv) parameters. The latter is the difference between the ratios of the 
unskilled labour intensity to the fictive factor intensity in the AGM and SERV 
sectors, respectively. The former is the difference between the ratios of the unskilled 
labour intensity to the fictive factor intensity, respectively, in the AGM and IND 
sectors. 
 
 
Table 2.29: The ten greatest % production decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 level (AGM 
sector) and the ten highest values of the α(agm/ind) parameter 
 ∆Y/Y (AGM)  α(agm/ind) 
South Austria (Austria) -2.47% South Austria (Austria) 4.79 
Ireland -2.15% West Austria (Austria) 3.50 
West Austria (Austria) -1.95% Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 3.15 
East Austria (Austria) -1.74% Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 2.96 
Portugal -1.47% Portugal 2.91 
Attica (Greece) -1.44% East Austria (Austria) 2.73 
Mecklenburg-Vor. (Germany) -1.19% Voreia Ellada (Greece) 2.65 
Northern Ireland -1.10% Attica (Greece) 2.09 
Luxembourg -1.10% Ireland 1.58 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -1.10% South (Italy) 1.41 
 
Notes: ( ) ( ), , , ,/ /( / ) agm nut agm nut ind nut ind nutagm ind L Q L Qα α α α α−=  
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Table 2.30: The ten greatest % production decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 level (AGM 
sector) and the ten highest values of  the α(agm/serv) parameter 
 ∆Y/Y (AGM)  α(agm/serv) 
South Austria (Austria) -2.47% South Austria (Austria) 5.05 
Ireland -2.15% Portugal 4.41 
West Austria (Austria) -1.95% West Austria (Austria) 3.79 
East Austria (Austria) -1.74% Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 3.67 
Portugal -1.47% Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 3.41 
Attica (Greece) -1.44% Voreia Ellada (Greece) 3.25 
Mecklenburg-Vor. (Germany) -1.19% East Austria (Austria) 2.98 
Northern Ireland -1.10% Attica (Greece) 2.72 
Luxembourg -1.10% South (Italy) 2.02 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -1.10% Islands (Italy) 1.63 
 
Notes: ( ) ( ), , , ,/ /( / ) agm nut agm nut serv nut serv nutagm serv L Q L Qα α α α α−=  
 
  
It is possible to see that seven % production changes match the corresponding key 
parameters for the NUTS 1 regions in Table 2.29 and six % production changes 
match the corresponding key parameter for the NUTS 1 regions in Table 2.30 (the % 
production changes and corresponding key parameters, which match each other, are 
reported in bold). Therefore, given the production decrease in the agriculture sector 
for all of the EU15 regions, the most affected regions will be those in which there is 
a stronger sectoral difference between AGM and the other sectors in the relative use 
of the unskilled and skilled factors. For example, South Austria experiences the 
greatest decrease in AGM and uses more intensively the unskilled labour in the 
AGM sector and the skilled labour in the IND and SERV sectors with respect to the 
other NUTS 1 regions. 
An analogous argument can be made to explain the different (positive and 
negative) % production changes in the IND and SERV sectors, which are displayed 
respectively, in Table 2.31 and in Table 2.32. 
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Table 2.31: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 
level (IND sector) and the ten highest values of the α(agm/ind) parameter 
 ∆Y/Y (IND)  α(agm/ind) 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -7.62% South Austria (Austria) 4.79 
Attica (Greece) -1.38% West Austria (Austria) 3.50 
Community of Madrid (Spain) -1.15% Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 3.15 
Luxembourg 1.06% Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 2.96 
West Austria (Austria) 1.55% Portugal 2.91 
Brussels-Capital Region 1.94% East Austria (Austria) 2.73 
Mecklenburg-Vor. (Germany) 2.10% Voreia Ellada (Greece) 2.65 
East Austria (Austria) 2.40% Attica (Greece) 2.09 
South Austria (Austria) 2.99% Ireland 1.58 
Ireland 7.02% South (Italy) 1.41 
 
Notes: ( ) ( ), , , ,/ /( / ) agm nut agm nut ind nut ind nutagm ind L Q L Qα α α α α−=  
 
 
Table 2.32: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 
level (SERV sector) and the ten highest values of the α(agm/serv) parameter 
 ∆Y/Y (SERV)  α(agm/serv) 
Ireland -2.31% South Austria (Austria) 5.05 
South Austria (Austria) -1.15% Portugal 4.41 
West Austria (Austria) -0.63% West Austria (Austria) 3.79 
East Austria (Austria) -0.59% Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 3.67 
Mecklenburg-Vor. (Germany) -0.50% Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 3.41 
North East (Spain) 0.39% Voreia Ellada (Greece) 3.25 
East (Spain) 0.43% East Austria (Austria) 2.98 
Portugal 0.47% Attica (Greece) 2.72 
Attica (Greece) 0.47% South (Italy) 2.02 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 1.62% Islands (Italy) 1.63 
 
Notes: ( ) ( ), , , ,/ /( / ) agm nut agm nut serv nut serv nutagm serv L Q L Qα α α α α−=  
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So far the reasons, which cause different magnitudes in the three sectors, have 
been explained but it is also important to understand the sign of the production 
change across the NUTS 1 regions. In the agricultural sector there is no doubt 
because the sign is the same for all the NUTS 1 regions and, thus, this can be 
interpreted as a result of the demand side at the macro-area level. In contrast, the sign 
changes according with the NUTS 1 region in manufactures and services. This can 
be interpreted as a result of the improved efficiency in the allocation of the inputs, 
i.e. as a result of the supply side at the NUTS 1 level. 
Table 2.33 and Table 2.34 help us to understand the different signs in the IND 
sector.  
 
 
Table 2.33: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 
level (IND sector) and the ten highest values of the α(ind/serv) parameter 
 ∆Y/Y (IND)  α(ind/serv) 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -7.62% Portugal 1.50 
Attica (Greece) -1.38% North East (Italy) 0.75 
Community of Madrid (Spain) -1.15% North West (Italy) 0.66 
Luxembourg 1.06% Centre (Italy) 0.63 
West Austria (Austria) 1.55% Attica (Greece) 0.63 
Brussels-Cap. Region (Belgium) 1.94% South (Italy) 0.61 
Mecklenburg-Vor. (Germany) 2.10% Voreia Ellada (Greece) 0.60 
East Austria (Austria) 2.40% Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 0.52 
South Austria (Austria) 2.99% Islands (Italy) 0.51 
Ireland 7.02% Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 0.45 
 
Notes: ( ) ( ), , , ,/ /( / ) ind nut ind nut serv nut serv nutind serv L Q L Qα α α α α−=  
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Table 2.34: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 
level (IND sector) and the ten lowest values of the α(ind/serv) parameter 
 ∆Y/Y (IND)  α(ind/serv) 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -7.62% Ireland -0.02 
Attica (Greece) -1.38% Mecklenburg-Vo (Germany) 0.05 
Community of Madrid (Spain) -1.15% Northern Ireland (U.K) 0.14 
Luxembourg 1.06% Brussels-Ca. Reg. (Belgium) 0.14 
West Austria (Austria) 1.55% Walloon Region (Belgium) 0.19 
Brussels-Ca. Reg. (Belgium) 1.94% Scotland (United Kingdom) 0.20 
Mecklenburg-Vor. (Germany) 2.10% North East England (U.K.) 0.21 
East Austria (Austria) 2.40% Mainland Finland (Finlnad) 0.21 
South Austria (Austria) 2.99% Greater London (U.K)  0.21 
Ireland 7.02% Brandenburg (Germany) 0.22 
 
Notes: ( ) ( ), , , ,/ /( / ) ind nut ind nut serv nut serv nutind serv L Q L Qα α α α α−=  
 
 
For example, the Greek regions, Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti and Attica, experience the 
greatest decrease in the IND sector and have a α(ind/serv) value included within the 
ten highest values. This means that these regions use the unskilled labour in the IND 
sector and the skilled labour in the SERV sector more intensively with respect to the 
other NUTS 1 regions. In contrast, Ireland experiences the greatest increase in the 
IND sector and has the lowest α(ind/serv) value. This means that Ireland uses 
unskilled labour and skilled labour by similar intensities in both the IND and SERV 
sectors with respect to the other NUTS 1 regions. 
A similar argument can be used for the SERV sector. Tables 2.35 and 2.36 
indicate Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti, Attica and Portugal as the regions with the greatest 
increase in the SERV sector. These regions also have a α(ind/serv) value included 
within the ten highest values. In contrast, Ireland experiences the greatest decrease in 
the SERV sector and has the lowest α(ind/serv) value. 
Thus, the increases and decreases of the production change in the IND and SERV 
sectors are characterised by inverse patterns at the NUTS 1 level.  
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Table 2.35: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 
level (SERV sector) and the ten highest values of the α(ind/serv) parameter 
 ∆Y/Y (SERV)  α(ind/serv) 
Ireland -2.31% Portugal 1.50 
South Austria (Austria) -1.15% North East (Italy) 0.75 
West Austria (Austria) -0.63% North West (Italy) 0.66 
East Austria (Austria) -0.59% Centre (Italy) 0.63 
Mecklenburg-Vor (Germany) -0.50% Attica (Greece) 0.63 
North East (Spain) 0.39% South (Italy) 0.61 
East (Spain) 0.43% Voreia Ellada (Greece) 0.60 
Portugal 0.47% Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 0.52 
Attica (Greece) 0.47% Islands (Italy) 0.51 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 1.62% Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 0.45 
 
Notes: ( ) ( ), , , ,/ /( / ) ind nut ind nut serv nut serv nutind serv L Q L Qα α α α α−=  
 
 
Table 2.36: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 
level (SERV sector) and the ten lowest values of the α(ind/serv) parameter 
 ∆Y/Y (SERV)  α(ind/serv) 
Ireland -2.31% Ireland -0.02 
South Austria (Austria) -1.15% Mecklenburg-Vo. Germany) 0.05 
West Austria (Austria) -0.63% Northern Ireland (UK) 0.14 
East Austria (Austria) -0.59% Brussels Ca. Reg. (Belgium) 0.14 
Mecklenburg-Vor. (Germany) -0.50% Walloon Region (Belgium) 0.19 
North East (Spain) 0.39% Scotland (UK) 0.20 
East (Spain) 0.43% North East England (UK) 0.21 
Portugal 0.47% Mainland Finland (Finlnad) 0.21 
Attica (Greece) 0.47% Greater London (UK) 0.21 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 1.62% Brandenburg (Germany) 0.22 
 
Notes: ( ) ( ), , , ,/ /( / ) ind nut ind nut serv nut serv nutind serv L Q L Qα α α α α−=  
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In Tables 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 2.36 only two out of ten or three out of ten production 
changes match the corresponding key parameters. This means that further channels, 
in addition to the sectoral difference between the ratios of the unskilled labour 
intensity to the skilled labour intensity, could exist in the model that determine the 
sign in the IND and SERV sectors. However, the above-mentioned channel, based on 
the α(ind/serv) parameter value, is likely to be very important because it involves the 
NUTS 1 regions which shows the highest increases and decreases in the IND and 
SERV sectors, i.e. Ireland and Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti. 
To summarize, trade policy strikes the AGM sector and causes a production 
decrease in the AGM sector for all of the NUTS 1 regions. The NUTS 1 regions, 
which use unskilled labour in the AGM sector and skilled labour in the IND and 
SERV sectors more intensively with respect to the other NUTS 1 regions, are the 
most affected regions in the AGM sector. The decrease in the AGM production, in 
turn, determines a production reallocation and reduces the labour demand for 
unskilled labour. As a result, in general the unskilled factor loses (the wage goes 
down) and the skilled factor wins (the wage goes up). However, in the NUTS 1 
regions which use the unskilled labour in the IND sector and the skilled labour in the 
SERV sector more intensively, the IND production goes down and the SERV 
production goes up. In contrast, in the NUTS 1 regions, which use the unskilled and 
skilled factors in the IND and SERV sectors by similar intensities, the IND 
production goes up and the SERV production goes down. 
The introduction of unskilled/skilled labour mobility within the EU15 and the 
EU27 determines smaller decreases in the AGM sector and, not surprisingly, a larger 
production reallocation between the IND and SERV sectors, as shown in Tables 2.10 
through Table 2.17. Strong amplification effects are observed in these two sectors for 
the NUTS 1 regions, which experienced strong decreases or increases in the case of 
unskilled/skilled labour immobility. These amplification effects occur because 
workers can move toward the regions where they receive a higher wage. This is also 
the reason why the Greek regions and Portugal exhibit a stronger skilled immigration 
(Table 2.19 and Table 2.21) while Ireland and Luxembourg have a stronger unskilled 
immigration (Table 2.18 and Table 2.20).  
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Welfare analysis cannot be carried out at the macro-area level. Nevertheless, the 
% change in the overall value added can be evaluated at the NUTS 1 through a 
Laspeyres index. It is interesting to note in Tables 2.22, 2.23 and 2.24 that labour 
mobility increases the losses and gains in terms of value added, in particular for the 
NUTS 1 regions in which there is a stronger production reallocation.   
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Chapter 3 
A global CGE trade model at the NUTS 1 
level with imperfect competition 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In the second chapter I set out a global CGE trade model at the NUTS level. 
Perfect competition and constant returns to scale were assumed to hold in all the 
sectors. The perfect competition in the goods market implies a first best solution but 
the market is likely to have imperfections and to be characterised by oligopolistic 
behaviour. Imperfect competition should be considered to give a greater realism to 
the trade policy scenario. In addition, it is interesting to compare the trade policy 
results in a perfect competition framework with the trade policy results in an 
imperfect competition framework. The comparison in terms of productive efficiency 
or welfare can be interpreted as the distance between the first best solution and a 
second best solution. 
Norman (1990) explains the need to take into account the imperfect competition 
in CGE models. He builds simplified models (three sectors and two countries) to 
investigate the consequences of trade liberalization. He finds that imperfect 
competition makes a significant quantitative difference (compared to the standard, 
perfectly competitive theory) to the effects of trade liberalization on inter-industry 
trade patterns. In addition, the Armington assumption is a good approximation of 
product differentiation only with respect to the intra-industry trade but is not a 
substitute for explicit incorporation of oligopolistic interaction and product 
differentiation at the firm level.     
Imperfect competition is now also incorporated in the GTAP and MIRAGE 
models. However, in MIRAGE agriculture continues to be characterised by perfect 
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competition and constant returns to scale because of the high number of producers in 
this sector. This assumption is also preserved in my approach.1 
In this chapter I present my version of a global CGE trade model at the sub-
national level with imperfect competition. It is applied to the 68 NUTS 1 regions 
within the first 15 member states of the European Union (EU15). As in the version 
with perfect competition, the demand side continues to be specified at the EU15 
level. This means that imports, exports, domestic demand, as well as the associated 
prices, are at the EU15 level. The imperfect competition is modelled through a 
Cournot-Nash scheme, where the strategic variable is the quantity produced by each 
NUTS 1 region. It is supposed that all the NUTS 1 firms, producing in the EU15 
macro-area, face the same price in the macro-area where they sell their product. As a 
result, in each macro-area there is a unique price-elasticity of the demand which is 
perceived by all the NUTS 1 firms producing in the EU15 macro-area.        
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 the theoretical structure is set 
out. In section 3 the calibration strategy is described. The chosen sectoral and 
geographical aggregations remain the same, as well as the trade policy simulation. In 
section 4 the results of the trade policy on the reallocation of production and varieties 
across sectors at the NUTS 1 level are presented. The results of the sensitivity 
analysis on the reallocation of production and varieties across sectors at the NUTS 1 
level with the introduction of the skilled/unskilled labour mobility are also shown. As 
in the previous chapter, other interesting results are presented: the unskilled/skilled 
labour migration within the EU15 and the EU27, the change in the total value added 
at the NUTS level and the changes in the trade patterns and welfare at the macro-area 
level. All the results are compared with those obtained in the perfect competition 
case. An interpretation for the imperfect competition case is given in section 5. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In my approach the primary energy sources sector is also considered perfectly competitive 
because in the MIRAGE model it is considered perfectly competitive. Even if this is controversial, I 
preferred to preserve the sectoral structuring of MIRAGE. However, the weight of the PRM sector is 
very small in the European economy (see Figure 2.3).   
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3.2 The theoretical structure of the model 
 
In this section I explain the theoretical structure of the model: the demand side, 
the supply side, the factor markets and macroeconomic closure. Particular attention is 
given at the demand side, which is substantially modified by the introduction of the 
imperfect competition. As in Chapter 2, I refer to the Appendixes at the end of the 
thesis for notational conventions, list of variables, parameters and equations. 
 
 
3.2.1 Demand 
 
All the demand variables are defined at the macro-area level. This implies that the 
price of each demand variable is equal for all the NUTS 1 regions. As in the perfect 
competition case, total demand is made up of final consumption, intermediate inputs 
and capital goods.2 In each macro-area a representative household chooses the 
optimal sectoral composition of its final consumption by maximising a LES-CES 
utility function subject to the household budget constraint. With this type of function 
there is a minimum level of consumption which makes the consumer preferences 
non-homothetic.  
Figure 3.1 illustrates the demand structure in each sector and in each one of the 
three macro-areas. As usual, I put the variable in the rectangle and the functional 
form used in the rhomb; i represents the general sectoral index while 
iARM
σ , 
iIMP
σ  
and 
iVAR
σ are, respectively, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
foreign aggregate good, the elasticity across foreign goods and the elasticity of 
substitution  across varieties. 
The standard Armington assumption is made to model foreign trade. Thus, the 
domestic and aggregate foreign goods are not perfect substitutes. Also, the imports 
from different macro-areas are not perfect substitutes.  
                                                 
2
 The intermediate inputs also enter in the production side. Therefore, they are regionalized. 
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    Figure 3.1: demand structure 
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So far the structure of the demand has not changed with respect to the perfect 
competition case. At the following stage, the horizontal product differentiation is 
introduced. I follow the approach used in MIRAGE which is, in turn, derived from 
the one used by Harrison et al. (1997). This approach is applied to the demand side, 
while some changes are made for the production side which is regionalized at the 
NUTS 1 level.   
A Nash-Cournot scheme is supposed to hold in the manufactures and services 
sectors. The strategic variable is the quantity produced by each NUTS 1 firm. In each 
NUTS 1 region and imperfectly competitive sector there are Ni,nut symmetric firms, 
where Ni,nut  is the number of varieties in sector i of the NUTS 1 region nut. Each 
firm produces a unique variety. The standard Lerner equation allows for the 
endogenous determination of the mark-ups µ:      
  
 
, , *
, , *
,
, , *
1
11
i mac mac
i mac mac
i mac
i mac mac
P
PY
EP
µ = =
−
 (3.1) 
 
where µi,mac,mac* is the mark-up applied in the macro-area mac* by each firm of 
sector i producing in the macro-area mac, Pi,mac,mac* is the price applied in the macro-
area mac* by each firm of sector i producing in the macro-area mac, EPi,mac,mac* is 
the price-elasticity of the demand, as perceived by the firm producing in sector i and 
in the macro-area mac and selling its product in the macro-area mac*, and PYi,mac is 
the marginal cost of the firm of sector i producing in the macro-area mac. The 
marginal cost is determined by the equality between supply and demand at the 
macro-area level for the general variety using the following equation:   
     
 
, , 15 , 15,
15 15
i nut i EU i EU mac
nut EU mac EU
Y DVAR DEMVAR
∈ ≠
= +∑ ∑  (3.2) 
 
where Yi,nut is the production of the general variety in sector i and in the NUTS 1 
region nut, DVARi,EU15 is the domestic demand for the general variety produced in 
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sector i of the EU15 macro-area and DEMVARi,EU15,mac is the demand in the macro-
area mac for the general variety of sector i produced in the EU15 macro-area. It is 
clear that in the ROW and REU macro-areas the production (Y) continues to be 
defined at the macro-area level. Eq. (3.2) gives the equilibrium for the two 
geographical levels. It is worth noting that the demand for the general variety is 
specified at the macro-area level and is satisfied by different representative firms in 
the NUTS 1 regions. As a result, in each imperfectly competitive sector and in each 
NUTS 1 region there are Ni,nut symmetric firms which produce Ni,nut varieties. It is 
assumed that all the firms within the EU15 have the same marginal cost (PYi,mac). 
However, they differ in the use of the inputs (the factor intensity), as noted in the 
second chapter. The factor intensity depends on the NUTS level.  
The total number of varieties by sector in the EU15 (Ni,EU15) is given by the 
following formulas: 
 
 
, 15 ,
15
i EU i nut
nut EU
N N
∈
= ∑  (3.3) 
    
The number of varieties in each sector and in each NUTS 1 region is 
endogenously determined by the zero-profit condition according to the following 
equation: 
 
 
, , , ,
, 15 , 15,
, 15 ,
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1 1
i nut i nut i nut i nut
i EU i EU mac
i EU i nut
mac EUi EU EU i EU mac
PVA VA PAINI AINI
DVAR DEMVAR
PY N
EP EP≠
= + +
 
− +  + + 
∑
 (3.4) 
 
where VAi,nut and AINIi,nut are, respectively, the value added and the aggregate 
intermediate input in sector i and in the NUTS 1 region nut, PVAi,nut and PAINIi,nut 
are the associated prices and EPi,EU15,EU15 and EPi,EU15,mac are, respectively, the 
perceived price-elasticity of the demand for the domestic good in sector i and in the 
macro-area EU15 and the perceived price-elasticity of the demand in sector i and in 
the macro-area mac for the firm producing in the macro-area EU15. 
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In the REU and ROW macro-areas Eq. (3.4) becomes the following: 
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 (3.5) 
 
I assume an international Cournot oligopoly under market segmentation. This 
means that each firm conjectures that all domestic and foreign rivals keep their 
supply quantities to the market of the macro-area mac fixed when it varies its own 
quantity in the market of the same macro-area mac. It is possible to demonstrate that 
in this case the perceived price-elasticities of the demand are given by the following 
two equations: 
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where 
iVAR
σ parameter is the elasticity of substitution across varieties in sector i, 
Cσ is the sectoral elasticity of substitution across goods of the total demand in the 
macro-area mac, SDTi,mac, SMi,mac,mac* and STi,mac,mac* are, respectively, the share of 
the domestic demand over the total demand in the macro-area mac and sector i, the 
share of the imports from macro-area mac to macro-area mac* in sector i over the 
total imports of the macro-area mac* in sector i and the share of the imports from 
macro-area mac to macro-area mac* in sector i over the total demand of the macro-
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area mac* in sector i (see the list of equations in Appendix 4 for the mathematic 
expression of the shares).3 
In order to avoid the problem of dependency of the equilibria on the choice of the 
numeraire, which can occur in the CGE models with imperfect competition, it is 
supposed that firms have not full information about all the general equilibrium 
effects of their actions, i.e. the firms rule out the possibility that their production 
decision influences the aggregate income via factor prices and profit feedback effects 
(the so-called Ford effect). 
 
 
3.2.2 Supply 
 
The structure of the supply side remains essentially unchanged with respect to the 
perfect competition case. A Leontief technology uses value added and aggregate 
intermediate input to obtain the output. There are five primary factors: unskilled 
labour, skilled labour, natural resources, land and capital. A CES bundle is used to 
model the complementarity between capital and skilled labour factors. The elasticity 
of substitution between capital and skilled labour is less than one used to model the 
substitutability across land, natural resources, unskilled labour and the fictive factor 
(Q), i.e. the CES bundle. A CES function links natural resources, land, unskilled 
labour and the fictive factor (Q). In every sector of each NUTS 1 region aggregate 
intermediate input is defined by a CES function among intermediate goods of all 
other sectors. As noted above, intermediate inputs are one of the components of the 
total demand together with final consumption and capital goods. The variable is 
regionalized but its price is at the macro-area level. 
The main difference between the production in the perfect competition case and 
the production in the imperfect competition case is the presence of a fixed cost. The 
fixed cost makes the total average cost decrease as the output increases. This takes 
into account the role carried out by the economies of scale.  
                                                 
3
 A technical derivation of Eqs. (3.6) and (3.7) is given by Willenbockel (2004). 
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The fixed cost (fci,nut) is measured in terms of units of output. In the NUTS 1 
region nut and in sector i it is derived from the formula of total cost:  
 
 ( ), , 15 , , , , , ,i nut i EU i nut i nut i nut i nut i nut i nutN PY Y fc PVA VA AINI PAINI+ = +  (3.8) 
   
 
3.2.3 Factor markets 
 
The imperfect competition in the goods market does not influence the structure of 
the factor endowments which continue to be fully employed. 
The supply of land and natural resources is at the NUTS 1 level. These two 
primary factors are used only in the agriculture  and primary energy sources sectors.  
Skilled and unskilled labour are perfectly mobile across the sectors. Concerning 
geographical labour mobility, as in the first chapter, in each macro-area skilled and 
unskilled workers maximise wage income subject to a CET (Constant Elasticity of 
Transformation) constraint. This implies imperfect mobility within the EU15 and 
different wages across the NUTS 1 regions.  
Two different values of the elasticity of migration in the CET function are 
supposed. When the elasticity is equal to zero perfect immobility of the 
unskilled/skilled labour at the NUTS 1 level is assumed. When the elasticity is equal 
to ten a high mobility within the EU15 is assumed. As a result, two really different 
scenarios are simulated:  regional labour immobility and high labour mobility within 
the EU15. The sensitivity analysis is carried out to assess the impact of labour 
mobility on the production and labour reallocation across sectors at the NUTS 1 level 
after the trade policy shock.   
In addition, an integrated labour market within the EU27 can be considered. In 
this integrated labour market skilled and unskilled workers can move not only within 
the EU15 but also between the EU15 NUTS 1 regions and the rest of Europe (REU). 
The capital supply is perfectly mobile across sectors and within each macro-area.  
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3.2.4 Macro-economic closure 
 
The introduction of imperfect competition does not modify the macro-economic 
closure. It is neoclassical; the investment is determined by the income and the 
exogenous saving rate for the representative household in the macro-area. In 
equilibrium the value of investment equals the value of total demand for capital 
goods. The external current account balance is fixed.  
Comparative static is used to interpret the trade policy effects. These effects must 
be considered as medium or long-run effects because the capital is perfectly mobile 
across sectors and within each macro-area, which are very large. In addition, the 
zero-profit condition holds.  
 
 
3.3 Calibration 
 
As shown by Willenbockel (see subsection 1.2.2), the calibration is a very 
important moment for the modelling of imperfect competition in the CGE models. 
Imperfect competition requires three parameters to be calibrated: the elasticity of 
substitution across varieties, the mark-up and the number of firms. Two of the three 
parameters are generally set extraneously, while the remaining one is calibrated 
residually through the Lerner relationship. 
This method is not considered fully satisfactory in MIRAGE because the available 
information is only used for two out of the three parameters. Moreover, the 
consistency of the results is assessed ex-post. As a result, an original method is used 
in MIRAGE which takes into account all the available information about the three 
parameters, not only their value, but also their variance. For each sector, the 
parameter values, which will be used in the model, are chosen as to minimize the 
logarithmic distance between the parameter and its external estimate. The distance is 
weighted by the inverted variance of the logarithm of estimates. The minimisation 
problem is subject to the consistency constrains with respect to the values of the 
three parameters (the zero-profit condition is also taken into account).  
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The formula is the following: 
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where N, µ, σVAR and π are, respectively, the number of firms, the mark-up, the 
elasticity of substitution across varieties and the profit. The hat (^) denotes the 
external estimate and v the variance. The geographical index is neglected for the sake 
of simplicity. 
The data source for the external estimates are the following. The elasticity of 
substitution across varieties is linked to the elasticity of substitution across foreign 
goods according to an equation close to Eq. (2.9), which, in turn, linked the 
Armington elasticity and the elasticity of substitution across foreign goods: 
 
 ( )1 2 1i iVAR IMPσ σ− = −  (3.10) 
 
As consequence, 
iVAR
σ is derived from 
iIMP
σ  which is derived from 
iARM
σ . The 
latter is drawn from the GTAP 6 database and is assumed to be the same across 
countries or groups of countries for a given sector. 
The values chosen for the mark-ups are based on estimates by Oliveira-Martins, 
Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) for manufactures and by Oliveira-Martins and Scarpetta 
(1999) for services. However, these econometric analyses are carried out for 
developed countries. For this reason in MIRAGE it is supposed that the mark-ups for 
low-income countries are given by the following formula (LIC and HIC indexes 
stand for low and high-income countries): 
 
 ( ), , 1 1.5 1i LIC i HICµ µ= − +  (3.11) 
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Concerning the number of firms, this parameter seems to be the easiest one to 
calibrate since good estimates of the Herfindhal index by sector exist. However, the 
real problem lies elsewhere: a sector is not necessarily a competition field. Indeed, 
the sectoral aggregation chosen in a CGE model can imply that firms are not all 
direct competitors to each other within a sector. Therefore, in MIRAGE sectors are 
divided in sub-sectors to allow for the different competition fields. ‘The competition 
field has the same size whatever the sector. The estimates by Davies and Lyons 
(1996) are used as a first estimate for the number of firm by sector in Europe. The 
number of sub-sectors within each sector is assumed to be proportionate to output 
value in the EU. The equivalent number of firms (which only matters in the model as 
the inverse of firms’ average market share) is then computed as the first “gross” 
estimate for the number of firms, divided by the number of sub-sectors. The number 
of firms in other areas is then assumed to be the same than in Europe’ (Bchir et al., 
2002, p.43). 
I follow the approach of MIRAGE for the calibration of the key parameters in the 
imperfect competition. The elasticity of substitution across varieties and the mark-
ups remain the same because they are specified at the macro-area level. In contrast, 
the number of firms is at the NUTS 1 level. Therefore, I use the zero-profit 
condition, the Eq. (3.4), to distribute at the NUTS level the total number of firms by 
sector in the EU15, which I draw from MIRAGE.  
As in the first chapter, the numeraire is the utility price of the representative 
household in the macro-area ROW. 
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3.4 Simulation results 
 
In this section the results of the trade policy shock are presented. The shock is 
unchanged with respect to the second chapter. A world tariff liberalization in the 
agricultural sector is implemented. Thus, all the ad valorem tariff rates are set to zero 
in the agricultural sector for all three macro-areas.  
GAMS software and the CONOPT 3 algorithm are used. I have 5677 equations 
and 5677 variables. As mentioned above, imperfect competition is assumed to hold 
in the IND and SERV sectors, while AGM continues to be characterised by perfect 
competition.  
This section is organized as follows. In subsection 3.4.1, I show the production 
reallocation in volume across sectors in the NUTS 1 regions. The imperfect 
competition allows the number of varieties and the average production per firm at the 
NUTS 1 level to be determined. As a consequence, these two variables are also 
displayed for the NUTS 1 regions, which experience the ten greatest % production 
increases or decreases. In subsection 3.4.2, I assess the impact of unskilled/skilled 
labour mobility on the outcomes of the previous subsection. Finally, in subsection 
3.4.3 I illustrate further interesting results as unskilled/skilled labour migration 
within Europe and the change in the total value added at the NUTS 1 level. The 
changes in the trade pattern and welfare are also displayed at the macro-area level. 
The welfare analysis is carried out through the usual equivalent variation measure as 
well as through the number of varieties according to the “love of variety” approach 
of Krugman (1979). 
 
 
3.4.1 Production reallocation across sectors in the NUTS 1 regions after a 
world trade liberalization in the agricultural sector 
 
In this section I show the results on production volume reallocation across the 
four sectors in each of the 68 NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 after a world tariff 
liberalization in the agricultural sector. The results in this subsection are obtained 
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under the assumption of  unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level, i.e. 
workers have to stay in the NUTS 1 region to which they belong. This hypothesis is 
formalized by assuming that the elasticity of migration in the CET functions is equal 
to zero, and denoting with σL and σH the elasticity of migration for the unskilled 
factor and the skilled factor, respectively. 
Before showing the outcomes at the NUTS level, I report the simulated effects of 
liberalization at the macro-area level in Table 3.1. In the EU15, the AGM sector is 
again the most affected, the % production decrease in volume is more than 1%. The 
changes are smaller in the other sectors and macro-areas with the exception of SERV 
in the REU macro-area, which exhibits a 1.23% decrease. However, in the imperfect 
competition case, the variations in the IND and SERV sectors  are greater than those 
observed in the perfect competition case; the signs are also different (see Table 2.5 
for a comparison). This suggests that imperfect competition matters for inter-industry 
production reallocation at the macro-area level. It is interesting to assess what 
happens at the NUTS 1 level. 
 
Table 3.1: % Production change in volume at the macro-area level 
 ROW EU15 REU 
AGM 0.26% -1.08% -0.37% 
PRM -0.09% -0.17% 0.79% 
IND -0.07% -0.19% 0.28% 
SERV 0.24% 0.67% -1.23% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
 
  
Table 3.2 reports these effects for each of the 68 NUTS regions. At first glance, it 
clearly appears that positive and negative magnitudes are higher than the ones 
observed at the macro-area level (especially for the manufactures and services 
sectors). In addition, the changes are negative for all the NUTS 1 regions in the 
agricultural sector (as in the perfect competition case), positive for all the NUTS 1 
regions except Ireland in services and negative and positive in manufactures. 
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Table 3.2: % Production change in volume at the NUTS 1 level 
 AGM PRM IND SERV 
Portugal -1.71% -0.17% -0.72% 1.29% 
North West (Spain) -1.05% -0.18% -0.51% 1.92% 
North East (Spain) -0.93% -0.16% -0.66% 1.81% 
Community of Madrid (Spain) -0.94% -0.17% -1.34% 1.03% 
Centre (Spain) -1.01% -0.17% -0.08% 1.52% 
East (Spain) -0.92% -0.17% -0.95% 0.95% 
South (Spain) -1.01% -0.17% -0.50% 0.98% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -1.28% -0.16% 0.25% 2.70% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -1.10% -0.16% -0.29% 4.14% 
Attica (Greece) -1.67% -0.16% -1.53% 2.18% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -0.65% -0.16% -8.62% 8.73% 
North West (Italy) -0.93% -0.16% -0.40% 0.59% 
North East (Italy) -0.96% -0.16% -0.40% 0.76% 
Centre (Italy) -1.04% -0.16% -0.35% 0.56% 
South (Italy) -1.26% -0.17% -0.02% 0.58% 
Islands (Italy) -1.13% -0.17% -0.14% 1.10% 
Île-de-France (France) -1.06% -0.17% -0.24% 0.28% 
Parisian basin (France) -0.87% -0.17% -0.29% 0.67% 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (France) -0.96% -0.22% -0.23% 1.51% 
East (France) -0.92% -0.17% -0.26% 1.16% 
West (France) -0.95% -0.16% -0.07% 0.70% 
South West (France) -0.98% -0.16% -0.20% 0.86% 
Centre East (France) -1.05% -0.17% -0.36% 0.84% 
Mediterranean (France) -0.91% -0.17% -0.94% 0.82% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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cont Table 3.2: % Production change in volume at the NUTS 1 level 
 AGM PRM IND SERV 
East Austria (Austria) -1.91% -0.16% 2.12% 0.65% 
South Austria (Austria) -2.68% -0.16% 2.97% 1.96% 
West Austria (Austria) -2.13% -0.16% 1.42% 1.03% 
Baden-Württemberg (Germany) -0.97% -0.17% -0.41% 0.74% 
Bavaria (Germany) -1.04% -0.18% -0.26% 0.50% 
Berlin (Germany) -0.89% -0.17% -0.86% 1.36% 
Brandenburg (Germany) -1.06% -0.18% -0.72% 2.45% 
Bremen (Germany) -0.87% 0.01% -0.56% 5.58% 
Hamburg (Germany) -0.89% -0.17% -0.78% 1.87% 
Hessen (Germany) -0.92% -0.17% -0.63% 0.92% 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) -1.33% -0.21% 1.93% 2.57% 
Lower Saxony (Germany) -0.94% -0.18% -0.41% 0.82% 
North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany) -0.92% -0.17% -0.45% 0.45% 
Rhineland-Palatinate (Germany) -0.98% -0.18% -0.33% 1.49% 
Saarland (Germany) -0.90% -0.18% -0.51% 4.83% 
Saxony (Germany) -1.02% -0.18% -0.47% 1.37% 
Saxony-Anhalt (Germany) -0.93% -0.18% -0.64% 2.44% 
Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) -0.95% -0.17% -0.66% 1.98% 
Thuringia (Germany) -0.98% -0.18% -0.52% 2.63% 
Luxembourg -1.25% -0.15% 0.75% 4.43% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) -1.21% -0.17% 1.61% 1.88% 
Flemish Region (Belgium) -1.09% -0.16% 0.20% 0.71% 
Walloon Region (Belgium) -1.10% -0.17% 0.20% 1.69% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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cont Table 3.2: % Production change in volume at the NUTS 1 level 
 AGM PRM IND SERV 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.94% -0.15% 0.47% 2.99% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) -1.00% -0.16% 0.23% 1.36% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.90% -0.16% 0.29% 0.41% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) -1.05% -0.16% 0.47% 1.11% 
Sweden -1.00% -0.17% 0.06% 0.43% 
Denmark -0.97% -0.15% -0.07% 0.68% 
Mainland Finland (Finland) -1.00% -0.17% 0.00% 0.92% 
Åland (Finland) -0.96% -0.15% -1.86% 2.32% 
Ireland -2.31% -0.18% 6.91% -1.26% 
North East England (United Kingdom) -0.90% -0.17% -0.38% 2.18% 
North West England (United Kingdom) -0.85% -0.21% -0.69% 0.87% 
Yorkshire and the Humber (United Kingdom) -0.85% -0.18% -0.48% 1.09% 
East Midlands (United Kingdom) -0.88% -0.17% -0.36% 1.27% 
West Midlands (United Kingdom) -0.90% -0.17% -0.41% 1.01% 
East of England (United Kingdom) -0.88% -0.25% -0.77% 0.96% 
Greater London (United Kingdom) -0.91% -0.16% -1.07% 0.44% 
South East England (United Kingdom) -1.15% -0.20% -0.54% 0.55% 
South West England (United Kingdom) -0.94% -0.18% -0.46% 0.99% 
Wales (United Kingdom) -1.10% -0.17% -0.15% 1.87% 
Scotland (United Kingdom) -0.96% -0.18% -0.45% 0.94% 
Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) -1.26% -0.17% 0.80% 2.89% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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In Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 attention is focused on the ten greatest (positive and 
negative) production changes in the AGM, IND and SERV sectors. In Table 3.4 and 
Table 3.5 the number of varieties (N) and the average production per firm (Y ) at the 
NUTS 1 level are also displayed for the NUTS 1 regions which experience the ten 
greatest production increases or decreases. The PRM sector is neglected because the 
variations are generally small and its overall weight is not relevant in the EU15 
economy. 
 
 
Table 3.3: The ten greatest % production decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 level 
 AGM 
South Austria (Austria) -2.68% 
Ireland -2.31% 
West Austria (Austria) -2.13% 
East Austria (Austria) -1.91% 
Portugal -1.71% 
Attica (Greece) -1.67% 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) -1.33% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -1.28% 
Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) -1.26% 
South (Italy) -1.26% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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Table 3.4: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 
level and the associated changes in the number of varieties (N) and average production per 
firm (Y )  
 IND IND (N) IND (Y )  
Ireland 6.91% 6.91% 0.00% 
South Austria (Austria) 2.97% 2.98% -0.01% 
East Austria (Austria) 2.12% 2.13% -0.01% 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany) 1.93% 1.94% -0.01% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) 1.61% 1.62% -0.02% 
West Austria (Austria) 1.42% 1.42% 0.00% 
Community of Madrid (Spain) -1.34% -1.33% -0.01% 
Attica (Greece) -1.53% -1.51% -0.01% 
Åland (Finland) -1.86% -0.95% -0.92% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -8.62% -8.54% -0.08% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
 
 
Table 3.5: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 
level and the associated changes in the number of varieties (N) and average production per 
firm (Y )  
 SERV SERV (N) SERV (Y ) 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 8.73% 1.80% 6.81% 
Bremen (Germany) 5.58% 0.19% 5.38% 
Saarland (Germany) 4.83% 0.25% 4.57% 
Luxembourg 4.43% -0.22% 4.66% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 4.14% 0.29% 3.83% 
North Netherlands 2.99% -0.15% 3.15% 
Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) 2.89% -0.17% 3.07% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 2.70% 0.08% 2.61% 
Thuringia (Germany) 2.63% 0.24% 2.39% 
Ireland -1.26% -2.28% 1.04% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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Summarizing, South Austria and Ireland display, at the same time, the greatest 
decrease in agriculture, respectively, -2.68% and -2.31% and the greatest increase in 
manufactures, respectively, 2.97% and 6.91% (as in the perfect competition case). 
Ireland is also the NUTS 1 region which exhibits the greatest decrease in the SERV 
sector (-1.26%) but unlike the perfect competition case, it is the only region which 
decreases its production in this sector. In contrast Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) has, 
respectively, the greatest increase in the SERV sector (8.73%) and the greatest 
decrease in the IND sector (-8.62%). The overall picture at the NUTS 1 level is close 
to that described in the perfect competition case (see the next section for a detailed 
comparison).  
Concerning the number of varieties (N) and the average production per firm (Y ) 
in the manufactures and services sectors, it is worth noting that in the IND sector the 
change is almost completely driven by N, while in the SERV sector it is driven by the 
combination of the two above-mentioned variables with the prevalence of Y .    
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3.4.2 Sensitivity analysis on production reallocation with the introduction of 
unskilled/skilled labour mobility 
 
In this scenario I suppose that skilled and unskilled workers can respond to the 
agricultural trade liberalization shock not only by changing the sector but also by 
emigrating from the NUTS 1 region, to which they belong, to another NUTS 1 
region. There are two possible options. In the first one EU15 workers can move only 
towards other NUTS 1 region within the EU15. In the second option EU15 workers 
and REU workers can move within the EU27. As explained in the first chapter, the 
unskilled/skilled labour mobility is modelled through a CET function in which σL and 
σH represent, respectively, the elasticity of migration for unskilled factor and skilled 
factor. In the first option these parameters refer to the EU15 labour market, while in 
the second option they refer to the EU27 labour market. The aim is to assess the 
impact of labour mobility on the trade policy outcomes.  
Table 3.6 reports the results for production change in volume at the macro-area 
level under the assumption of unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 
regions within the EU15. The results of Table 3.6 compared to Table 3.1 confirms 
AGM as the most affected sector in the EU15 even if the % change (-0.81%) is less 
in magnitude than in the labour immobility case (the same dynamic was observed in 
the perfect competition case). The economic responses in services and manufactures 
remain about the same in the world with the important exception of the EU15 
manufactures, which change the sign of the % variation from negative to positive 
with respect to Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.6: % Production change in volume at the macro-area level 
 ROW EU15 REU 
AGM 0.27% -0.81% -0.36% 
PRM -0.02% -0.13% 0.87% 
IND -0.08% 0.52% 0.27% 
SERV 0.25% 0.24% -1.24% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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Table 3.6 also shows that in the imperfect competition case the variations in the 
IND and SERV sectors are greater than those observed in the perfect competition 
case (see Table 2.10 for a comparison). As in the previous subsection, this suggests 
that imperfect competition influences inter-industry production reallocation at the 
macro-area level. Let us now move on to the NUTS 1 level. 
  Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9  display the results of the ten greatest (positive and 
negative) changes in the AGM, IND and SERV sectors at the NUTS 1 level. The 
number of varieties (N) and average production per firm (Y ) are also displayed for 
the IND and SERV sectors.   
 
 
Table 3.7: The ten greatest % production decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 level 
 AGM 
South Austria (Austria) -1.77% 
Ireland -1.64% 
West Austria (Austria) -1.50% 
East Austria (Austria) -1.41% 
Portugal -1.15% 
Luxembourg -1.10% 
Attica (Greece) -1.07% 
South (Italy) -0.98% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) -0.96% 
Île-de-France (France) -0.92% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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Table 3.8: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 
level and the associated changes in the number of varieties (N) and average production per 
firm (Y ) 
 IND IND (N) IND (Y ) 
Ireland 50.86% 50.85% 0.00% 
Luxembourg 33.95% 33.92% 0.02% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) 27.75% 27.74% 0.01% 
East Austria (Austria) 16.68% 16.68% 0.00% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) 16.41% 16.41% 0.00% 
Île-de-France (France) 15.53% 15.53% 0.00% 
Portugal -14.88% -14.88% 0.00% 
Attica (Greece) -16.04% -16.05% 0.01% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -34.83% -34.84% 0.01% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -89.99% -89.99% 0.04% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
Table 3.9: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 
level and the associated changes in the number of varieties (N) and average production per 
firm (Y ) 
 SERV SERV (N) SERV (Y ) 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 26.88% 18.65% 6.94% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 16.63% 12.25% 3.90% 
Portugal 9.52% 8.62% 0.82% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 8.44% 5.63% 2.66% 
Attica (Greece) 7.30% 5.51% 1.70% 
Bremen (Germany) 6.24% 0.73% 5.48% 
East Austria (Austria) -3.68% -4.82% 1.20% 
Île-de-France (France) -3.78% -4.03% 0.26% 
Luxembourg -4.52% -8.83% 4.74% 
Ireland -17.11% -17.98% 1.06% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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According to Table 3.7, Austria is affected much in the agricultural sector because 
all three of its NUTS 1 regions (South Austria, West Austria and East Austria) are in 
the first four positions of the ranking; however the changes are not very great 
(between 1% and 2%). 
In contrast, Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 show a very strong reallocation of production 
in manufactures and services with inverse patterns for some NUTS 1 regions. Indeed, 
two Greek NUTS 1 regions, Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti and Kentriki Ellada, have the 
highest positive values for production change in services, respectively 26.88% and 
16.63%, and the highest negative values for production change in manufactures, 
respectively -89.99% and -34.83%. Conversely, Ireland and Luxembourg have the 
highest positive values for production change in manufactures, respectively 50.86% 
and 33.95%, and the highest negative values for production change in services, 
respectively -17.11 and -4.52%. As in the subsection 2.7.2, these results are not 
intended to be realistic, because the labour mobility is probably too high, but they are 
a guide regarding the relevance of the assumption about labour mobility.  
The outcomes do not differ substantially from those obtained in the perfect 
competition case. Concerning the number of varieties (N) and the average production 
per firm (Y ) and unlike the previous subsection, it is useful to note that in both the 
IND and SERV sectors the production changes are almost completely driven by N. 
Thus, the labour mobility assumption modifies the weight of these two variables on 
the overall production change by sector.     
Table 3.10 reports results for production change in volume at the macro-area level 
under the assumption of unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 
regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe (REU) within the EU27 (σL = σH = 10). Table 
3.10 confirms the results of Table 3.6 with the important exception of the REU 
macro-area, which clearly loses in the integrated labour market within the EU27. 
Indeed, with respect to Table 3.6, the REU changes the sign of the IND % variation 
(from positive to negative) and shows a greater decreases in the AGM and SERV 
sectors (-1.28% and -2.10). This situation is completely opposite to that observed in 
the perfect competition case where the REU gained from the integrated labour 
market within the EU27.  
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Table 3.10: % production change in volume at the macro-area level 
 ROW EU15 REU 
AGM 0.27% -0.82% -1.28% 
PRM -0.04% -0.17% 0.52% 
IND -0.08% 0.68% -0.90% 
SERV 0.24% 0.16% -2.10% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
Tables 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 display the results of the ten greatest (positive and 
negative) changes in AGM, IND and SERV sectors for the 68 NUTS 1 regions. The 
results of these three tables do not significantly change with respect to Tables 3.7, 3.8 
and 3.9.  
 
 
Table 3.11: The ten greatest % production decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 level 
 AGM 
South Austria (Austria) -1.60% 
Ireland -1.47% 
West Austria (Austria) -1.41% 
East Austria (Austria) -1.33% 
Portugal -1.19% 
Luxembourg -1.12% 
Attica (Greece) -1.08% 
South (Italy) -1.01% 
Île-de-France (France) -0.95% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) -0.95% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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Table 3.12: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 
level and the associated changes in the number of varieties (N) and average production per 
firm (Y ) 
 IND IND (N) IND (Y ) 
Ireland 40.40% 40.40% 0.00% 
Luxembourg 34.98% 34.96% 0.01% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) 25.67% 25.66% 0.01% 
Île-de-France (France) 17.25% 17.25% 0.00% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) 16.91% 16.91% 0.00% 
Portugal -14.09% -14.10% 0.00% 
Attica (Greece) -14.66% -14.66% 0.01% 
Brandenburg (Germany) -14.84% -14.84% 0.00% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -33.76% -33.77% 0.01% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -89.99% -89.99% 0.04% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
Table 3.13: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 
level and the associated changes in the number of varieties (N) and average production per 
firm (Y ) 
 SERV SERV (N) SERV (Y ) 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 26.95% 18.80% 6.86% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 16.37% 12.04% 3.86% 
Portugal 9.40% 8.51% 0.81% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 7.93% 5.16% 2.64% 
Attica (Greece) 6.96% 5.19% 1.68% 
Brandenburg (Germany) 6.79% 4.42% 2.27% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) -3.00% -3.47% 0.49% 
Île-de-France (France) -4.14% -4.39% 0.26% 
Luxembourg -4.71% -8.98% 4.70% 
Ireland -13.36% -14.26% 1.05% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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As noted in the second chapter, the introduction of unskilled/skilled labour 
mobility within the EU15 and the EU27 determines smaller decreases in the AGM 
sector and, not surprisingly, a larger production reallocation between the IND and 
SERV sectors with respect to the labour immobility scenario. Strong amplification 
effects are observed in these two sectors for the NUTS 1 regions, which experienced 
strong decreases or increases in the case of unskilled/skilled labour immobility. 
These amplification effects occur because workers can now move toward the regions 
where they receive a higher wage.  
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3.4.3 Further interesting results 
 
In this subsection I present further interesting results of the trade policy shock. In 
order to assess the labour reallocation across the NUTS 1 regions after the trade 
policy simulation, in Tables 3.14 and 3.15 I report migration results, respectively, for 
unskilled and skilled labour under the assumption of unskilled/skilled labour 
mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15.  
 
 
Table 3.14: Unskilled labour migration within the EU15 
 Change in L supply 
Ireland 2.12% 
Luxembourg 0.99% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) 0.87% 
Île-de-France (France) 0.60% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.55% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.52% 
East Austria (Austria) 0.49% 
Mecklenburg-Vor. (Germany) 0.43% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.43% 
Brandenburg (Germany) -0.39% 
Community of Madrid (Spain) -0.44% 
South (Spain) -0.49% 
Centre (Spain) -0.49% 
North West (Spain) -0.50% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -0.51% 
North East (Spain) -0.57% 
Attica (Greece) -0.58% 
East (Spain) -0.60% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -0.86% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -0.90% 
 
Notes: The 20 greatest % increases or decreases in unskilled labour supply  (σL = 10). 
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Table 3.15: Skilled labour migration within the EU15 
 Change in H supply 
Portugal 3.04% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 1.91% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 1.71% 
Attica (Greece) 1.18% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 1.03% 
East (Spain) 0.74% 
Centre (Spain) 0.66% 
North West (Spain) 0.65% 
North East (Spain) 0.61% 
South (Spain) 0.61% 
Brandenburg (Germany) 0.55% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.61% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.66% 
East Austria (Austria) -0.79% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.86% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.87% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) -1.02% 
Île-de-France (France) -1.07% 
Ireland -2.50% 
Luxembourg -2.51% 
 
Notes: The 20 greatest % increases or decreases in skilled labour supply  (σH = 10). 
 
 
 
 
As in Tables 2.18 and 2.19, the NUTS 1 regions displaying the highest sectoral 
production reallocation also show the highest unskilled/skilled labour reallocation. 
The labour reallocation follows an inverse pattern in these NUTS 1 regions 
according to their sectoral specialisation. For example, Ireland and Luxembourg 
absorb unskilled labour because they have an increase in the IND sector and a 
decrease in the SERV sector after the trade shock while Kentriki Ellada and Nisia 
Aigaiou-Kriti absorb skilled labour because they have a decrease in the IND sector 
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and an increase in the SERV sector after the trade shock. Basically, the results do not 
change with the integrated labour market within the EU27 for the NUTS 1 regions, 
as it is shown in Table 3.16 and Table 3.17. In general, these outcomes are very close 
to those obtained in the case of perfect competition.  
 
 
Table 3.16: Unskilled labour migration within the EU27 
 Change in L supply 
Ireland 1.75% 
Luxembourg 1.14% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) 0.84% 
Île-de-France (France) 0.74% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.62% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.61% 
East Austria (Austria) 0.53% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.50% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) 0.46% 
North West (Italy) 0.42% 
Centre (Italy) 0.41% 
North East (Italy) 0.40% 
South (Italy) 0.37% 
South (Spain) -0.36% 
North West (Spain) -0.36% 
Attica (Greece) -0.40% 
North East (Spain) -0.43% 
East (Spain) -0.46% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -0.71% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -0.77% 
REU (Rest of Europe) -2.12% 
 
Notes: The 20 greatest % increases or decreases in unskilled labour supply (σL = 10). REU change in 
unskilled labour supply is also included. 
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Table 3.17: Skilled labour migration within the EU27 
 Change in H supply 
Portugal 3.12% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 2.02% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 1.77% 
Attica (Greece) 1.18% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 1.04% 
East (Spain) 0.76% 
Brandenburg (Germany) 0.70% 
Centre (Spain) 0.68% 
North West (Spain) 0.68% 
South (Spain) 0.64% 
North East (Spain) 0.62% 
East Austria (Austria) -0.55% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.57% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.60% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.77% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.85% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) -0.96% 
Île-de-France (France) -1.12% 
REU (Rest of Europe) -1.49% 
Ireland -1.98% 
Luxembourg -2.50% 
 
Notes: The 20 greatest % increases or decreases in skilled labour supply (σH = 10). REU change in 
skilled labour supply is also included. 
 
 
 
The only notable exception is the Rest of Europe (REU), which is characterised 
by unskilled/skilled labour emigration (-2.12% and -1.49%) while in the perfect 
competition case, the REU was characterised by unskilled/skilled labour 
immigration.   
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As explained in the second chapter, welfare analysis cannot be carried out at the 
macro-area level. Therefore, I use a Laspeyres index to evaluate the % change in the 
overall value added at the NUTS 1 level. Tables 3.18, 3.19 and 3.20 display value 
added changes corresponding to the three different scenarios about labour mobility.    
 
 
Table 3.18: The 20 greatest % value added increases or decreases within the EU15 
 Change 
Ireland 0.44% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 0.31% 
Attica (Greece) 0.06% 
Mecklenburg-Vor. (Germany) 0.05% 
Portugal 0.04% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 0.03% 
East (Spain) 0.03% 
North East (Italy) 0.03% 
North East (Spain) 0.02% 
Community of Madrid (Spain) 0.02% 
Flemish Region (Belgium) -0.02% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) -0.02% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.03% 
South Austria (Austria) -0.03% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.03% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.03% 
West Austria (Austria) -0.04% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.04% 
East Austria (Austria) -0.05% 
Luxembourg -0.06% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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Table 3.19: The 20 greatest % value added increases or decreases within the EU15 
 Change 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 3.48% 
Ireland 2.84% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 1.90% 
Portugal 1.35% 
Attica (Greece) 0.94% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 0.82% 
East (Spain) 0.51% 
North East (Spain) 0.40% 
North West (Spain) 0.26% 
Flemish Region (Belgium) -0.30% 
Greater London (United Kingdom) -0.30% 
Denmark -0.33% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.35% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.42% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) -0.47% 
East Austria (Austria) -0.51% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.54% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.70% 
Île-de-France (France) -1.14% 
Luxembourg -2.17% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 region within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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Table 3.20: The 20 greatest % value added increases or decreases within the EU27 
 Change 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 3.60% 
Ireland 2.27% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 1.96% 
Portugal 1.50% 
Attica (Greece) 0.98% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 0.84% 
East (Spain) 0.55% 
North East (Spain) 0.44% 
North West (Spain) 0.32% 
Brandenburg (Germany) 0.31% 
South (Spain) 0.29% 
North Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.29% 
Greater London (United Kingdom) -0.30% 
East Austria (Austria) -0.31% 
East Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.36% 
Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium) -0.45% 
South Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.46% 
West Netherlands (Netherlands) -0.66% 
Île-de-France (France) -1.20% 
Luxembourg -2.13% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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The changes are small in the first scenario (labour immobility) but not negligible 
in the second and third ones (labour mobility within the EU15 and the EU27). The 
NUTS 1 regions, characterised by a stronger production reallocation, are the ones 
which experience the most important gains from trade policy reform in terms of 
increase of value added (Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti, Kentriki Ellada, Ireland, Portugal) and 
the most important losses from trade policy reform in terms of decrease of value 
added (West Netherlands, Île-de-France and Luxembourg). Also here, the outcomes 
are close to those illustrated in the model with perfect competition. 
The changes in the trade patterns, i.e. the change in the sectoral imports and 
exports at the macro-area level, are set out in Tables 3.21, 3.22 and 3.23 for the three 
different scenarios. 
 
Table 3.21: % Trade pattern change in volume at the macro-area level 
  ROW EU15 REU 
AGM ROW 53.67% 19.11% 14.62% 
AGM EU15 30.91% -5.25% 38.73% 
AGM REU 44.39% 19.42% 18.75% 
PRM ROW -0.12% -0.09% 0.00% 
PRM EU15 -0.23% -0.19% -0.12% 
PRM REU 0.72% 0.69% 0.78% 
IND ROW -0.08% 0.19% -0.57% 
IND EU15 -0.39% -0.12% -0.86% 
IND REU 0.75% 1.02% 0.23% 
SERV ROW -0.23% -1.09% 2.74% 
SERV EU15 1.09% 0.22% 4.12% 
SERV REU -4.70% -5.52% -1.83% 
  
Notes: The second column shows the exporting macro-area, the first row the importing macro-area. 
Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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Table 3.22: % Trade pattern change in volume at the macro-area level 
  ROW EU15 REU 
AGM ROW 53.66% 19.59% 14.61% 
AGM EU15 30.77% -4.98% 38.57% 
AGM REU 44.41% 19.93% 18.77% 
PRM ROW -0.13% 0.54% -0.04% 
PRM EU15 -0.83% -0.17% -0.75% 
PRM REU 0.76% 1.39% 0.81% 
IND ROW -0.11% 0.22% -0.68% 
IND EU15 -0.18% 0.17% -0.73% 
IND REU 0.76% 1.09% 0.16% 
SERV ROW -0.23% -1.03% 2.80% 
SERV EU15 1.08% 0.28% 4.16% 
SERV REU -4.78% -5.54% -1.86% 
  
Notes: The second column shows the exporting macro-area, the first row the importing macro-area. 
Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
Table 3.23: % Trade pattern change in volume at the macro-area level 
  ROW EU15 REU 
AGM ROW 53.67% 19.57% 13.26% 
AGM EU15 30.79% -4.98% 36.96% 
AGM REU 44.72% 20.16% 17.61% 
PRM ROW -0.12% 0.50% -1.32% 
PRM EU15 -0.85% -0.22% -2.04% 
PRM REU 1.64% 2.21% 0.36% 
IND ROW -0.10% 0.26% -1.13% 
IND EU15 -0.17% 0.21% -1.20% 
IND REU -0.22% 0.13% -1.28% 
SERV ROW -0.23% -0.99% 2.10% 
SERV EU15 1.09% 0.32% 3.46% 
SERV REU -5.23% -5.96% -2.99% 
  
Notes: The second column shows the exporting macro-area, the first row the importing macro-area. 
Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe (REU) 
within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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As in the perfect competition case (see Tables 2.25, 2.26 and 2.27 for a 
comparison), the greatest variations occur in the AGM sector. However, unlike the 
perfect competition case, the changes in imports are not negligible also in the other 
sectors at the macro-area level. For example, the REU macro-areas decreases its 
exports toward the EU15 and ROW by more than 4% in the SERV sector. In 
contrast, the EU15 macro-area increases its exports toward the REU and ROW by 
more than 1% in the same sector. Therefore, the term of trade effect, which is driven 
by the change in the demand at the macro-area level after the agricultural 
liberalization, is of benefit to the EU15 and is to the detriment of the REU.       
Finally, welfare analysis is carried out at the macro-area level. Table 3.24 lays out 
the welfare gains measured in EV $ million under the three different labour market 
scenarios.  
 
 
Table 3.24: Equivalent variation at the macro-area level 
 ROW EU15 REU 
σL =  σH = 0 within EU15 -78925 1289 -6645 
σL =  σH = 10 within EU15 -80526 4286 -6759 
σL =  σH = 10 within EU27 -79522 8055 -11217 
 
Notes: $ million.  
 
 
Under the assumption of unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level 
within the EU15, the ROW loses about $78925 million, REU loses $6645 million 
and EU15 is the only winner because it gains $1289 million. In the second scenario, 
i.e. labour mobility within the EU15, the ROW loses $80526 million, REU loses 
$6759 million and EU15 gains $4286 million. Finally, by assuming an integrated 
labour market within the EU27, the ROW loses $79522 million, REU loses $11217 
million and EU15 gains $8055 million. This picture of the welfare change is very 
different from that obtained in the perfect competition case. In the perfect 
competition case, the shock caused welfare gains, even if very limited, especially if 
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compared to those obtained in other studies (Hertel and Keeney, 2005; Bouet et al., 
2005). In addition, by assuming an integrated labour market within the EU27, the 
REU macro-area was the winner, while the EU15 macro-area was the loser. In the 
imperfect competition case, the outcomes are reversed: the EU15 wins and the REU 
loses. Moreover and significantly, it is possible to note that the tariff liberalization in 
the agricultural sector causes a decrease in the overall welfare at the world level in all 
three labour market scenarios. This is a very striking result but great caution should 
be exercised because the outcomes could depend on the NUTS regional level 
adopted to define the production structure, as already underlined in the second 
chapter. However, in my model the hypothesis about the perfect/imperfect 
competition in the goods market is crucial for analysing the welfare effect of trade 
policy liberalization.  
The welfare analysis is also carried out also by assessing the change in the number 
of varieties (N) at the macro-area level according to the “love of variety” approach of 
Krugman (1979). Tables 3.25, 3.26 and 3.27 confirm the fact that in the Rest of the 
world (ROW) the welfare also decreases in terms of number of varieties in all three 
labour market scenarios.  
Concerning the EU15 and REU, Tables 3.25, 3.26 and 3.27 again show that the 
EU15 is the winning macro-area while the REU is the loser. Indeed, by assuming 
perfect labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level, the number of varieties for the EU15 
decreases by 0.13% in the IND sector but increases by 0.09% in the SERV sector; in 
contrast, the number of varieties for the REU increases by 0.22% in the IND sector 
but exhibits a strong decrease in the SERV sector (-5.59%).  
By assuming labour mobility at the NUTS 1 level, the number of varieties for the 
EU15 increases by 0.11% in the IND sector and by 0.14% in the SERV sector; in 
contrast, the number of varieties for the REU increases by 0.20% in the IND sector 
but continues to exhibit a strong decrease in the SERV sector (-5.70%).  
Assuming an integrated labour market within the EU27 is the worst scenario for 
the REU which experiences a decrease in both the IND and SERV sectors (-0.79% 
and -6.43%); in contrast, the EU15 shows increases in both the IND and SERV 
sectors (0.12% and 0.17).  
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These outcomes are consistent with the effects of trade policy liberalization on the 
trade patterns and welfare measured in terms of equivalent variation. 
It is possible to conclude that the distance between the first best solution (perfect 
competition) and a second best solution (imperfect competition) is appreciable in 
terms of welfare, while the results for the production reallocation at the NUTS level 
do not seem very different between perfect and imperfect competition.             
 
 
 
Table 3.25: % Change in the number of varieties (N) at the macro-area level 
 ROW EU15 REU 
IND -0.05% -0.13% 0.22% 
SERV -1.15% 0.09% -5.59% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
 
 
Table 3.26: % Change in the number of varieties (N) at the macro-area level 
 ROW EU15 REU 
IND -0.07% 0.11% 0.20% 
SERV -1.17% 0.14% -5.70% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
Table 3.27: % Change in the number of varieties (N) at the macro-area level 
 ROW EU15 REU 
IND -0.06% 0.12% -0.79% 
SERV -1.15% 0.17% -6.43% 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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3.5 Interpretation of the results 
 
The previous section shows that imperfect competition influences the welfare 
analysis and the production reallocation across sectors at the macro-area level. At 
first glance, the results at the NUTS 1 level do not differ very much between 
imperfect competition and perfect competition. 
In this section an in-depth comparison is carried out to verify if the production 
reallocation at the NUTS 1 level does not change much using the perfect or imperfect 
competition scheme.  
Tables 3.28, 3.29 and 3.30 display the ten greatest % decreases or increases in 
production at the NUTS 1 level for the AGM, IND and SERV sectors in the two 
schemes (perfect and imperfect competition) under the assumption of perfect labour 
immobility at the NUTS 1 level. The NUTS 1 regions and the associated production 
changes, which match each other, are reported in bold. 
 
 
Table 3.28: The ten greatest % production decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 level 
in the model with perfect competition (pc) and imperfect competition (ic)  
 AGM (pc)  AGM (ic) 
South Austria (Austria) -2.47% South Austria (Austria) -2.68% 
Ireland -2.15% Ireland -2.31% 
West Austria (Austria) -1.95% West Austria (Austria) -2.13% 
East Austria (Austria) -1.74% East Austria (Austria) -1.91% 
Portugal -1.47% Portugal -1.71% 
Attica (Greece) -1.44% Attica (Greece) -1.67% 
Mecklenburg-Vo. (Germany) -1.19% Mecklenburg-Vo. (Germany) -1.33% 
Northern Ireland -1.10% Voreia Ellada (Greece) -1.28% 
Luxembourg -1.10% Northern Ireland (UK) -1.26% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -1.10% South (Italy) -1.26% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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Table 3.29: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the 
NUTS 1 level in the model with perfect (pc) and imperfect competition (ic)  
 IND (pc)  IND (ic) 
Ireland 7.02% Ireland 6.91% 
South Austria (Austria) 2.99% South Austria (Austria) 2.97% 
East Austria (Austria) 2.40% East Austria (Austria) 2.12% 
Mecklenburg-Vo. (Germany) 2.10% Mecklenburg-Vo. (Germany) 1.93% 
Brussels-Cap. Reg. (Belgium) 1.94% Brussels-Cap. Reg. (Belgium) 1.61% 
West Austria (Austria) 1.55% West Austria (Austria) 1.42% 
Luxembourg 1.06% Community of Madrid (Spain) -1.34% 
Community of Madrid (Spain) -1.15% Attica (Greece) -1.53% 
Attica (Greece) -1.38% Åland (Finland) -1.86% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -7.62% Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -8.62% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
 
 
 
Table 3.30: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the 
NUTS 1 level in the model with perfect (pc) and imperfect competition (ic)  
 SERV (pc)  SERV (ic) 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 1.62% Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 8.73% 
Attica (Greece) 0.47% Bremen (Germany) 5.58% 
Portugal 0.47% Saarland (Germany) 4.83% 
East (Spain) 0.43% Luxembourg 4.43% 
North East (Spain) 0.39% Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 4.14% 
Mecklenburg-Vo. (Germany) -0.50% North Nether. (Netherlands) 2.99% 
East Austria (Austria) -0.59% Northern Ireland (UK) 2.89% 
West Austria (Austria) -0.63% Voreia Ellada (Greece) 2.70% 
South Austria (Austria) -1.15% Thuringia (Germany) 2.63% 
Ireland -2.31% Ireland -1.26% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour immobility at the NUTS 1 level within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 0). 
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In the agricultural sector and manufactures nine regions out of ten match each 
other. In services only two regions out of ten match each other; however, they are the 
NUTS 1 regions which exhibit the greatest decrease and the greatest increase. In 
addition, in the SERV sector the sign of the production change is always positive 
with the imperfect competition scheme except for Ireland. In contrast, the sign is 
equally positive and negative with the perfect competition scheme. An unexpected 
result is the increase in the SERV sector of Northern Ireland, which has a value of 
the key parameter α(ind/serv), i.e. the sectoral difference between the ratios of the 
unskilled labour intensity to the skilled labour intensity in the IND and SERV 
sectors, which is among the ten lowest values of this parameter (see Tables 2.34 and 
2.36). As reported in section 2.8, further channels, in addition to the sectoral 
difference between the ratios of the unskilled labour intensity to the skilled labour 
intensity, are likely to work in determining the sign in the IND and SERV sectors. It 
is interesting to note that the increase in the SERV sector for the Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti 
jumps from 1.62% in the perfect competition to 8.73% in the imperfect competition 
while the decrease in the same sector for Ireland falls from -2.31% to -1.26% (see 
Table 3.30). 
Tables 3.31, 3.32 and 3.33 display the ten greatest decreases or increases of 
production at the NUTS 1 level for the AGM, IND and SERV sectors in the two 
schemes (perfect and imperfect competition) under the assumption of labour mobility 
across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15. The NUTS 1 regions and the associated 
production changes, which match each other, are reported in bold. 
In the agricultural sector and services eight regions out of ten match each other 
while in manufactures ten regions out of ten match each other. The increases are 
amplified in the IND and SERV sectors moving from the perfect to the imperfect 
competition scheme. 
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Table 3.31: The ten greatest % production decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 level 
in the model with perfect competition (pc) and imperfect competition (ic)  
 AGM (pc)  AGM (ic) 
South Austria (Austria) -1.72% South Austria (Austria) -1.77% 
West Austria (Austria) -1.43% Ireland -1.64% 
East Austria (Austria) -1.28% West Austria (Austria) -1.50% 
Ireland -1.28% East Austria (Austria) -1.41% 
Portugal -1.27% Portugal -1.15% 
Attica (Greece) -1.22% Luxembourg -1.10% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -0.95% Attica (Greece) -1.07% 
Luxembourg -0.94% South (Italy) -0.98% 
South (Italy) -0.91% Brussels-Cap. Reg. (Belgium) -0.96% 
Islands (Italy) -0.82% Île-de-France (France) -0.92% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
Table 3.32: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the 
NUTS 1 level in the model with perfect (pc) and imperfect competition (ic)  
 IND (pc)  IND (ic) 
Ireland 31.40% Ireland 50.86% 
Luxembourg 23.33% Luxembourg 33.95% 
Brussels Ca. Reg. (Belgium) 17.87% Brussels-Ca. Reg. (Belgium) 27.75% 
West Nether. (Netherlands) 11.23% East Austria (Austria) 16.68% 
East Austria (Austria) 11.19% West Nether. (Netherlands) 16.41% 
Île-de-France (France) 10.93% Île-de-France (France) 15.53% 
Portugal -9.51% Portugal -14.88% 
Attica (Greece) -10.24% Attica (Greece) -16.04% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -21.04% Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -34.83% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -90.00% Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -89.99% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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Table 3.33: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the 
NUTS 1 level in the model with perfect (pc) and imperfect competition (ic)  
 SERV (pc)  SERV (ic) 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 18.64% Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 26.88% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 7.53% Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 16.63% 
Portugal 5.61% Portugal 9.52% 
Attica (Greece) 3.56% Voreia Ellada (Greece) 8.44% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 3.41% Attica (Greece) 7.30% 
East (Spain) 3.25% Bremen (Germany) 6.24% 
North East (Spain) 2.99% East Austria (Austria) -3.68% 
East Austria (Austria) -3.19% Île-de-France (France) -3.78% 
Luxembourg -6.06% Luxembourg -4.52% 
Ireland -11.09% Ireland -17.11% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility across the NUTS 1 regions within the EU15 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
Finally, Tables 3.34, 3.35 and 3.36 display the ten greatest % decreases or 
increases of production at the NUTS 1 level for the AGM, IND and SERV sectors in 
the two schemes (perfect and imperfect competition) under the assumption of labour 
mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and REU within the EU27. The NUTS 
1 regions and the associated production changes, which match each other, are 
reported in bold. 
In the agricultural sector eight regions out of ten match each other, in 
manufactures nine regions out of ten match each other and in services seven regions 
out of ten match each other. As in the labour mobility scenario within the EU15, the 
increases are amplified in the IND and SERV sectors moving from the perfect to the 
imperfect competition scheme. An unexpected result is the increase in the SERV 
sector of Brandenburg, which has a value of the key parameter α(ind/serv), i.e. the 
sectoral difference between the ratios of the unskilled labour intensity to the skilled 
labour intensity in the IND and SERV sectors, which is  among the ten lowest values 
of this parameter (see Table 2.34 and 2.36). 
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Table 3.34: The ten greatest % production decreases in volume at the NUTS 1 level 
in the model with perfect competition (pc) and imperfect competition (ic)  
 AGM (pc)  AGM (ic) 
South Austria (Austria) -1.74% South Austria (Austria) -1.60% 
West Austria (Austria) -1.44% Ireland -1.47% 
Ireland -1.30% West Austria (Austria) -1.41% 
East Austria (Austria) -1.29% East Austria (Austria) -1.33% 
Portugal -1.27% Portugal -1.19% 
Attica (Greece) -1.22% Luxembourg -1.12% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) -0.94% Attica (Greece) -1.08% 
Luxembourg -0.94% South (Italy) -1.01% 
South (Italy) -0.91% Île-de-France (France) -0.95% 
Islands (Italy) -0.81% Brussels-Cap. Reg. (Belgium) -0.95% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
Table 3.35: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the 
NUTS 1 level in the model with perfect (pc) and imperfect competition (ic)  
 IND (pc)  IND (ic) 
Ireland 32.84% Ireland 40.40% 
Luxembourg 23.34% Luxembourg 34.98% 
Brussels Cap. Reg. (Belgium) 18.23% Brussels-Cap. Reg. (Belgium) 25.67% 
East Austria (Austria) 11.67% Île-de-France (France) 17.25% 
West Nether. (Netherlands) 11.24% West Nether. (Netherlands) 16.91% 
Île-de-France (France) 10.79% Portugal -14.09% 
Portugal -9.65% Attica (Greece) -14.66% 
Attica (Greece) -10.46% Brandenburg (Germany) -14.84% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -21.28% Kentriki Ellada (Greece) -33.76% 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -95.00% Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) -89.99% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
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Table 3.33: The ten greatest % production increases or decreases in volume at the 
NUTS 1 level in the model with perfect (pc) and imperfect competition (ic)  
 SERV (pc)  SERV (ic) 
Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 19.64% Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti (Greece) 26.95% 
Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 7.60% Kentriki Ellada (Greece) 16.37% 
Portugal 5.65% Portugal 9.40% 
Attica (Greece) 3.61% Voreia Ellada (Greece) 7.93% 
Voreia Ellada (Greece) 3.48% Attica (Greece) 6.96% 
East (Spain) 3.29% Brandenburg (Germany) 6.79% 
South Nether. (Netherlands) -3.05% West Nether. (Netherlands) -3.00% 
East Austria (Austria) -3.34% Île-de-France (France) -4.14% 
Luxembourg -6.08% Luxembourg -4.71% 
Ireland -11.60% Ireland -13.36% 
 
Notes: Unskilled/skilled labour mobility between the NUTS 1 regions (EU15) and the Rest of Europe 
(REU) within the EU27 (σL =  σH = 10). 
 
 
It can be said that the production outcomes at the NUTS level do not differ greatly  
between perfect and imperfect competition. In addition, the introduction of the labour 
mobility improves the likeness of the results between the two schemes. 
The reason, which can explain the likeness of the NUTS results and the difference 
of the results at the macro-area level between the perfect and imperfect competition 
cases, is that the demand is specified at the macro-area level (EU15 as a whole). As a 
result, the aggregate demand effect of the shock is shared across all the NUTS 1 
regions according to their technology, i.e. the intensity by which the NUTS 1 regions 
use the input factors (especially the skilled and unskilled factors as explained through 
the stylised model). These intensities do not change between perfect and imperfect 
competition. Therefore, the aggregate demand effect of the shock, which in contrast 
changes between perfect and imperfect competition, is shared across the NUTS 1 
regions in the same way. Thus, the interpretation, which was given in the second 
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chapter based on the sectoral difference between the ratios of the unskilled labour 
intensity to the skilled labour intensity, remains valid.  
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Conclusions 
 
The aim of this work was to build a global CGE model at the NUTS 1 level for 
trade policy evaluation. The model was applied to the 68 NUTS 1 regions in the 
EU15 mainly to assess the production reallocation across sectors in each NUTS 1 
region after a world tariff liberalization in agriculture. Nevertheless, it can also be 
used to simulate other trade policy reforms according to the special interest of the 
researcher. Special attention is given to the economic interpretation of the trade 
policy effects. Indeed, a weak link of the CGE approach is the poor economic 
interpretation of the results.  
The results at the NUTS 1 level are the following. The tariff liberalization in 
agriculture has a strong effect in the Austrian regions (East, West and South), Ireland 
and Portugal in the AGM sector. However, all the NUTS 1 regions decrease 
production in this sector. In the IND and SERV sectors it is possible to note inverse 
patterns of production at the NUTS 1 level. Indeed, Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti, Attica and 
Portugal show the greatest decreases in the IND sector while Ireland, East Austria 
and Luxembourg experience the greatest increase in this sector. In contrast, Nisia 
Aigaiou-Kriti, Attica and Portugal exhibit the greatest increases in the SERV sector 
while Ireland, East Austria and Luxembourg show the greatest decrease in this 
sector.  
The stylised model allows the key parameter to be determined for interpreting the 
results. This parameter is the sectoral difference between the ratios of unskilled 
labour intensity to skilled labour intensity. Indeed, skilled labour and unskilled 
labour can be considered as the source of the heterogeneity across the NUTS 1 
regions. To summarize, trade policy strikes the AGM sector and causes a production 
decrease in the AGM sector for all the NUTS 1 regions. The NUTS 1 regions, which 
use unskilled labour in the AGM sector and skilled labour in the IND and SERV 
sectors more intensively with respect to the other NUTS 1 regions, are the regions 
most affected in the AGM sector. The decrease in the AGM production, in turn, 
determines a production reallocation and reduces the labour demand for unskilled 
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labour. As a result, in general the unskilled factor loses (the wage goes down) and the 
skilled factor wins (the wage goes up). However, in the NUTS 1 regions which use 
the unskilled labour in the IND sector and the skilled labour in the SERV sector more 
intensively, the IND production decreases and SERV production increases. In 
contrast, in the NUTS 1 regions, which use the unskilled and skilled factors in the 
IND and SERV sectors by similar intensities, the IND production goes up and the 
SERV production goes down. 
The introduction of the labour mobility within the EU15 and the EU27 causes 
amplification effects for the NUTS 1 regions which experienced strong increases or 
decreases in the IND and SERV sectors under the assumption of perfect immobility 
at the NUTS 1 level. In general, this hypothesis has a strong impact on the outcomes 
and determines unrealistic variations of the production in the services and 
manufactures sectors after agricultural liberalization. These results are not intended 
to be realistic but are a guide regarding the relevance of the assumption about labour 
mobility. 
The results at the NUTS 1 level are robust enough between perfect competition 
and imperfect competition. A possible explanation is that the demand is specified at 
the macro-area level (EU15 as a whole). As a result, the aggregate demand effect of 
the shock is shared across all the NUTS 1 regions according to their technology, i.e. 
the intensity by which the NUTS 1 regions use the input factors (especially the 
skilled and unskilled factors). These intensities do not change moving from perfect to 
imperfect competition.  
In contrast, the results at the macro-area level change greatly. Imperfect 
competition influences inter-industry production reallocation and welfare at the 
macro-area level.  
Concerning the welfare analysis, very limited gains are obtained from trade 
liberalization with the perfect competition scheme. The welfare change is measured 
in terms of equivalent variation. The world gains are light under all three labour 
mobility scenarios, especially if compared to those observed in other studies (Hertel 
and Keeney, 2005; Bouet et al., 2005).  In the third scenario, the integrated labour 
market within the EU27, the EU15 loses and the Rest of Europe (REU) wins. 
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With the imperfect competition the tariff liberalization in the agricultural sector 
causes a decrease in the overall welfare at the world level in all three labour market 
scenarios. This is a very striking result but great caution should be exercised because 
the outcomes could depend on the NUTS regional level adopted to define the 
production structure. Only the EU15 benefits from agricultural liberalization. 
Concerning the integrated labour market within the EU27, it can be noted that there 
is an opposite outcome with respect the perfect competition scheme; indeed in this 
case the EU15 wins and REU loses.    
In the imperfect competition framework the welfare analysis can also be carried 
out by assessing the change in the number of varieties at the macro-area level 
according to the “love of variety” approach of Krugman (1979). This analysis 
confirms the fact that in the Rest of the world (ROW) the welfare also decreases in 
terms of number of varieties in all three labour market scenarios. Concerning the 
EU15 and REU, the EU15 is again the winner while the REU is the loser.  
To summarize, the distance between the first best solution (perfect competition) 
and a second best solution (imperfect competition), modelled by the Cournot-Nash 
scheme, is appreciable in terms of welfare at the macro-area level, while the results 
for the production reallocation at the NUTS level are not very different between the 
two schemes. 
Let us now move on to a description of the possible extensions for further 
research. 
The focus of this model is on the production side. I concentrated my attention on 
the skilled and unskilled factors at the NUTS 1 level because of data constraints. 
Nevertheless other factors can be considered or added in order to make the analysis 
more complete. 
Another issues is the welfare analysis. The policy maker is probably also 
interested in assessing the welfare change at the NUTS 1 level after a trade 
liberalization. This implies the introduction of a representative household in each 
NUTS 1 region, as in the approach of Jean and Laborde (2004). This, in turn, 
requires much more data, for example, on consumption, income and savings at the 
regional level. However, the lack of well suited data to model the trade flows across 
 156 
the NUTS regions and between the NUTS regions and the other parts of the world 
remains a serious constraint. Simplifying assumption must be made. 
A more detailed regional level (NUTS 2 or NUTS 3) could be developed even if 
the computational tractability of the model should be verified.        
   In this model an agricultural tariff liberalization was implemented but only the 
agricultural market access at the world level was analysed. I made this choice to 
preserve the simplicity of the model in order to better understand its economic results 
and to make the most of the MAcMap database, which was expressly created for the 
computable general equilibrium analysis. However, the protection of agriculture is 
very tricky, especially in the European Union, where the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) plays an important role. Therefore, it could be interesting to study the 
interactions between the market access liberalization with the other pillars of trade 
protection in agriculture: export subsidies, domestic support and quotas. 
A more technical development of the model concerns the elasticity value of 
migration in the CET functions within Europe. As noted, a high labour mobility 
within Europe implies unrealistic production reallocation between the IND and 
SERV sectors. Common sense would suggest an elasticity value closer to zero than 
to ten. However, an econometric analysis would help to give a greater robustness to 
the model. In addition, the econometric analysis should distinguish between 
unskilled labour mobility and skilled labour mobility. 
Other weak links of the CGE trade models, such as GTAP and MIRAGE, is the 
full employment of the factors (especially labour) and the exogenus aggregate 
productivity. An attempt to incorporate endogenous unemployment and productivity 
in the model would be praiseworthy. The Melitz model (2003) allows for the 
endogenous determination of aggregate productivity. As shown, two applications of 
the Melitz assumption to CGE trade models exist: Balistreri, Hillberry and 
Rutherford (2007) and Zhai (2008). However, inserting these two variables at the 
NUTS 1 level is a very difficult task in terms of data requirements and computational 
resources. 
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Appendix 1: notation 
 
i and j denote the sector ( i j≠ ) 
nut and nut* denote the NUTS 1 regions ( *nut nut≠ ) 
mac and mac* denote the macro-areas ( *mac mac≠ ) 
 
 
Appendix 2: list of variables 
 
Demand 
DEMTOTi,mac  Total demand 
PDEMTOTi,mac   Price of total demand 
PYi,mac    Marginal cost 
BUDCmac   Budget allocated to consumption  
UTmac         Utility 
PUTmac         Price of utility  
Ci,mac         Consumption  
PCi,mac         Price of consumption 
KGi,mac                Capital goods 
PKGi,mac             Price of capital goods 
Di,mac                  Domestic demand  
PDi,mac                Price of domestic good  
Mi,mac                  Aggregate imports 
PMi,mac          Price of aggregate imports 
DEMi,mac,mac*   Demand in macro-area mac* of good i produced in mac 
PDEMi,mac,mac*   Price in macro-area mac* of good i produced in mac 
PINIi,j,mac       Price of intermediate inputs in macro-area mac produced 
    in sector i  and sold to sector j 
DVARi,mac    Domestic demand for variety produced in macro-area mac 
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PDVARi,mac   Price of variety produced in mac and sold in mac 
DEMVARi,mac,mac*   Demand in macro-area mac* for variety produced in mac 
PDEMVARi,mac,mac* Price of variety produced in mac and sold in mac* 
EPDi,mac    Perceived price elasticity in market mac for domestic variety  
EPi,mac,mac*  Perceived price elasticity in macro-area mac* for variety 
  produced in mac   
SDTi,mac    Share of domestic demand over total demand in mac 
SMi,mac,mac*   Share of imports in macro-area mac* of good i produced in  
    mac over total imports of mac*
 
STi,mac,mac*    Share of imports in macro-area mac* of good i produced in  
    mac over total demand of mac*
 
 
Production 
VAi,nut    Value added 
PVAi,nut    Price of valued added  
AINIi,nut      Aggregate intermediate inputs 
PAINIi,nut    Price of aggregate intermediate inputs 
INIi,nut,nut*    Intermediate inputs 
Li,nut     Unskilled labour demand 
PLnut     Price of unskilled labour 
TEi,nut    Land demand 
PTEi,nut     Price of land 
RNi,nut     Natural resources demand 
PRNi,nut    Price of natural resources 
Qi,nut    Fictive factor demand  
PQi,nut    Price of fictive factor 
Ki,nut     Capital demand 
PKmac    Price of capital in macro-area mac 
Hi,nut    Skilled labour demand 
PHnut    Price of skilled labour 
Ni,nut    Number of varieties  
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Factor markets  
HSUPnut    Skilled labour supply 
LSUPnut     Unskilled labour supply 
 
Macro-economic closure  
INVmac     Investment 
PINVmac     Price of investment 
REVmac    Income 
 
 
Appendix 3: list of parameters 
 
Demand 
αCi,mac   Coefficient of consumption in LES-CES function  
αKGi,mac     Coefficient of capital goods in CES function 
αDi,mac     Coefficient of domestic good in CES Armington  function 
αMi,mac    Coefficient of aggregate imports good in CES Arm. function 
αIMPi,mac,mac*          Coefficient of imports from mac to mac* in CES imp. function 
ATRi,mac,mac*     Ad valorem tariff rate applied by mac* and paid by mac 
Cσ     Elasticity of substitution of consumption  
KGσ     Elasticity of substitution of capital goods  
INIσ     Elasticity of substitution of intermediate inputs  
iARM
σ    Armington elasticity of substitution 
iIMP
σ    Elasticity of substitution across imports  
iVAR
σ     Elasticity of substitution across varieties 
cmini,mac    Minimum consumption in LES-CES function  
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Production 
αVAi,nut   Coefficient of value added in Leontief function 
αAINIi,nut   Coef. of aggregate intermediate input in Leontief function 
αINIi,j,nut   Coef. of intermediate input in aggr. interm. input CES function 
αLi,nut    Coef. of unskilled labour in valued added CES function 
αTEi,nut    Coef. of land in valued added CES function 
αRNi,nut   Coef. of natural resources in valued added CES function 
αQi,nut   Coef. of fictive factor in valued added CES function 
αKi,nut    Coef. of capital in fictive factor CES function 
αHi,nut   Coef. of skilled labour in fictive factor CES function 
VAσ    Elasticity of substitution across primary inputs 
CAPσ    Elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labour 
fci,nut   Fixed cost in imperfect competition scheme 
 
Factor markets  
αLSnut    Coef. of unskilled labour in unsk. labour supply CET function 
αHSnut   Coef. of skilled labour in skilled labour supply CET function 
Lσ     Elasticity of migration in unsk. labour supply CET function 
Hσ    Elasticity of migration in skilled labour supply CET function 
KSUPmac   Capital supply at macro-area level 
HTOTSUPmac  Skilled labour supply at macro-area level 
LTOTSUPmac   Unskilled labour supply at macro-area level 
RNSUPi,nut   Natuaral resources supply at NUTS level 
TESUPnut   Land supply at NUTS level 
HTOTSUPEU27  Skilled labour supply at macro-area level in the EU27 
LTOTSUPEU27   Unskilled labour supply at macro-area level in the EU27 
 
Macro-economic closure  
savmac    Exogenous saving rate 
BALmac    Current account balance surplus 
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Appendix 4: list of equations 
 
Equilibrium in the goods market (perfect competition): 
   
 
, , , , *
*
i nut i mac i mac mac
nut mac mac mac
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Equilibrium in the goods market (imperfect competition): 
 
 
, , , , *
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Demand 
Total demand: 
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nut mac j
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LES-CES constraint for consumption: 
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Budget allocated to consumption: 
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CES constraint for capital goods: 
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Armington CES function: 
  
 
, , , , , ,
1 1/ 1 1/ 1 1/
, , , , ,
min
. .   
ARM ARM ARMi i i
i mac i mac i mac i mac i mac i mac
i c i mac i mac i mac i mac
PDEMTOT DEMTOT PD D PM M
s t DEMTOT D D M M
σ σ σ
α α
− − −
= +
= +
 (A.7) 
 
CES imports function: 
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Varieties (imperfect competition): 
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Mark-ups (imperfect competition): 
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Market-shares (imperfect competition): 
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Price of domestic good (perfect competition): 
 
 
, ,i mac i macPD PY=  (A.16) 
 
Price of variety produced in mac and sold in mac (imperfect competition): 
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Price in macro-area mac* of good i produced in mac (perfect competition): 
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Price of variety produced in mac and sold in mac* (imperfect competition): 
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Production 
Leontief technology (perfect competition): 
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Leontief technology (imperfect competition): 
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CES value added technology: 
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CES fictive factor technology: 
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CES technology of aggregate intermediate input: 
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Zero profit condition to determine the number of varieties at the NUTS level: 
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Equilibrium in the factor markets: 
Equilibrium in the capital market:  
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Equilibrium in the land market: 
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Equilibrium in the natural resources market: 
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Unskilled labour supply (CET function): 
 
 
L
L
nut nut
nut mac
nut nut
nut mac
LS PLLSUP LTOTSUP
LS PL
σ
σ
α
α
∈
=
∑
 (A.29) 
 
Equilibrium in the unskilled labour market: 
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Skilled labour supply (CET function): 
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Equilibrium in the skilled labour market: 
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Unskilled labour supply in the integrated labour market within the EU27 (CET 
function): 
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Skilled labour supply in the integrated labour market within the EU27 (CET 
function): 
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Macro-economic closure 
Investment: 
 
 mac mac mac macREV sav PINV INV=  (A.35) 
 
Income of the macro-area: 
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